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... And lead us not into temptation, But deliver us from evil.'
Where... were the outside accountants and attorneys when these transactions
were effectuated? What is difficult to understand is that with all the profes-
sional talent involved.., why at least one professional would not have blown
the whistle to stop the overreaching that took place in this case 2
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a disturbing number of well-respected lawyers in large
established firms have been caught stealing large amounts of money from their
clients and their partners by padding, manipulating and fabricating time sheets
and expense vouchers.3 Some have gone to prison, been disbarred, and/or been
fired.4 Others have escaped prosecution or discipline.5 It used to be that lawyers
inclined to steal from their clients wrote checks to themselves from their client
trust accounts without client authorization and without having earned the money.
Trust account fraud still occurs, but in recent years, theft from clients and from
partners through billing and expense fraud has become more common and more
pervasive.
Billing fraud takes many different forms. Here are some examples:
" Some lawyers are just sloppy about keeping time records.
" Some systematically "pad" timesheets, or bill one client for work done for
another.
* Some create entirely fictitious timesheets.
* Some record hours based on work done by other lawyers, paralegals or
secretaries, representing that they did the work. This may result in nonbillable
time being billed, or in work being billed at a rate higher than that of the person
who actually did the work.
* Some lawyers bill for time that their clients might not regard as legitimately
billable-for schmoozing with other lawyers, chatting with clients about sports
or families, for doing administrative work that could be done by a non-lawyer,
or for thinking about a case while mowing the lawn or watching television.
The methods of expense fraud are equally diverse; the lawyers who engage in
expense fraud may be stealing from their clients or their partners or both.
; Some lawyers represent personal expenses to be business expenses. Some
limit themselves to requesting reimbursement for personal expenses that have a
"nexus" to the work, such as a daily massage while in litigation, or buying a
new suit while on travel. Others bill clients for extravagant gifts and vacations
regardless of whether there is a work nexus.
* Some "doctor" receipts for legitimate expenses to increase the amounts
claimed, or manufacture receipts for expenses that were not in fact incurred.
* Some lawyers - being "fair" to their clients, represent legitimately billable
time as reimbursable expenses, so that the payment of that amount from the
client goes directly to the lawyer as reimbursement rather than being paid to the
firm as a fee. Since this income to the lawyer is represented as reimbursement
3. See infra section I-A.
4. See infra sections VII, IX.
5. See id.
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of expenses, it is unlikely to be reported as income, so this maneuver also may
involve tax fraud.
Billing fraud is far more difficult to detect than expense fraud, unless the
lawyer is reckless enough to bill more than twenty-four hours per day. But
regulation of this type of conduct is very difficult because no one except the
lawyer really knows how much time was spent and how much was billed.
Because this arena involves such a wide degree of personal discretion, those
tempted to cheat may perceive, quite accurately, that the odds of apprehension are
close to zero. Nevertheless, some lawyers are being investigated, disciplined, and
prosecuted, so the problem is beginning to surface and a body of law on billing
fraud is developing.
This study of these recent cases of billing and expense fraud confirms the
views of David Wilkins, Ted Schneyer, and many other scholars that the
disciplinary system performs only one of several needed regulatory functions.6
The cases demonstrate the need for public and private regulatory responses that
not only receive and investigate complaints, but also provide education, preven-
tion, proactive monitoring, and remediation. Lawyers who engage in billing and
expense fraud should be fired, disbarred, prosecuted on criminal charges, sued for
malpractice. If the public and private organizations that can attend to this problem
take it seriously, the norms in the legal profession might shift to require that
lawyers be candid and truthful in billing clients.
A. SIXTEEN CASES
I undertook the research for this article because in recent years, I periodically
noticed reports of cases of elite lawyers who had gone to jail, been disbarred, or
been investigated for stealing by billing and expense fraud. I had not previously
seen such reports of prosecution or disbarment of senior partners in major law
firms. In my research, I sought to identify as many cases as possible involving
billing or expense fraud involving prominent lawyers and large amounts of
money. I found almost no cases of this sort prior to 1989 (and none involving
6. See generally David Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers, 105 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1992) (reporting
that during the 1980s new systems developed for regulation of lawyers beyond the bar disciplinary agencies,
and urging that this multi-faceted regulatory system is useful and necessary to an independent legal profession);
Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 COPNELL L. REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Schneyer,
Professional Discipline] (urging expansion of the jurisdiction of disciplinary agencies to allow discipline of law
firms as well as individual lawyers); Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law
Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209 (1996); Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial
Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71 (1996); Rhode, Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W.L. REv.
665 (1994) (urging that the "fuller realization of professional ideals" will require changes in regulatory
structures, such as admissions, discipline and judicial oversight, market initiatives to increase competition
among lawyers, and educational initiatives in law schools, law firms, and bar associations); Susan P. Koniak,
The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389 (1992); Deborah L. Rhode, The Rhetoric of
Professional Reform, 45 MD. L. REV. 274 (1986) (identifying the dangers posed by self-regulation through the
disciplinary system, and urging the need for expansion of regulatory structures that govern lawyers).
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lawyers at "elite" firms (large firms or spin-offs from large firms), and after 1989
I found thirty-six such cases.7 I had hoped to find some earlier cases so that I
could track the development of the problem or the enforcement efforts. Instead it
was as if I had stepped through a looking glass. On one side, the problem appears
not to exist. On the other, there is a striking pattern of cases. I suggest that this
type of misconduct occurred before 1989, but that in the late 1980s the incidence
and/or prosecution of billing and expense fraud increased.8
From the thirty-six, I selected sixteen cases for more intensive study.9 These
sixteen cases involve lawyers who came from privileged backgrounds, attended
elite schools, and have been mentored and trained at some of the most respected
law firms in the United States. Some of the cases on the "B" list involved proven
theft below $100,000,1o lawyers at smaller firms, or associates at large firms. To
be eligible for a place on the short list a lawyer must have:
- been a managing partner, a member of the executive committee or a
rainmaker at a large, respected law firm or a spin-off from such a firm; "
- been publicly accused of stealing over $100,000 from clients or from his or
her law firm by fraudulent representations as to hours worked or expenses
incurred;
- been jailed and/or disbarred for billing or expense fraud.1 2
These lawyers engaged in patterns of fraud that went on for an average of five
years. Their collective total proven or admitted theft is about $16 million. These
highly educated successful lawyers were at the pinnacle of the profession. In
7. Thirty-five of the 37 cases occurred or became public during or after 1989. Thomas Schneider's
misconduct occurred in 1981 and was reported prior to 1986. See In Re Schneider, 553 A.2d 206, 206-208 (D.C.
1989). Gary Nothstein's billing fraud occurred between 1980 and 1982, and was reported shortly thereafter.
Nothstein?s case was made public again in 1995, however, when Nothstein committed suicide after changing
his name to Notestein and misrepresenting himself as a recent Georgetown University Law Center graduate in
order to obtain a position as a first-year associate at Shaw, Pittman, Pitts & Trowbridge in Washington, D.C. See
Paul Duggan, Lawyer Used Own Gun, Police Say; Suicide May Have Left Cards to Aid in His ID, WASH. POST,
July 26, 1995, at B3.
8. See infra section II.
9. A table presenting information about the other twenty cases in the sample of thirty-six appears as
Appendix A.
10. For example, Glenn Nadell, who was the head of the tax department at the Chicago law firm of Katten,
Muchin & Zavis, who resigned from the firm in February 1995 after an internal investigation, revealed that he
has billed less than $50,000 in false or inflated expenses to clients over a period of three years. Nadell's partner
Al Muchin commented of the incident: "It's ... silly." Karen Dillon, Katten Partner Resigns after Alleged
Overbilling, Am. LAW., Apr. 1995, at 13.
11. Eleven of the firms are among the 250 largest law firms in the country, according to the Annual Survey of
the Nation's Largest Law Firms, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 30, 1996, at C25. Of the four that are not on this list, one is
defunct and the other three are among the 1,000 largest US firms. The US Business Litigation: 1,000 Largest US
Law Firms, CoRP. LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 1996, at 14.
12. While proceedings are still in progress in a few cases, all of the sixteen lawyers have either been
suspended or disbarred.
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many of the cases it is clear that their partners knew about and/or participated in
the billing fraud. 
1 3
Table 1 introduces the sixteen cases whose comparative study is the central
focus of this article. The table shows what law schools the lawyers attended and
when they graduated,' 4 where they worked when they were discovered to be
engaged in billing and expense fraud, the position of each lawyer when the billing
fraud was discovered, the amounts that were (variously) alleged, admitted, or
proven to have been stolen by the lawyers, the periods of time during which the
misconduct occurred, the prison sentences imposed on those who were pros-
ecuted, and the sanctions that were imposed by lawyer disciplinary agencies.
TABLE 1
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CASES
Name, Law Alleged Prison
School Where Firm Where Amount Sentence
Lawyer Misconduct Stolen and (Months) &
Earned Occurred, Dates Year Discipline or
JD & Year Position Alleged1 5  Imposed Resignation
1 Edward S. Digges, Whar- $3.1M 30 disbarred MD
Digges, Jr., ton and 1994-1989 1989-90 & US
Maryland Levin,16  (Dresser) (Groner 91) Sup.Ct.
'71 Annapolis, 1990
MD, man-
aging pait-
ner
13. Thejudge who heard the disciplinary action against Stanford Hess, for example, found that "other senior
members of Weinberg and Green knew about the fraudulent billing scheme and allowed it to continue;" the
judge found their conduct "reprehensible" but found that the partner's knowledge did not "vitiate the
respondent's culpability nor... minimize his responsibility for his conduct." Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Hess, Case No. 97301053, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 12 (Circuit Court for Baltimore City, June
2, 1998).
14. I present some contextual information without any direct causal or explanatory connection to the billing
and expense fraud. I include background information about the lawyers, for example, because these lawyers'
education and professional accomplishment places them at the top of their profession.
15. I have ranked the lawyers by the amounts of money that they admitted, were alleged or proven to have
stolen from their clients and partners.
16. Before Mr. Digges started the firm of Digges, Wharton and Levin, he was managing partner at the law
firm of Piper and Marbury.
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Name, Law Alleged Prison
School Where Firm Where Amount Sentence
Lawyer Misconduct Stolen and (Months) &
Earned Occurred, Dates Year Discipline or
JD & Year Position Alleged 15  Imposed Resignation
2 Harvey Myer- Myerson & $2.5M 70 disbarred New
son; Colum- Kuhn,' 7  1980-1989 1992 York 1998
bia '64 New York, (Jensen 92a, (Lubasch 92b) (Discipline)
managing US v. Myer-
partner son)
3 Wilkes "Skip" Bronson, $2.3M 24-30 resigned CA
Morgan, Bronson & 1984-199118 1994 1992 (Re
Hastings McKinnon, (Osborne 92) ("Faked" 95) Morgan)
'73 Santa Rosa
office, man-
aging part-
ner
4 H. Lawrence Winston & $1.62M 55 disbarred US
Fox, Vir- Strawn, DC 1986-1991 no parole 1992 S. Ct. 1992;
ginia '64 office, man- (Groner 92) (Ex-Lawyer disbarred
aging part- 92) VA 1992
ner and DC
1993 (Re
Fox 92, 93)
5 Maureen Chapman & $1.48M 20  12 interim sus-
Walsh,' 9  Cutler, Chi- 1991-1994 1997 pension
Northwest- cago, non- (Petition) (Jackson 97) ordered
ern '80 equity part- 11/97 (Man-
ner son)
17. Before he started the law firm of Myerson & Kuhn, Mr. Myerson was managing partner and head of the
litigation department at Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey.
18. In an arbitration proceeding against its insurer, Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon claimed that Morgan had
stolen $3.5 million from the firm and its clients. Barbara Steuart, Bronson Wins $984,000 From Insurer in
Embezzlement Case, THE RECORDER, Oct. 28, 1994, at 3.
19. Maureen Walsh Fairchild is married to Gary Fairchild. They were partners at two different Chicago law
firms. Each engaged in substantial independent billing fraud, and also committed some billing fraud in
collaboration with one another. The disciplinary complaint used her maiden name. John Flynn Rooney,
Fairchild Would Tell All About Acts at Firm, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 8, 1996, at 1. The criminal indictment
refers to her as "Maureen Walsh Fairchild." In this Article I refer to her as Maureen Walsh. Because I often refer
to the lawyers discussed by their last names, the use of her maiden name reduces the possibility of confusion
between Maureen Walsh Fairchild and Gary Fairchild.
20. Maureen Walsh was charged by the disciplinary agency in Chicago with having overbilled clients and her
law firm by $1.48 million. The subsequent criminal indictment charged her with mail and wire fraud of
[Vol. 12:205
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Name, Law Alleged Prison
School Where Firm Where Amount Sentence
Lawyer Misconduct Stolen and (Months) &
Earned Occurred, Dates Year Discipline or
JD & Year Position Alleged' 5  Imposed Resignation
6 William F. Duker, Barrett, $1.4M 33 disbarred New
Duker, Yale Gravante & 1990-1995 1997 York
'81 Markel, (Walsh 97) (Weiser) 9/24/97 (Re
New York, Duker 97);
managing disbarred
partner DC 5/98
(Ethics
Log)
7 William Ap- McDermott, $1.1M not prosecuted disbarred DC
pler, Will & Em- 1986-1991 1995 (Re
Georgetown ery, DC, (Re Appler) Appler)
'69 non-equity
partner
8 Gary Winston & $784T 24 voluntary dis-
Fairchild, Strawn, 1984-1994 1995 barment IL
Northwest- Chicago, (Re Fairchild) (O'Connor 1994 (order
ern '69 managing 95); 3 yrs. of Disci-
partner Suspended plinary
(Petition Commis-
97) sion)
9 Michael X. Akin, Gump, $500T none reported disbarred DC
Morrell, Strauss, 1985-1990 in press 1996 (Re
Georgetown Hauer & (Torry 95) Morrell)
'68 Feld, DC, of
counsel
10 Webster Hub- The Rose Law $482T 21 disbarred by
bell, Arkan- Firm, Little 1989-1994 1994 consent AK
sas '73 Rock, man- (Information) (Reske 95) 1995 (Re
aging part- Hubbell)
ner
$900,000. The discrepancy between these two amounts was not explained. In re Walsh, No. 94-CH-653,
Petition Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 761 (I11. 1997).
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Name, Law Alleged Prison
School Where Firm Where Amount Sentence
Lawyer Misconduct Stolen and (Months) &
Earned Occurred, Dates Year Discipline or
JD & Year Position Alleged 15  Imposed Resignation
11 James T. Thompson, $385T none reported suspended
Crowley, Hine and 1990-1992; in press indefinitely
Michigan Flory, one incident Ohio 1994
'68 Cleveland, in 1987 (Re (Re Crow-
partner, Crowley) ley)
chairman of
litigation
dept.
12 Timothy Flato, Latham & $300-400T; 6 months resigned CA
USC '81 Watkins, 1991-1994 home deten- 1996 (Re
San Fran- (Crawford tion 1996 Flato)
cisco, part- 96b; Mintz (Mintz 96c)
ner, head of 96c)
project fi-
nance group
(Mintz 96b)
13 Richard Salo- Mayer, Brown $254T 2 1  none reported disbarred by
mon, Har- & Platt, 1990-199422 in press consent
vard '79 Chicago, (Re Salomon) IL 1994
partner (Re Salo-
mon)
14 Sherman F Tenzer, Green- $225T none reported resigned New
Taub, New blatt, Fallon 1991-199423 in press York 1996
York Law & Kaplan, (Notice of (Re Taub)
School '71 New York, Charges)
tax partner I I I _I
21. This amount is taken from the Illinois Supreme Court opinion disbarring Richard Salomon. It includes
amounts attributable to billing and expense fraud, but does not include amounts attributable to referral and
service fees paid directly to Salomon which should have been paid to the firm. The $254,000 includes:
$36,905.75 in inflated billings to the Chrysler Corp., $214,063.42 in mischaracterized expenses on bills to
twelve clients, designed to secure payment for expenses in violation of client policies, and $3,089.21 in personal
or other telephone calls improperly billed to the firm. In re Salomon, MR 10420 (I11. S. Ct., Sept. 23, 1994).
22. This time period reflects billing misconduct only. Salomon also falsely represented on his resume and in
other biographical data from 1986 to 1994 that he graduated magna cum laude from Harvard Law School. Id.
23. Although the Notice of Charges filed by the Disciplinary Agency indicates that Taub's misconduct
occurred "during Taub's employment at Tenzer, Greenblatt," the bulk of the fraud appears to have occurred
214 [Vol. 12:205
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Name, Law Alleged Prison
School Where Firm Where Amount Sentence
Lawyer Misconduct Stolen and (Months) &
Earned Occurred, Dates Year Discipline or
JD & Year Position Alleged' 5  Imposed Resignation
15 Stanford Hess, Weinberg & $110T 2 4  none reported suspended for
Maryland Green, Bal- 1984-1987 in press three years
'66 timore, part- (James 95a) MD 1999
ner (Opinion)
16 Scott J. Hunton & unknown 2 5  criminal in- suspended
McKay Williams, approxi- vestigation New York
Wolas partner, mately pending 11/97 (Dis-
Fordham head of liti- 1991-1995 cipline)
'76 gation dept. (Vorobil 96)
in NY office
Most but not all of the lawyers were in senior positions in their firms.
Seven-were managing partners, five of the main offices of their firms, and two of
branch offices. Three others were the heads of departments or practice groups in
their firms. Of the other six, three were equity partners, two were non-equity
partners, and one was of counsel. Those who were in less senior positions were
included in the sample because they had established themselves in stable
positions at very large firms and generated significant income.
Two of the lawyers were managing partners at small law firms that had spun off
from large prominent law firms; both had been managing partners of the large
firms before they formed their own firms.2 6 These lawyers took some of their
clients with them when they created their own firms.
between the years of 1991 and 1994. In re Taub, HP No. 34/95, Statement of Charges, (Sup. Ct. N. Y. App. Div.,
Aug. 14, 1995).
24. The amount alleged to have been added to the bills through the computerized padding scheme was
$110,000, but the firm repaid the bank $475,000, which was represented as compensation for the bill-padding
and its consequences. Also the pleadings on billing fraud alleged that other clients had been overbilled as well.
Michael James, Bank Says Top Law Firm Padded Bills, BALTIMORE SuN, April 27, 1995, at Al; Harvey
Berkman, He Balked at Bills, So Firm Padded Them, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 2, 1995, at A10.
25. The amount of Wolas' billing fraud is unknown. It is estimated that he stole between $40 million and
$100 million through the Ponzi scheme.
26. Harvey Myerson was managing partner of Myerson & Kuhn; Ed Digges was managing partner of Piper
& Marbury.
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B. HOW THE ARTICLE IS ORGANIZED
This article endeavors to answer the following sets of questions:
- What changes in the legal profession have produced a professional environ-
ment in which senior partners in law firms slide into stealing from their partners
and their clients?
27
- How widespread and serious is the problem of billing and expense fraud? Are
these isolated instances of "bad apples"? Or does the pattern of recent billing
fraud cases at elite law firms represent the "tip of an iceberg" in the legal
profession? 28 How many other managing partners and rainmakers are engaged
in chronic theft from their clients and their partners?
29
• Can we make sense of these cases by study of the professional histories of the
lawyers or their firms, or not?
30
* What kinds of misconduct were involved in these cases? How did the lawyers
accomplish the billing and/or expense fraud, and what did they do with money
they amassed? The lawyers were charged with, proven to have stolen, or
admitted stealing hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars. Do the public
reports reveal the true scope of the misconduct, or did they steal much more
than the amounts alleged?
31
* Why did these lawyers misappropriate funds through padding or manipula-
tion of time sheets or expense reports? Is it that some lawyers will stop at
nothing in the quest for wealth and status? Do the lawyers' personal and family
backgrounds show a dearth of moral compass? Were some of them mentally ill?
How did they explain their misconduct once confronted with it?
3 2
- Where were the lawyer regulators? Why didn't the regulatory system prevent
these fiduciary fiascos? Once these situations came to light, how effective or
consistent were the disciplinary agencies and the prosecutors in responding to
these cases?
3 3
- What can we observe about the law firms' behavior in responding to these
cases of billing and expense fraud? How did these cases come to light? When
complaints were made within the firms about the lawyers' misconduct, did the
firms investigate and report the misconduct? How did it happen that many of
27. See infra section 1I.
28. See infra section III.
29. See id.
30. See infra section IV.
31. See infra section V.
32. See infra section VI.
33. See infra section VII.
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these lawyers engaged in billing or expense fraud undetected for years? Why
were they not caught immediately? Did other lawyers in their firms know what
they were doing? If so, why was the misconduct not immediately -investi-
gated and reported to disciplinary authorities or law enforcement officials?
34
How did the partners explain the misconduct of the lawyers charged with theft?
Did the firms have educational programs or monitoring systems in place to
prevent or detect such misconduct?
35
- What was the fallout from these troublesome cases? Did they spawn civil
suits against'the lawyers, their firms, the insurers? Did all the lawyers lose their
positions and stop practicing law? Did the lawyers or the firms repay the money
that was misappropriated? Have the billing and expense fraud cases damaged
the reputations or incomes of the law firms where they occurred? Have the
firms made changes in management structure to prevent or detect billing
fraud?
36
- What measures are needed to eliminate billing and expense fraud from the
legal profession? What can educators, regulators, criminal justice officials, law
firms, and clients do to prevent or to detect this insidious pattern of miscon-
duct? Should law firms abandon hourly billing? Should law firms need to
restructure their compensation and incentive systems? Should unethical billing
practices be addressed with greater specificity in the ethical rules that govem
lawyers? Is monitoring by the bar, by malpractice insurers, or by clients likely
to prevent or deter billing fraud? Is the relegation of billing disputes to fee
arbitration part of the problem or part of the solution? What useful contribution
can be made through educational efforts directed at law students, lawyers,
clients, judges, or disciplinary officials? 37
Study of these cases is helpful to understand some of the problems in the legal
profession at the end of the twentieth century - problems of individual and
institutional integrity, problems of arrogance and greed, problems of formal and
informal regulation. This study may be useful to law firms, accountants, legal
auditors, malpractice insurers, consumers of legal services, and lawyer regula-
tors.38 By better understanding how these highly educated and successful lawyers
34. See infra Section VIII and Appendix 'T', which explains that some firms appear to have initiated
investigation and made appropriate reports promptly upon learning of the billing fraud, while others waited
months or years to take significant corrective action.
35. See infra section VIII.
36. See infra section IX.
37. See infra section X.
38. Readers may use the information for different purposes. Some may wish to learn about billing and
expense fraud, or about misconduct within large law firms, but many readers may refer this work with more
instrumental goals. A prosecutor handling a lawyer billing fraud case might wish to know what charges were
filed or sentences imposed on each of the sixteen lawyers. A law firm manager might seek to learn how the
billing fraud was discovered in each case. A bar counsel might want to find out who reported the misconduct in
each case and whether the initial report was made to a disciplinary agency, a judge, or a prosecutor. A
malpractice insurer might read for insight relevant to the development of policy on risk management and loss
prevention. A lawyer representing another lawyer charged with billing or expense fraud might find useful the
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came to engage in patterns of financial fraud, we may be better able to design
educational and public and private regulatory structures that will reduce or
eliminate lawyer billing fraud.
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
I collected information about the sixteen lawyers whose cases are examined
here principally from journalistic publications, from published court opinions
and from pleadings filed in disciplinary and criminal cases.3 9 In many cases legal
journalists and criminal and disciplinary investigators have explored these cases
in such depth that richly detailed stories can be told. In some cases there is
relatively little public information available. I have broken out this information
into a series of tables which allow comparative examination of the lawyers, their
behavior, their law firms, and the responses of various institutions to the billing
fraud. Some tables are included in the text and followed by analysis of the data;
others are presented as appendices.
My primary reliance on published documents may involve some distortion of
the picture. I wrote to the lawyers in this study to let them know that I was writing
about them and to invite them to share any information or comments,40 but I have
not been able to learn every side of these stories. The lawyers might offer
different accounts of what happened and why it happened. There may be
dimensions of the stories that remain unknown except to those who were directly
involved. I do not pretend to know the absolute truth about these cases, or even
the whole stories. Instead, my goal was to compile those parts of the stories that
have been told by others and to compare the stories to see what can be learned
from the collective picture.
The purpose of these comparative case studies is to learn as much as possible
about the individual and institutional characteristics, values and circumstances
that led to the billing and expense fraud of each of these lawyers. To prevent or
deter billing and expense fraud, it is essential to understand the nature and causes
of the misconduct. By examining the whole context of these events, it is possible
inventory of mental health defenses and other mitigating circumstances that were presented by these sixteen
lawyers. A more fearsome prospect is that an avaricious lawyer might read for details on methods of billing and
expense fraud to expand his or her repertoire of methods of income expansion. Such a reader would be
well-advised to review also the prison terms, disbarments, and other disastrous consequences that befell these
sixteen lawyers.
39. Conventional law review citation has not been used in referencing sources of factual information
presented in the tables in this article. The assembled data reported in the tables was collected from a set of
articles, ccourt decisions, and court filings, and often combinations of these. The sources are listed separately in
Appendix N under the names of the lawyers. Footnotes in the tables were used to add specific notes and in
support of direct quotations.
40. In response to my inquiries, I corresponded and/or talked with Webster Hubbell, Edward Digges, and
Richard Salomon. I received responses from some of the other lawyers or their counsel, most often declining
comment.
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to obtain a fuller understanding of what happened and why and to assess how to
address these problems.
II. THE CHANGING PROFESSION
A. THE RISING DOMINANCE OF INCOME GENERATION AS A PRIMARY GOAL
Various developments in the legal profession have contributed to the emer-
gence of billing fraud as a major problem. During the 1980s and 90s, the legal
profession has become more of a business and less of a profession. Civility has
declined, competition has increased. Financial success has become the dominant
value for many lawyers. Many lawyers and firms have subordinated professional
standards, fiduciary obligations to clients, and ideas about mentoring to income
maximization. Preoccupation with profit is most intense in some of the most
respected law firms in the United States.
The rising dominance of income generation as a central goal is evident in many
recent trends in the profession.42 Large law firms have grown larger lateral
movement among firms has increased, 44 and the likelihood of an associate
becoming a partner at his or her firm has dropped dramatically.45 Partnership in a
law firm used to represent life tenure.46 Now many firms routinely lay off not
41. Deborah Rhode points to billing fraud as example of the way that self-interest eclipses fiduciary
obligation. See Rhode, supra note 6, at 678.
42. One firm that exemplifies this trend is Winston & Strawn, which employed two of the sixteen lawyers in
the sample. One former partner said "It's a law firm of the eighties and nineties, where you have a bunch of
people tied together by money, and that's it." Emily Barker, Winston & Strawn Gets Ruthless, AM. LAW., June
1993, at 70. Barker described a wholesale layoff of 20 partners in 1993, orchestrated by then managing partner
Gary Fairchild. She wrote of the situation, "Winston & Strawn is a law firm that never forgets it's a business,
and business was down." Id. One impact of the partner layoffs was to return the associate: partner ratio to its
former flush position of 6 to 1, and to boost the equity partners' profits by 4 percent, to $415,000 per person. Id.
43. See RICHARD ABEL, AMEicAN LAWYERS 183 (1989) ("In the eleven years from 1968 to 1979, the average
size of the twenty largest U.S. firms nearly doubled (from 128 to 234); in the nine years from 1979 to 1987, it
more than doubled again."); see also Wade Lambert, Women Lawyers Talk About Double Standard At Work,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1995, at B5 (noting that the "number of lawyers employed by the nation's 250 largest law
firms grew by 2% over the past year"); Art Brewer, 1996 Survey Indicates Significant Gains, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 4,
1996, at 54 ("The number of attorneys in the top 25 New York City firms has increased by 4.7 percent.").
44. David Segal, When Legal Eagles Fly the Coop, WASH. POST, July 1, 1996, at F1O (stating that "about
40% of the partners in the 2,000 largest law firms in the country are lateral hires."); Amy Stevens, Somber
Reunion for Harvard Law's Class of '85, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1995, at B I (noting that in the ten years between
1985 and 1995 the number of young lawyers who stayed with their first law firm decreased from 40% to 20%).
45. See Zay N. Smith, Bird Name Hatches Wild Goose Chase, Cfn. SuN-Tntsts, Sept 28, 1995, at 4 (noting
that prior to 1981, 21.5% of male associates made partner while 15.3% of women made partner. Since 1981, the
number has fallen to 17% for males, and 5% for females); Junda Woo, Climb to the Top at Big Law Firms is
Becoming Steeper and Steeper Every Year WALL ST. J., June 15, 1992, at B8 ("Ascending the partnership ladder
at a major law firm is becoming more and more like climbing Mount Everest: Even the hardiest probably will
never reach the summit.").
46. See Jonathan M. Moses, Partners Losing Their Guarantee of Life Tenure, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1992, at
B 1 (quoting a legal placement service provider as saying, "It used to be when there were tough times, the older
partners would simply take less... [t]here was no thought of firing partners").
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only associates but also partners.4 7 The desire to increase firm profits and partner
income is the principal force that has driven these changes.48
Lawyers are employed at law firms in a multiplying number of statuses. Once
all the lawyers were either associates or partners. 49 Now there are equity partners,
income partners, junior partners, senior partners, of counsels, permanent associ-
ates, and part-time associates and partners.50 The incomes of partners at large
firms have increased enormously. There was some leveling off and decline in
partners' incomes during the early 1990s,5' but 1996 data suggests that the law
business is expanding, and that partners' incomes have begun to swell again.52
Firms have gradually increased demands on lawyers to bill hours.53 Twenty years
ago most firms expected lawyers to bill 1300 to 1500 hours per year.5 4 By 1990
many firms had increased the annual target for both associates and partners to
2,000 hours per year, and the most demanding firms expected 2,500 hours per
47. See Saundra Torry , Showing a Partner the Door Based on the Bottom Line, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1996,
at F7 ("Ten years ago forcing out partners was unthinkable, but it has become more prevalent in the 1990s.");
Moses, supra note 45, at B1 ("Life tenure, once a cherished guarantee of partnership, is going the way of
afternoon tea and unlimited expense accounts at many large law firms.").
48. The Young Lawyers Division of the ABA produced a report on the declining quality of life for young
lawyers titled "At the Breaking Point." One of the main problems the report identified was that firms require
lawyers to work "ever-increasing billable hours." The report describes law firm managers in the 1980s as
resembling "not the enlightened corporate executive... but rather the industrial manager in the earlier years of
the Industrial Revolution." The critique of law firm managers continues: "they have taken the simple route of
making more money by making non-equity individuals, and partners, work longer hours." The report is quoted
in Nancy D. Holt, Are Longer Hours Here to Stay?: Quality lime Losing Out, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1993, at 62.
49. See Status at Law Firms Used to be Cut and Dried, Not Anymore, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 6, 1997, at Bll
(stating that "Traditionally, law firms were overwhelmingly populated by two classes of lawyers "partners and
associates").
50. Id.
51. See Ellen Joan Pollock, Slump Hits Elite Firms, Survey Shows, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1993, at B I (noting
that AmLaw 100 figures for 1992 show that "big, successful law firms" are "stuck in the doldrums"); Stephen
Brill, Short Tenn Pain, Long-Tern Gain, AM. LAW., Jan-Feb 1991, at 5 (noting that in 1991, 11 of the 12 law
large law firms sampled showed a decline in profits per partner).
52. See Karen Dillon, Finally the Roaring Nineties, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 1997, at 13 (stating that partner
profits in 1996 were up sharply from the prior year and that 1996 was the best year of the 1990s in terms of law
firm profitability).
53. See Amee McKim, The Lawyer Track: The Case for Humanizing the Career within a Large Law Fin, 55
OEHo ST. L. J. 167, 174 (1994) (noting that billable hour requirements have increased in the last 10 years).
Professor Manuel Ramos writes that "Partners in big firms have a tremendous incentive to overwork associates.
Each additional associate hour billed after meeting the overhead is pure profit for the partners, who are all too
eager to base yearly bonuses and promotions on hours billed over 'minimums' of 1800 and 2,000 hours. Average
billable hours have grown, and the trend is to hire fewer lawyers to do more work." Manuel R. Ramos, Legal
Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1718-19 (1994).
54. The ABA Commission on Women in the Profession notes that "The extraordinary increase in expected
billable hours over the last fifteen years, from 1,300 to 1,500 to in excess of 2,000, is making it extremely
difficult for lawyers to pursue ... other interests [such as pro bono work, political work, continuing legal
education and other teaching]." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCtATION, COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION:
LAWYERS AND BALANCED LIvEs: A GUIDE TO DRAFTING AND IMPLEMENTING WORKPLACE POLICIES FOR LAWYERS
5 (1990) [hereinafter ABA COMMISSION ON WOMEN]. See also McKim, supra note 53; William G. Ross, The
Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 78-83 (1991).
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year.55 This work structure is nothing short of disastrous for the family and
personal lives of lawyers who meet these expectations.56
Many aspiring lawyers enter law school with public-spirited goals, but the
economics of legal education requires them to focus on income generation. The
profession has become gradually more diverse. Forty years ago most law students
were young men from privileged families. In recent years a more diverse group of
students has entered law school 57 and become attorneys. 58 Lawyers as a group
are more heterogeneous and less privileged. As law school tuition rises, more and
more students get deep into debt before graduation. The vast majority of lawyers
now start their careers with student loans of sixty to one hundred thousand
dollars. 59 Most law students at elite schools are able to find high-paying positions
in private practice if they want them, but many other new graduates must search
for months to find any legal employment. A significant percentage of law school
55. ABA COMMISSION ON WOMEN, supra note 54, at 5. One study conducted by the ABA indicated that
between 1984 and 1990 the percentage of lawyers who worked more than 200 hours per month increased from
35% to 50%. Holt, supra note 48, at 64. While this survey does not appear to refer to hours billed, the increase in
hours worked theoretically should produce an increase in hours billed. See Paul Marcotte, Hours Way up: 2,500
Now Magic Number, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1988, at 18 (reporting that lawyers in the most demanding firms averaged
2,500 billable hours, up from 2,210 in 1982); cited in Ramos, supra note 53, at 1719.
56. Professor Ramos reports that "In a study by the ABA Young Lawyers Division, lawyers complained of
intolerable daily stress, work overload, time pressures, poor interpersonal relationships at work, inadequate
support, and too much competition. As many as fifty-five percent of the men and sixty-one percent of the women
said they had no time for themselves or their families." Ramos, supra note 53, at 1715, citing AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, YOUNG LAWYERS DMsION, THE STATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1990 24 (1991). One recent
study tracking 584 women lawyers found that "those who worked more than 45 hours a week were three times
more likely to have a miscarriage than those who worked less than 35 hours. Another study of men's suicide
cases found that male lawyers were two times as likely to commit suicide as the general population." Laura
Gatland, Dangerous Dedication: Studies Suggest Long Hours, Productivity Pressures Can Cause Serious
Health Problems and a Higher Suicide Rate for Attorneys, A.B.A. J. 1997, at 28.
57. See Renee Landers, Status, Progress, and Integration of Lawyers of Color in the Profession, 19 W. NEW
ENG. L. REv. 121, 123 (1997) (noting that a "revolution" has occurred in the legal profession in the last 25 years
as more women and minorities go to law school); Arleen Jacobius, Affirmative Action on Way Out in California,
Law School Student Bodies Will Be Primarily White and Asian, Some Say, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995, at 22 (stating
that the number of women at Boait Hall increased from 4% in the mid-1960s to 48% in 1994. The number of
non-Caucasian students, increased from "very few" in the mid-1960s to 40 percent in 1994). Arlene Jacobius
has pointed out, however, that the recent California referendum to ban affirmative action may reverse this trend
and "produce a law school population made up mostly of white and Asian students." Id. at 22.
58. The ABA Commission on Women in the Profession notes that "Twenty years ago, women were less than
five percent of the legal profession." AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION THE LAWYERS STATISTICAL REPORT: A
STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE US LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980s 10 (1985). In 1990, women constituted more
than 20% of lawyers, US DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, Table
22, at 183 (1990), and more than 40% of law students. AMERICAN BAR ASSN. SECrION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, FALL OF 1989 66 (1990). See
also ABA COMMISSION ON WOMEN, supra note 54, at 4.
59. See 16 PA. LAW. 3 (1994); David Chambers, The Burdens of Educational Loans: The Impacts of Debt on
Job Choice and Standards of Living for Students at Nine American Law Schools, 42 J. LEGAL EDUc. 187, 187
(1992).
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graduates accept non-legal, temporary or part-time positions. 6° Lawyers are
collectively far less satisfied with their careers than they were twenty years ago in
part because of the demanding schedules imposed as a result of hourly billing.6'
Many lawyers leave the profession to search for better lives.62
Client behavior has also changed during the last twenty years. 63 Corporate
clients that once each had a deep and stable relationship with a single firm now
solicit bids from law firms for various chunks of legal work.64 As the cost of legal
services rises, corporations ask in-house counsel to do an increasing share of the
legal work.65 Corporations that once unquestioningly paid massive legal fees
based on billing statements that offered little more information than "for
professional services rendered" now publish extensive policies detailing what
they will and will not pay for and in what form they require billing information.66
The corporations' interest in cost control has given rise to a cottage industry of
legal auditors who earn their fees by scrutinizing law firm bills and identifying
fraudulent, improper or unnecessary charges.67 Clients also are far more likely
60. Cindy Collins, NALP Survey Shows Increase in Non-Legal Work for Graduates, 14 LAW. HIRING &
TRAINING REP. 10 (1994); Stable Job Market for Class of 1993 Law School Graduates, 67 Wis. LAW. 6 (1994).
61. See James F. Mundy, Making Practice More User Friendly, 19 PA. LAw. 2 (1997) (stating that the level of
job satisfaction among lawyers dropped by almost 20% from 1984 to 1990); David R. Edelstein, Practicing
Law: A Challenge to Your Mental Health, CHICAGO BAR Ass'N REcoRD June 1994, at 24 (noting that "ABA
surveys show a steady decline in job satisfaction" among lawyers).
62. See Deborah K. Holmes, Learning from Corporate America: Addressing Dysfunction in the Large Law
Firm, 31 GONZ. L. REv. 373,376 (1995-96) (noting that 23% of New Jersey lawyers surveyed plan to leave the
practice of law before retirement and that a similar number of North Carolina lawyers would not choose to
become lawyers if they had the opportunity to make an initial career choice again); Holt, supra note 48, at 62
(reporting that "In Maryland, nearly one third of lawyers surveyed.., in 1988 said they were not sure whether
they wanted to continue practicing law; and 23 percent of North Carolina lawyers ... [said in] 1990... they
would not become attorneys again.")
63. See generally Anne B. Fisher, How to Cut Your Legal Costs, FORTUNE, Apr. 23, 1990, at 185 (noting that
"legal costs are ripe for the kind of stringent reducing every other corporate expense has undergone in recent
years"). Fisher points out that "Law firms took in $52 billion in 1985. This year the total looks to be around $90
billion" and offers advice to corporations to reduce legal costs. Id.
64. See Helen A. Garten, Insider Trading in the Corporate Interest, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 573, 606 (1987)
(noting that corporations are breaking established ties with law firms and forcing the firms to bid for individual
projects); Amy Stevens, Lawyers and Clients, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1994, at B9 ("In some instances, companies
are conducting 'beauty contests,' in which lawyers compete for work by trying to submit the lowest bid.").
65. See Garten, supra note 64, at 606 (noting expansion of the use of in-house lawyers by corporations). One
example of this is that over a two-year period, in-house staff at FDIC went from handling 39% to handling 57%
of FDIC legal work. See Alfred J. T. Byrne, Manager's Journal: You Think You Have Lawyer Problems?, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 2, 1992, at A 16 (discussing the FDIC's legal management system, which includes doing more work
in-house).
66. See Ross, supra note 54, at 2 & n. 9 (citing support for the proposition that corporate clients who would
once acquiesce to lawyer billing practices now scrutinize law firm bills). In 1992, Walt Disney Co. sent a memo
to its outside lawyers stating that it "would not tolerate the kinds of billing practices that it routinely accepted in
the 1980s." See Amy Stevens, Disney Acts to Cut Overcharging for Work by Outside Law Firms, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 2, 1992, at B5. One law firm response to the memo was "[w]e applaud this, and we'll apply it, but we're
just sorry that things have reached such a state in our profession where this is necessary." Id.
67. See Larry Smith, Legal Auditors Expand their Practice Amid Growing Criticism, INSIDE LmI., Oct.
1993, at 24 (1993) (discussing the role of the legal auditor).
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than they once were to sue their lawyers for malpractice or breach of fiduciary
duty.
6 8
B. THE GROWTH OF LAWYER REGULATION
The institutions that regulate lawyers have grown enormously during the last
twenty years. Once staffed principally by volunteers, lawyer disciplinary agen-
cies now employ hundreds of full-time lawyer prosecutors.69 Ethics committees
also have acquired full-time professional staff.7 ° Malpractice insurers employ
another layer of regulators who offer training and counseling on risk management
to insured firms.71 Many law firms have set up ethics committees and have
appointed general counsels who spend their time training and counseling lawyers
and monitoring firm practices that present risks of liability or disciplinary
action.72
The law governing lawyers has grown exponentially. In 1980 there was little
literature on the law governing lawyers. Each state had an ethics code and many
had ethics committees that published advisory opinions interpreting the ethical
rules.7 3 Most law schools had established a requirement that every student take a
course in professional responsibility.74 Then there emerged a couple of signifi-
cant treatises,7 5 a weekly loose-leaf service,7 6 a dozen or more new textbooks,7 7
68. "Between 1979 and 1986, not only did the number of legal malpractice cases double, but the average
settlement nationally soared from $3,000 to $45,000." Ramos, supra note 53, at 1678. It is not clear whether the
rising number of malpractice cases reflects an increase in lawyer misconduct, or simply a change in attitudes
about responding to lawyer misconduct by filing suit.
69. See Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United States, 7 GEo. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 911, 929 (1994) (discussing evolution of the lawyer discipline system and noting that "almost
every state [has] professional disciplinary counsel, on staff").
70. See Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performance, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 193, 201
(1996) (explaining the roles of staff of state bar ethics committees).
71. See Ted Schneyer, Legal Process Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FoRDHAM L. REV. 33,
65 (1996) ("It is well understood that malpractice insurers help their insureds avoid liability by providing expert
risk management advice.")
72. See Jonathan M. Epstein, The In-House Ethics Advisor: Practical Benefits for the Modem Law Firm, 7
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1011, 1128 (1996) (discussing the range of tasks performed by law firm ethics committees
and in-house ethics advisors to avoid risks of liability or disciplinary action against lawyers in the firms).
73. See Whitney A. McCaslin, Empowering Ethics Committees, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 959, 965 (1996)
(discussing the emergence and role of state ethics committees).
74. The American Bar Association now requires all ABA accredited law schools to provide "instruction in
the duties and responsibilities of the legal profession." AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF
LAW SCHOOLS AND INTERPRETATIONS 302(a)(iv). The course must cover the "history, goals, structure and
responsibilities of the legal profession" as well as the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See id.
75. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (1986), GEOFFREY G. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES,
THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL coNDUCT (2d ed. 1990).
76. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT.
77. E.g., NATHAN CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION
(1996); STEPHEN GILERs, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS (4th ed. 1995); GEOFFREY
HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING (2d ed. 1994); DEBORAH RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL
1999]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
and a specialized journal on legal ethics. 78 Forward-looking law schools began to
set up ethics institutes.79 Scores of law professors began to turn out a rich body of
literature on the legal profession.8 ° In 1984, the American Law Institute decided
to produce a restatement on the law governing lawyers.8 t The growing body of
law reflects a mushrooming network of public and private regulatory activity
focussed on the legal profession. The growing profession may be burdened by
complex problems, but the regulatory structures provide increased capacity to
respond to those problems. Hundreds of practicing lawyers and academics now
specialize in legal ethics. While some of the ethical dilemmas encountered by
lawyers are a product of recent developments in the profession (such as the
conflicts of interest that arise in firms with thousands of lawyers), others have
been there all along (such as the conflict between the obligation to keep client
confidences and the obligation to be truthful in presenting information to a
tribunal). The committees and books and journals and conferences on these
topics have led the profession to a higher level of awareness of ethical questions,
and have led some issues to be recognized as problems that previously went
unnoticed.
The public image of the legal profession has experienced both positive and
negative changes during the last twenty years. The profession has become the
favorite whipping boy of conservative politicians and talk show hosts.82 At the
same time lawyering has become chic: movies, books and television shows
depict lawyers as wealthy, good-looking, competent, and idealistic. 83 The popu-
lar television show L.A. Law turned out to be the most significant factor in a
major increase in applications to law school during the late 1980s.84 This
ETHics, (2d ed. 1995); THOMAS MORGAN & RONALD ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL
REsPONSIBtLrrY (6th ed. 1995). This represents only a small sample of the fine available texts.
78. The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics began publication in 1987.
79. These include the Stein Center for Ethics and Public Interest Law at Fordham Law School, The
University of Pennsylvania Law School Center on Professionalism, Kennedy Institute for Ethics at Georgetown
University, Keck Center on Legal Ethics and Legal Profession at Stanford University, Center for Ethics in
Public Policy & Professions at Emory University, Program in Ethics and Professions at Harvard University.
80. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Annotated Bibliography of Educational Materials on Legal Ethics, 58
LAW & CoNrrEMP. PROBS. 361 (1996) An updated version of the bibliography will be published in the
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics.
81. This Restatement is entitled RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS. This restate-
ment is still going through a revision process within the American Law Institute. Tom Morgan and Ronald
Rotunda assert optimistically that "It is expected to be finished sometime before the start of the next
millennium." MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 77, at 13.
82. See Paula A. Franzese, Speech E. Pluribus Unum ? From Many, One: In Unity There is Strength, 25
SETON HALL L. REv. 1460, 1461 (1995) ("[Tlhe [legal] profession is now fodder for joke after joke after joke.
From Jay Leno to Rush Limbaugh to Geraldo, jabs at lawyers have become commonplace.")
83. See, for example, the many works of John Grisham, including the novels The Firn, The Client, The
Pelican Brief, A ime to Kill, and others, and the film Class Action. The television show Law and Order is
another relevant example.
84. See Alan Abrahamson, Applications Hit Record Highs for US Law Schools: Increase Attributed to Impact
of Television Hit LA. Law, Los ANGELES TlMEs, Aug. 20, 1989, at B 1.
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dichotomous public image may reflect both envy of lawyers' newfound methods
to generate higher incomes and mistrust of the fiduciaries who wind up in
possession of such a large portion of their clients' assets.85 The ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professionalism wrote in 1993 that "One major
contributing factor to the discouraging public opinion of the legal profession
appears to be the billing practices of some of its members."-
86
III. LAWYER BILLING AND EXPENSE FRAUD: A BY-PRODUCT
OF THE CULTURE OF GREED
Hourly billing pressure may be the most serious problem faced by the legal
profession. It has robbed many lawyers of the possibility of balanced lives, has
caused a decline in mentoring, collegial relationships, and professional satisfac-
tion, and has had a marked corrosive effect on the integrity of many lawyers,
including those who are the subject of this study. Billing pressure is partly
responsible for the low esteem in which our profession is held.87 Billing and
expense fraud is only one product of the billing mania that has taken over the
culture in so many large firms. Regardless of the precise magnitude of this
problem, the profession must take it on. As long as some lawyers deceive their
clients about how much time they are spending or what they are doing, all clients
worry. If clients lose confidence that there is some objective basis for the amount
they are billed, or if clients lose confidence that their lawyers are candid about the
basis for their bills, who could fault clients who become suspicious, demanding
itemization and compliance with restrictions?
The profession has just begun to study the problem of billing and expense
fraud. Our disciplinary rules do not include any specific prohibition of billing
fraud, but make a general exhortation that fees must be reasonable. In 1993 the
ABA Ethics Committee issued an opinion on issues relating to hourly billing,
prohibiting padding of time sheets, double-billing, billing anew for recycled
work, and charging above cost for administrative or other non-legal services.88
85. The poor public image of lawyers is highlighted in a poem by Alan Knight, reprinted in the Wall Street
Journal: "These newfound legal terms today, You know they've got me reeling; What lawyers now call
over-billing I thought was simply stealing." Alan Knight, Legal Sleaze, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1995, at A15.
86. ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professionalism, Formal Op. 93-379 (1993).
87. See generally Patrick J. Schlitz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and
the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MiNN. L. REV. 705 (1998) (discussing the legal profession's
contemporary unprecedented preoccupation with money, and the negative consequences of the culture of greed
for the lives of lawyers, for mentoring relationships, and for the moral development of lawyers).
88. Formal Op. 93-379, supra note 86. The opinion states that
- a lawyer who agrees to bill on basis of time spent cannot bill for more than actual time spent except
for rounding time up to a minimum billing increment;
* a performance fee or bonus may be added to the lawyer's fee only if the client agrees;
* a lawyer may charge clients separately for expenses incurred in connection with legal services, but
may not charge for overhead related to maintaining, staffing and equipping an office;
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This opinion was an important step in the direction of providing needed guidance to
lawyers, and has been followed or extended by many other state and local bar ethics
committees. 89 Still, lawyers, firms, and lawyer regulators have been slow to recognize
the frequency and seriousness of billing fraud. The disciplinary systems still focus on
monitoring trust accounts as a primary method of detecting theft from clients.9° Some
have established random trust account audit programs or overdraft notification sys-
tems.91 These measures are important, but they fail to detect what may be the most
common method of theft from clients in the nineties: billing and expense fraud.
The collective denial and minimization of unethical billing practices may be
explained in part by self-interest. Within a firm, for example, the partner of a
lawyer engaged in billing fraud might turn a blind eye to misconduct if he shares
* marking up expenses not permitted, either for services provided in office or services provided by
third parties
* a lawyer may not bill one period of time to more than one client;
* a lawyer may not bill a client not bill more than actual time spent even if a job that would have taken
twenty hours takes only two because a similar job was recently done for another client;
* a bill for legal services that states only a total dollar figure "often does not provide sufficient
information" to a client.
89. DC Bar Ethics Committee, Op. No. 267, Disclosure of Billing Practices (1993) (states that when client is
informed that he will be billed based on time worked, violation of rule 8.4 to impose additional undisclosed fees
that are not calculated on the disclosed basis; concurs with ABA Op. 93-379 that a lawyer cannot charge more
than hours expended when he has told a client he will bill based on time); Alabama Ethics Op. RO-94-02 (1993)
(adopting ABA Formal Op. 93-379); South Carolina Bar Advisory Op. 96-13 (1996) (stating that a lawyer may
bill clients for paralegal services as long as the lawyer complies with the disclosure requirements in ABA
Formal Op. 93-379); Arizona Op. 94-10 (1994) (requiring that a lawyer may bill a client for costs calculated as
a percentage of total fees instead of itemizing expenses, as long as the method of calculating costs is disclosed to
the client and the lawyer is prepared to show that the method of calculation approximates actual costs); Alaska
Bar Association, Ethics Op. 95-4 (1995) (approving guidance offered in ABA opinion 93-379 and stating that a
lawyer must charge clients only actual (not marked up) cost of any services provided by third party vendors, and
that any in-house expenses to be charged to a client must be disclosed to client in advance and agreed to by
client); State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct Formal Op.
1996-147 (1996) (noting that where an attorney performs work on more than one matter at a time, the lawyer
may not bill a full hourly rate to more than one client for the same time period, or bill one client a multiple of that
hourly fee for that same time period unless the lawyer has disclosed the practice at the outset, obtained client
consent, and made sure the fee is not unconscionable); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on
Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 1994-9 (1994) (stating that preparation of bills may be delegated to
nonlawyers but lawyers are responsible for any improprieties in billing).
90. See generally, Irene M. Ricci, Trust account: Client Trust Funds: How to Avoid Ethical Problems, 11
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 245 (1998).
91. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY, REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 76 n.19 (1992) (noting that, as of 1992, attorney
recordkeeping verification rules exist in eleven states (Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York (lst and 2nd Departments), Washington and Wisconsin), trust
account overdraft notification rules exist in twelve states (California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia and Washington), and random audit
programs exist in eight states (Iowa, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York (lst and 2nd
Departments), North Carolina, Vermont and Washington)).
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in the resulting income. Lawyers who engage in billing fraud violate many
well-entrenched assumptions about the professional integrity of the individuals
and the institutions involved. Professor Deborah Rhode posits that practicing
lawyers, judges and disciplinary officials may suffer from "cognitive conserva-
tism", in which they "... are more likely to register and retain information that is
compatible with established beliefs or earlier decisions;",92 also they may
experience "cognitive dissonance," in which, "[a]fter making a decision, individuals
tend to suppress or reconstrue information that casts doubts on that decision."
93
Most people asked to describe unethical lawyers might identify ambulance
chasers, marginal sole practitioners, isolated alcoholics, and unscrupulous per-
sonal injury lawyers. 94 Some of the wealthiest American lawyers - partners in
large law firms - have enjoyed a widespread assumption that their ethical standards
are impeccable.95 They are highly educated, well paid, have intelligent support staff and
large libraries. One might assume that they are invulnerable to the temptations that have
led more marginal lawyers to engage in unethical behavior.96
A. HOW MUCH BILLING FRAUD IS THERE?
Research suggests that there is a substantial amount of billing and expense
fraud. Only some fraction of the incidents lead to discipline, criminal prosecu-
tion, or civil liability.
- A great deal of billing fraud is not reported in the press and does not lead to
prosecution or disciplinary proceedings. 97 In interviews and questionnaires I
have received anonymous or confidential reports of numerous lawyers (not the
92. Rhode, supra note 6, at 685.
93. Id. Rhode points out also that "insensitivity [to ethical issues] is exacerbated by common human
tendencies to explain ethical misconduct in terms of individual deviance rather than institutional constraints. It
is easier to attribute problems of professionalism to occasional lapses by aberrant practitioners than to
acknowledge failures in market structures and regulatory design." Id. at 686.
94. See Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL.
U. L. REv., 657, 677 (1994). Mashbum finds a correlation between prestige - defined as the "moral authority
to make judgments about the standards of professional behavior" - and reputation for ethical behavior. Studies
conducted in Chicago and Detroit show that large corporate law firms are perceived as high prestige firms and
that the lawyers who work in those firms are regarded as the most ethical. Small personal injury, divorce, and
criminal defense firms are perceived as low prestige and the lawyers who work there are perceived as the least
ethical. See id., at 676-77; see also Peter Gerstenzang, Up and Down by Sleazebag Lawyers on Video, ENT.
WKLY., Oct. 18, 1996, at 89 (discussing videos that portray unethical and sleazy lawyers as alcoholic
ambulance-chasers (e.g., THE VERDICT), drug-addicted defense attorneys (CARLrro's WAY), and lawyers whose
careers are on a downhill slide (THE BELIEVER)).
95. See Mashburn, supra note 94, at 677 (discussing the results of two studies of hierarchy in large city legal
communities).
96. Ted Schneyer points out that even if there is inadequate or improper conduct by lawyers representing
corporate clients, the clients are less likely than individual clients to complain to disciplinary agencies, and more
likely to exert pressure on the firm or to hire a different firm. Schneyer, supra note 6, at 7-8.
97. I have reported examples of such cases elsewhere. Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
659, 705-720 (1990) [hereinafter Lerman, Lying to Clients]; Lisa G. Lerman, Gross Profits: Some Questions
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ones discussed in this Article) who are in powerful positions in their firms and
in the profession who are engaged in chronic billing fraud.98 Most of the
lawyers with whom I talk about this topic report stories from their own firms
and voice the opinion that these problems are epidemic.
Survey data collected by Professor William Ross suggests that a majority of
lawyers who bill by the hour at least occasionally inflate their hours, and that a
smaller percentage of them anonymously admit to larger-scale inflation of
hours or fabrication of time records. 99 Most lawyers report that other lawyers
engage in billing fraud more often than they themselves do. 100
- In some of the cases examined in this article, other lawyers in the law firms
were aware of the billing fraud of their partners. Some accepted or participated
in it, some turned a blind eye to it, some fired lawyers who attempted to initiate
investigation of it.
Ten years ago the kinds of billing fraud that now lands some lawyers in prison
was widely accepted among lawyers in many large private law firms. In recent
years this conduct has begun to be "criminalized." Although stealing has been
regarded as criminal for centuries, stealing by misrepresentation of hours worked
or by doing superfluous work to generate billable hours was treated as an unstated
exception to the prohibition against theft.'0° One possible explanation why some
of these intelligent and educated people allowed themselves to pursue patterns of
avaricious behavior is that other lawyers they knew were engaged in similar
billing and expense fraud and no one thought there was anything wrong with it.
B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SIXTEEN CASES
The cases examined in this article are perhaps the most startling of a spate of
recent cases of billing and expense fraud. Some of the twenty other cases I
identified also defy conventional notions about what kind of misconduct is
About Lawyer Billing Practices, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 645, 648-650 (1994) [hereinafter Lerman, Gross Profits];
Lisa G. Lerman, Scenes from a Law Firm, 50 RuTGERs L. REv. 2153 (1998).
98. Id.
99. Professor William Ross of Cumberland School of Law surveyed 500 lawyers and received responses
from 272. Of that group, 49% of the respondents said that they either "rarely" or "occasionally" billed two
clients for the same period of time (engaged in double billing), while 1.2% admitted to "frequent" double
billing. Ross, supra note 54, at 15.
100. Professor Ross asked how often the respondents thought that other lawyers "padded" their hours
(recording more time than actually worked), and found that 12.3% said other lawyers pad their hours
"frequently"; 80.4% said "rarely" or "occasionally"; 7.3% said "never". Id. at 16.
101. In fact, lawyers inflated the number of hours billed beyond actual time worked 200 years ago. The term
"verbose attorney," was attributed to "the custom in modem Europe to regulate.. the payment of the attomies
[sic] and clerks of court according to the number of pages which they had occasion to write... In order to
increase their payment, the attornies [sic] and clerks have contrived to multiply words beyond all necessity, to
the corruption of the law language of every court of justice in Europe." ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
680 (Modem Library ed., 1937) (1776), cited in Letters to the Editor, Billing Clients Can Be Murder WAL ST.
J., Nov. 18, 1991, at AI7.
[Vol. 12:205
BLUE-CHIP BILKING
committed by what type of lawyer. Two of the other twenty cases involve theft of
millions of dollars. ' 0 2 Some of them involve lawyers at prestigious and respected
law firms.' 0 3 Most of the cases involved lawyers who were partners in well-
established law firms; only three involve solo practitioners.'o4
The sixteen cases that are the primary subjects of this study may represent "the
tip of an iceberg" 5 If lawyers with top credentials and superb institutional
support are stealing from their clients, the profession needs to re-evaluate its
assumptions about standards of practice and self-regulation. These cases repre-
sent individual and institutional failures that are difficult to fathom. Lawyers and
clients must reconceptualize lawyer misconduct and move from a model that
focuses only on individual deviance to one that takes account of the role played
by legal organizations in tolerating or tacitly requiring unethical and even
criminal behavior, t6
IV. THE LAWYERS AND THEIR LAW FIRMs
A. EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND PROFESSIONAL RECORD OF THE LAWYERS
The lawyers whose cases are examined here are among the best educated and
most accomplished lawyers in the United States. A review of their credentials and
their professional histories is dizzyingly dissonant with the collective picture of
shameless, calculated thievery.
Most of these lawyers attended elite law schools.' 0 7 Some earned law degrees
at Chicago, Columbia, Georgetown, Harvard, Hastings, New York University,
Northwestern, University of Southern California, Virginia, and Yale. Two were
102. James Dougherty was alleged to have stolen $5 million through billing fraud; Lynn Boyd Stites' scheme
is estimated to have involved theft of between $50 million and $200 million. See Appendix A.
103. These firms include, for example, Hopkins & Carley; Sidley & Austin; Shaw, Pittman, Posts &
Trowbridge; Katten, Muchin & Zavis; Seyfarth, Shaw; and Eckert, Seamans. See Appendix A.
104. The solo practitioners are James Dogherty, Forriss Elliott, and Lynn Boyd Stites.
105. Those attempting to call the attention of the legal profession to an unrecognized problem tend to
characterize the visible portion of the problem as the "tip of an iceberg." Another segment of literature seeking
to minimize certain problems in the legal profession may point to these same visible instances of misconduct
merely as "a few bad apples." See Ramos, supra note 53, at 1695 (noting this trend and subscribing to the
iceberg metaphor in his description of the growing problem of legal malpractice). Professor Geoffrey Hazard
offers an example of an attempted but incomplete shift in conception of lawyer misconduct. On Primetime Live,
he said "It's not as bad as you think. It's worse. They say there are only a few bad apples. That, of course, is not
true. There are quite a few bad apples." PRImETtME LIVE, Law and Disorder: Unethical Lawyers, (ABC
television broadcast, Feb. 10, 1994). Ted Schneyer discusses how treatment of lawyer or law firm misconduct as
"bad apples" hampers the recognition of institutional problems and the development of systemic solutions.
Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 6, at 1.
106. Professor Ted Schneyer wisely observes that one must examine both individual and institutional causes
of misconduct. He writes: "[t]o say that the bulk of unethical conduct in law firms has organizational rather than
individual roots may exaggerate the case. Yet it would be foolhardy to suppose, especially for the larger firms,
that bureaucratic failings and collective decisions do not play a significant causal role." Schneyer, Professional
Discipline, supra note 6, at 25.
107. Sources for the information included in this section are identified in Appendix B.
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clerks to federal judges.'0 8 Two others held senior editorial posts on their law
reviews.' 0 9 Three had been attorneys at the Department of Justice, and one of
those was Associate Attorney General." 0 Most of these lawyers received supe-
rior educations, both as undergraduates and as law students. Nearly all of them
became partners at large and prestigious law firms. Seven were managing
partners. "' Two others were the heads of departments in their firms. 12
Some of the lawyers had sterling reputations prior to the emergence of their
fraudulent activity. Gary Fairchild presents a prime example. After Fairchild was
fired by Winston & Strawn, Kelly A. Fox, the managing editor of Illinois Legal
Times said, "If someone asked me two weeks ago, 'who are the most impressive
lawyers in Chicago?' his name would have come up." 113 One of Fairchild's
partners said, "If you told me there was only one honest lawyer out of 476
lawyers here, I would tell you it was Gary Fairchild .... He seemed to be
perfectly open and above board. It's like when the kid next door turns out to be an
ax murderer.""l4 A Wall Street Journal article stated that "[s]everal partners
report that over the years, Mr. Fairchild occasionally second-guessed their
expense accounts and appeared ethically fastidious." 1
15
Several others among the sixteen lawyers had excellent reputations. Webster
Hubbell served as Associate Attorney General of the United States. Many
lawyers who worked with him at the Department of Justice regarded him as a
paragon of integrity. 116 Hubbell also served as Mayor of Little Rock, Arkansas,
Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court, and chaired the Ethics Committee
of the Arkansas Bar Association and the Arkansas Board of Bar Examiners.
Richard Salomon was an Advisor to the American Law Institute and assisted the
ABA Commission on Professionalism. His record shows a long list of publica-
tions, including several articles in legal ethics." 17 William Duker, who boasted a
law degree from Yale and a Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge, clerked for
108. William Duker and Richard Salomon.
109. Webster Hubbell and Timothy Flato.
110. William Appler, Gary Fairchild, and Webster Hubbell.
111. Edward Digges, Jr., William Duker, Harvey Myerson, Wilkes Morgan, H. Lawrence Fox, Gary
Fairchild, and Webster Hubbell.
112. James Crowley headed the litigation department at Thompson, Hine & Flory; Timothy Flato headed the
project-finance group at Latham & Watkins.
113. David Margolick, A Theft Scandal Ravages a Career at a Leading American Law Firm, N.Y. TIES,
May 13, 1994, at B18.
114. Id.
115. Stevens, supra note 44, at B3.
116. See Michael Isikoff, Hubbell Resigns at Justice in Rose Law Firm Dispute; Accused of Overbilling
Clients, Improper Expenses. WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1994, at AI(observing that Attorney General Janet Reno
"called Hubbell a 'tireless cruader for doing the right thing,' and she was confident he had done nothing
wrong.").
117. See entry on Richard Salomon in Appendix B.
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Judge Patricia Wald, worked as a lawyer at Cravath, Swaine & Moore, and then
became a law professor in Albany.
1 8
Not every one of the sixteen lawyers displays this "star" quality in the same
degree, but the litany of the lawyers'credentials and experience is impossible to
reconcile with the misconduct that led to prosecution and/or discipline for these
lawyers. One or two such cases could be explained as aberrational, but sixteen
such cases raise questions about our collective assumption that education and
professional achievement are necessarily associated with high standards of
integrity and professional conduct.
B. LAWYERS' INCOME, BILLINGS, AND BILLABLE HOURS
Many of the sixteen lawyers examined in this article had high managerial
positions, either as the managing partners of their firms, or of their branch offices,
or the heads of their departments. Many of these lawyers were rainmakers:
lawyers who brought in significant amounts of business, were responsible for
millions of dollars in annual billings, and themselves billed more hours per year
than most of the other lawyers in their firms.
Many of these lawyers billed enormous numbers of hours. Digges billed 5,800
hours one year. Two others billed at or above 3,000 hours a year at least in some
years. (Salomon billed 3,500, Flato billed 3,000.) Two others on the list are
identified in the articles about them as a "top-billing" partner (Fox) or as the
"highest biller" in his firm (Hess, although he claimed at his disciplinary hearing
never to have billed 2,000 hours). 119
Many of these lawyers were successful rainmakers, bringing in significant
amounts of business and responsible for millions of dollars per year in billings.
Flato was responsible for $4-6 million per year in billings, Taub for $1.5 million
per year, Hess for $1 million per year. 120
One ingredient in the development of the schemes to manipulate hours and
expenses billed may be the discretion that accompanies responsibility for the
management of large amounts of work. These lawyers tended to deal with big
clients that paid large fees. When one is dealing in big numbers, perhaps for some
lawyers small modifications in time sheets or expense vouchers seem insignifi-
cant or permissible.
Many of these sixteen lawyers were earning incomes that placed them at the
top of their profession during the same years that they engaged in billing and
expense fraud. Duker earned between $1 million and $5 millikon per year.
Digges earned $678,000 one year, Flato and Fairchild each earned $600,000
118. See entry on William Duker in Appendix B.
119. See Appendix C for sources on this data.
120. Id.
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during at least one year. Wolas was reported to earn about $500,000.12 1 Large-
scale billing fraud, then, is not caused by anything that most of us would
recognize as economic need. Perhaps for some people, high incomes contribute
to a loss of perspective, boundaries, or even integrity.
C. THE LAW FIRMS.
One might expect large-scale billing fraud to be uncovered at firms reputed to
be unethical or excessively aggressive or dishonest. Again our expectations are
not met - the law firms are or were among the best-regarded law firms in the
United States. If large-scale billing fraud occurred in these firms, does it occur in
others? Do some firms have institutional mechanisms or value systems that
would discourage or prevent such misconduct? Why was this type of fiduciary
failure possible at so many respected firms?
The sixteen lawyers included in this study were employed at fifteen firms.
(Two were at Winston & Strawn). Of those fifteen firms, one is defunct (Myerson
& Kuhn) and three have changed their names.12 2 Of the other twelve, seven are
among the 100 highest-grossing law firms in the United States in 1996, and six
out of those seven are in the top fifty.' 23 The seven firms collectively employ
3,800 lawyers.1 24 Of the other six existing firms, three employ over 100 lawyers
each (Chapman, Bronson & Weinberg), two are among the largest 350 firms in
the US (Chapman and Bronson), and one (Rose) was the firm of the first lady and
the former Associate Attorney General. William Duker's firm was a spin-off from
Cravath, Swaine & Moore.' 25 Myerson & Kuhn was a large firm representing
big-name clients before it filed for bankruptcy.' 2 6 Digges, Wharton & Levin was
a spin-off from Piper & Marbury, another very large firm. 127 Edward Digges, Jr.,
had been the managing partner at Piper & Marbury.
28
121. Id.
122. Digges, Wharton & Levin is now known as Wharton, Levin, Ehrmantraut, Klein and Nash; Duker,
Barrett, Gravante & Markel is now known as Barrett & Gravante. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 1997;
Sharon Walsh, Lawyer Says He Cheated Government; Guilty Plea Entered in Overbilling Case, WASH. POST,
Aug. 22, 1997, at G1. Weinberg & Green merged with Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul in 1999 and is now called
Saul, Ewing, Weinberg & Green. Conversation with Deborah Shortridge, Esq., June 1999.
123. In the 1997 AmLaw 100 rankings, Latham & Watkins was fourth, Mayer, Brown & Platt was seventh,
McDermott, Will & Emery was fifteenth, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld was twenty-fourth, Hundton &
Williams was 33r1, Winston & Strawn was 35 th, and Thompson, Hine & Flory was 88 th . See Table 2.
124. The larger the number of lawyers in these firms, the higher its ranking for gross billings. As of 1996,
Latham had 660 lawyers, Mayer had 643, McDermott had 610, Akin had 593, Hunton had 489, Winston had
487, and Thompson had 315. See Table 2.
125. Walsh, supra note 122, at G1.
126. Arlynn Leiber Presser, Lawyer Indicted for Overbilling, 91 A.B.A. J., May 1991, at 27.
127. Piper & Marbury is ranked 80th for gross revenue in the 1997 AmLaw 100 ($101 million). It had 294
lawyers and profits per equity partner of $310,000 in 1996. America's Highest Grossing Firms in 1996, The
AmLaw 100, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 1997, at special insert.
128. Rick Greenberg, Obsession: How a Blue-Blood Lawyer Sold His Soul to Regain His Birthright, 10
REGARDIES 48 (1990).
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Most of these firms have fine reputations. Of the Rose Firm, 2 9 for example,
Judge Digby of Arkansas said "if there was ever a law firm that stood at the top of
the heap in terms of eliteness, it was at the pinnacle." 30 As with the educational
background and professional accomplishments of the lawyers, it is surprising to
find a pattern of cases involving theft of large amounts of money from clients and
partners at these highly respected firms. One might imagine that the institutional
culture of such firms would lead to intolerance of this type of behavior, and that
the management structure would be designed to provide both training and
monitoring that would prevent or detect billing fraud. But these lawyers are not
just mavericks who slipped by an otherwise conscientious management structure.
In many instances, they were the managers. Their billing practices may have been
exempt from ordinary institutional scrutiny because of their senior positions. If
so, one might draw from these cautionary tales the message that legal organiza-
tions need to monitor their generals as well as their infantry.
It is difficult to get a clear picture of the reputation of a law firm. One crude
measure of a firm's reputation, however, is its size and income. Firms that grow
and prosper appear to enjoy high regard for their ability to provide quality client
service. Table 2 presents information about the ranking of the law firms in size
and income by legal newspapers.
TABLE 2
INFORMATION ABOUT THE LAW FIRMs
Firm at Time Information about Firm
Lawyer of Misconduct (Size, Reputation, etc.)
1 Edward S. Digges, Digges, Wharton Small litigation boutique in An-
Jr. and Levin, Balti- napolis, MD. The firm was
$3.IM more founded in 1984 by Digges and
two other lawyers from Piper
and Marbury. Digges' reputation
enabled his new firm to attract
such clients as Firestone, Walt
Disney, McDonnell Douglas, and
Dresser Industries. (Greenberg
90)
129. The Rose Firm was founded by U.M. Rose, who was a founder of the American Bar Association.
Claudia MacLachlan & Harver Berkman, Little Rock's Bar Shaken to its Core; Local Lawyers Reeling as
Washington Woes Come Home to Roost, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 11, 1994, at Al.
130. Id.
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Firm at Time Information about Firm
Lawyer of Misconduct (Size, Reputation, etc.)
2 Harvey Myerson Myerson & Kuhn, Among the partners at Myerson &
$2.5M New York Kuhn were Faith Whittlesey,
former US Ambassador to Swit-
zerland, and Michael Horowitz,
former General Counsel at OMB.
The firm employed 170 lawyers
before it folded. (Presser 91)
3 Wilkes "Skip" Mor- Bronson, Bronson & 137 attorneys as of 1996, 226th in
gan McKinnon, Santa size according to the NLJ 250.
$2.3M Rosa office
H. Lawrence Fox
$1.62M
Winston & Strawn,
DC office
Ranked 35th by gross revenue in
the 1997 AmLaw 100 ($187 mil-
lion). 487 lawyers. Profits per
equity partner of $500,000. Pro
bono grade of "B" (good) (data
for 96) (AmLaw 97).131 21st
largest of NLJ 250. Walter Mon-
dale was a lawyer there after he
was VP; Managing partner after
Fairchild was former IL Gover-
nor James R. Thompson; firm
represents General Electric,
Bankers' Trust and NatWest
U.S.A. (Margolick 94); "an old
and famously Republican firm."
(Goldberg 94) One Chicago liti-
gator named Don Reuben said of
the firm: "They always per-
ceived themselves - and prop-
erly so - as solid, savvy, ultra-
gentlemen, always in the know,
and a part of Chicago almost
from the day the Indians
came." 
132
131. 1 include this information on the evaluation of the firms' pro bono performance if it is available because
it may be that at firms where the pressure to produce billable hours is higher, the amount of pro bono work is
less. Perhaps firms that encourage pro bono work would be less likely to impose pressure on attorneys that
might encourage billing fraud.
132. Margolick, supra note 113, at B18.
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Firm at Time Information about Firm
Lawyer of Misconduct (Size, Reputation, etc.)
5 Maureen Walsh Chapman & Cutler, 199 attorneys as of 1996, 184th in size
$1.48M Chicago in the NIJ 250. 80th in American
Lawyer list of top 100 law firms.
1992 revenues were $84.5 million;
1992 per partner profits $305,000.
(Crains 5/30/94) Founded 1913,
respected for work in banking and
finance. (Anderson 94) Served as
bond counsel or underwriter's
counsel for Chicago for over 70
years. (Duncan 94a)
6 William E Duker Duker, Barrett, Gra- 23 lawyer firm; spin-off of Cravath,
$1.4M vante & Markel, Swain & Moore. (Walsh 97)
New York
7 William Appler McDermott, Will & Ranked 15th by gross revenue in the
$1.1M Emery, DC office 1997 AmLaw 100 ($281 million).
610 lawyers. Profits per equity part-
ner of $615,000. Pro bono grade of
"C" (fair) (data for 96). (AmLaw
97) 46th in size in the NU 250.
8 Gary Fairchild Winston & Strawn, Information about Winston &
$784M Chicago Strawn appears under H.
Lawrence Fox.
9 Michael X. Morrell Akin, Gump, Ranked 24th by gross revenue in
$500T Strauss, Hauer & the 1997 AmLaw 100 ($218 mil-
Feld, DC lion). 593 lawyers. Profits per
equity partner of $430,000. Pro
bono grade of "C" (fair) (data
for 96). (AmLaw 97) Number 12
in the 1996 NLJ 250.
10 Webster Hubbell The Rose Law Firm, Fifty-three lawyers as of 1994.
$482T Little Rock (Weisskopf 94) 133
133. An interesting note about the development of the firm is that the departure of major Rose rainmaker C.
Joseph Giroir, Sr. in 1988 cleared the way for the litigation department lawyers, Foster, Hubbell, Rodham, and
Kennedy to take control of the firm. Kim Eisler, Tangled, WASHINGTONIAN, Mar. 1995, at 56.
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Firm at Time Information about Finn
Lawyer of Misconduct (Size, Reputation, etc.)
11 James T. Crowley Thompson, Hine Ranked 88th by gross revenue in
$385T and Flory, Cincin- the 1997 AmLaw 100 ($93
nati million). 315 lawyers. Profits
per equity partner of $255,000.
Pro bono grade of "B" (good)
(data for 96). (AmLaw 97)
Number 64 in NLJ 250 for
1996.
12 Timothy Flato Latham & Watkins, Ranked 4th by gross revenue in the
$300-400T San Francisco 1997 AmLaw 100 ($363 mil-
lion). 660 lawyers. Profits per
equity partner of $760,000. Pro
bono grade of "C" (data for 96).
(AmLaw 97) 6th in size accord-
ing to the NLJ 250.134
13 Richard Salomon Mayer, Brown & Ranked 7th for gross revenue in
$254T Platt, Chicago the 1997 AmLaw 100 ($325
million). 643 lawyers. Profits
per equity partner of $425,000.
Pro bono grade of "C" (data
for 96). (AmLaw 97) Ranked
8th largest firm in the NLJ
250.
14 Sherman E Taub Tenzer, Greenblatt, 86 lawyers, ranked 386th in size
$225T Fallon & Kaplan, among US law firms in 1996.
New York (Largest 96) Ranked by American
Lawyer in 20th place among
underwriter's counsel for 1996;
raised $87.5 million. (Corrections
97)
134. Latham's average salaries for partners in 1990 were $670,000, more than double the average at Orrick,
Herrington, the firm that Flato left when he became a partner at Latham. David Newdorf, Why Plato Jumped
from Orrick to Latham, AM. LAW., Apr. 1991, at 19. However, profits per partner declined in the 1990s. At
Latham, the American Lawyer reported profits per partner in 1993 to average $460,000. Barbara Steuart,
Latham Says Partner Faked Expenses, RECORDER, Jan. 9, 1995, at 1.
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V. WHAT THE LAWYERS DID
A. HOW THE BILLING AND EXPENSE FRAUD WAS ACCOMPLISHED
To evaluate the billing and expense fraud that occurred in these cases, one must
consider the details of what was done and how it was done.135 Like jurors, we
then may discern the intentions of the actors. Our assessment of the wrongfulness
of the conduct may be affected by whether the conduct was sloppy, negligent,
reckless, or carefully calculated. Also the assessment is affected by who the thief
is and what his reasons for stealing were. A poor man stealing bread for his
sister's hungry child may not be as morally culpable as a wealthy person stealing
an extra hundred thousand a year to add to his already six figure income. 36 We
also might consider relevant the identities of the victims of the theft and the
character of the consequences to them. To understand the nature of the billing and
expense fraud committed by these lawyers, one must examine the methods by
which they accomplished their misappropriations.
135. See section IC for discussion of the limitations of what can be learned from public sources.
136. See generally VICTOR HuGo, LEs MISERABLES (Lee Fahnestock trans., Signet 1987).
Firm at Time Information about Firm
Lawyer of Misconduct (Size, Reputation, etc.)
15 Stanford Hess Weinberg & Green, Seventh-largest law firm in Mary-
$110T Baltimore land. Founded in 1918. As of
1993 it had 116 lawyers, in-
cluding 38 equity partners.
(Mullaney 94) The Baltimore
Sun reported that the firm had
a "solid reputation for its
work in complex banking and
commercial litigation." (James
95b)
16 Scott J. McKay Hunton & Williams, Ranked 33rd for gross revenue in
Wolas New York office the 1997 AmLaw 100 ($190.5
million). 489 lawyers. Profits
per partner of $350,000. Pro bono
grade of "A" (data for 96). (Am-
Law 97) Number 27 in the 1996
NLJ 250.
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TABLE 3
METHODS OF BILLING AND EXPENSE FRAUD
Name, Alleged
Amt. Stolen,
Dates of Misconduct
Methods of Billing and
Expense Fraud Alleged
-4- -4-
Edward S. Digges,
Jr.,
$3.1M
1984-1989
(Dresser 89)
.1 .4
Harvey Myerson
$2.OM
fifteen year pattern
(approximately 1980
to 1989)
(US v. Myerson)
Digges wrote fake time sheets, engaged in expense
fraud, inflated hours, billed for work not done,
billed for time of persons who did no work on mat-
ters billed on, engaged in "ad hoc value billing."
(St. Paul 92) One judge who reviewed the case
described the methods as "almost fictional," and
offered these examples: $98,700 billed for services
never performed by David Levin; almost $500,000
for time attributed to legal assistants, medical ex-
perts and law clerks, when the work billed for was
in fact done by the firm's receptionist and secretar-
ies, and $66,127.29 for legal and medical research
that cost only $394.98. (Dresser 89)
Digges' partners helped cover up the billing fraud
after complaints were made. The partners and their
wives spent part of a weekend at the firm produc-
ing fictitious time sheets to correspond with erro-
neous bills that had been sent to the client. The
wives were enlisted so that time sheets would re-
flect the handwriting of several people. (St. Paul
92)
Digges wrote over 100 checks on firm accounts for
personal expenses, claiming they were payments to
"expert witnesses" or other law-related work.
(Greenberg 90)
Reporter Paul Marcotte wrote "He was accused of
charging clients for time that was not used for
work; tacking personal expenses for travel, jewelry
and clothing onto large litigation bills to clients;
and directing other attorneys to falsely record the
number of hours they worked." (Marcotte 90) Part-
ner Lloyd Clareman said that when the "upward
adjustment" of a bill was insufficient, Myerson
yelled: "there's no way the bills are going to go
out like this. It's going to be done. And if you don't
want to do it, I'll do it myself." (Marcotte 90) Part-
ner Arthur Ruegger testified that Myerson "said 'if
you can't get the bills where I tell you to, I'll find
people who can.' " (Hurtado 92b)
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Name, Alleged
Amt. Stolen, Methods of Billing and
Dates of Misconduct Expense Fraud Alleged
Myerson's secretary said that for years Myerson
regularly took thousands of dollars from petty cash
and identified clients who should be billed for the
withdrawals. (Hurtado 92) Partners testified that
Myerson "would direct what he wanted the bills to
be for particular .matters or clients for particular
months," and that the amounts he designated bore
no relationship to the work that needed to be done
for the various clients. These billing targets were
announced at monthly lunch meetings. (US v.
Myerson)
Myerson was alleged to have taken more than
$400,000 from firm accounts, to have deposited a
$125,000 client check into his personal account,
(Cohen 89e) and to have doubled or quadrupled
the number of hours billed each month to Shearson
Lehman. (Brill 89) Myerson denied inflating hours,
claiming that associates did not record their time
accurately. A lawyer at Shearson recalled that
Myerson said "these goddam associates never
know how much time they really work." (Brill 89)
3 Wilkes "Skip" Morgan charged clients for costs he had not incurred
Morgan and services that had not been rendered. Also he
$2.3M billed for over $500,000 worth of time that he had
(1984 to 1991) not worked. (Osborne 92)
(Osborne 92)
4 H. Lawrence Fox Fox represented some legal fees to be expenses rather
$1.62M than charges for time worked. The amounts shifted
(1986-1991) were payable directly to him rather than to his law
(Groner 92) firm. Also Fox submitted false invoices to the law
firm from The Keefe Co., a lobbying firm. The firm
paid Keefe, who issued checks according to direc-
tions from Fox. One of the checks issued was for
$170,000, payable to Fox's wife. (Ex-Lawyer 92)
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Name, Alleged
Amt. Stolen, Methods of Billing and
Dates of Misconduct Expense Fraud Alleged
Maureen Walsh
$1.48M
(1991 to 1994)
(Petition)
Charged with ethical violations for billing time on
closed files, claiming to have worked hours billed
by associates, and billing her firm and clients for
personal expenses. Walsh also was charged with
inflating fees. An associate claimed that Walsh
asked him to create false time records. (Goldberg
94)
Walsh inflated legal bills to Harris Bank by $1.1 mil-
lion between '86 and May '94. She manipulated
her time sheets, adding "descriptions of services
which had not actually been performed, and attrib-
ut[ing] to other lawyers many... false descrip-
tions of activities." (ARDC Complaint) The com-
plaint reported that her billings to the bank were
inflated by over 1,500 hours. (Stevens 94)
Walsh billed Winston & Strawn for $248,000 of legal
work that was never done. (Stevens 94) She set up
files for fictitious clients and told Chapman that
she had been retained to provide these services.
(Rooney 96) She billed for blocks of time when
she was not working during vacations with her
boyfriend, a trip to testify in a friend's divorce
hearing, and a period when she was hospitalized
for asthma. (Buttry 96) Walsh was charged with
having caused her firm to overbill clients by about
$850,000. (Indictment)
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Name, Alleged
Amt. Stolen,
Dates of Misconduct
William F. Duker
$1.4M
(1990-1995)
(Walsh 97)
+ I
William Appler
$1.1M
(1986-1991)
(Re Appler)
Methods of Billing and
Expense Fraud Alleged
Duker intentionally overbilled the federal govern-
ment and destroyed and concealed records to con-
ceal his activities. (Duker Pleads 97) As managing
partner, he reviewed the time records of associates
and partners in the firm. He forwarded them to the
bookkeeper with written instructions directing the
bookkeeper to increase the number of hours billed
above the numbers recorded by the lawyers. When
audited by FDIC, Duker gathered the original time
records and either concealed them or destroyed
them, and directed the firm office manager to pro-
vide false information to the government. (Walsh
97)
Appler billed five firm clients (four corporations and
one trade union) directly without firm authoriza-
tion. He claimed to be taking vacation or doing
client development during some periods when he
was billing these clients. (Murawski 94) Appler
"had most of the payments mailed directly to his
home, so that his secretary would not see them; he
also forbade his secretary to open any of his
mail.... [He] spent many hours typing up fac-
simile legal bills to present to the clients, himself,
rather than having his secretary do them. And, of
course, he kept all the records for the bills at his
home." (Re Appler) He "often shifted fees to ex-
penses and vice-versa, to make the bottom line
agree with the billing totals he was submitting to
his firm's accounting department." (Murawski 94)
Appler deceived his firm, sometimes with the knowl-
edge and cooperation of clients. He also deceived
clients, sometimes billing over 24 hours per day, or
billing one expense to two clients. He billed
$16,000 of personal expenses to one client. (Mu-
rawski 94)
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Name, Alleged
Amt. Stolen,
Dates of Misconduct
Gary Fairchild
$784T
(1984-1994)
(Re Fairchild)
Methods of Billing and
Expense Fraud Alleged
Fairchild began inflating his expenses soon after he
became managing partner of Winston & Strawn. A
firm internal investigation concluded that he had
been reimbursed by the firm for at least $500,000
of personal expenses. Fairchild submitted for reim-
bursement photocopies of personal checks made
out to various companies and claimed that they
were business expenses. He destroyed the checks
after the firm "reimbursed" him. He also submit-
ted receipts for personal expenses (such as enter-
tainment and a family vacation), representing them
to have been business expenses.
By mid-1993, he was claiming about $8,000 per
month in improper requests for reimbursement.
(Stevens 94, Dillon 94) He hired his wife Maureen
Walsh, to collect some unpaid bills for Winston &
Strawn, and approved payment to her firm of
$248,000 for work that was not done. (Margolick
94)
9 Michael X. Morrell While at Akin Gump, Morrell persuaded a French
$500T pharmaceutical client to hire a dummy consulting
(1985-1990) firm he had set up (which had no clients or em-
(Torry 95) ployees) to arrange drug testing needed for FDA
approval. The client paid nearly $1 million to the
consulting firm; Morrell paid about half this
amount into his checking account, his profit-shar-
ing plan, or took it in cash. (Torry 95)
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Name, Alleged
Amt. Stolen,
Dates of Misconduct
___ .1 4
Webster Hubbell
$482T
(1989-1994)
(Information)
Methods of Billing and
Expense Fraud Alleged
Hubbell was charged with implementing a "scheme
to defraud and obtain money and property from the
Rose Law firm and its members, and from the
Firm's clients, by means of false and fraudulent
pretenses and representations." (Information) The
conduct alleged (and admitted in the guilty plea)
included over 400 instances of financial fraud, in-
cluding: obtaining client advance checks and other
firm funds to pay for personal expenses, represent-
ing that funds were for legitimate expenditures;
"alter[ing] various internal billing memoranda
through various means, including.., inflating the
number of hours of attorney time for which a client
was billed, above the actual hours worked;" caus-
ing "client advance checks drawn on the Firm to
be sent in payment of his and his family's personal
expenses for credit card purchases" on ten of his
credit cards." (Information)
Hubbell was charged with illegal activity from Jan.
1989-March 1994, but Hubbell pled guilty only to
fraud between 1989 and 1992. (Plea Agreement)
11 James T. Crowley Crowley obtained cash from his firm to pay some
$385T expenses and then requested reimbursement for
(1990-1992) those expenses. He altered expense reports and
(Re Crowley) credit card receipts, increasing amounts claimed;
sometimes he submitted particular expense reports
for reimbursement more than one client. (Solov 93,
Re Crowley 94)
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Name, Alleged
Amt. Stolen,
Dates of Misconduct
Methods of Billing and
Expense Fraud Alleged
12 Timothy Flato Flato traveled about 30 weeks a year, so legitimate
$300-400T travel expenses were high, but he was reimbursed
(1991-1994) for more than his actual expenses. He bought
(Mintz 96c) round-trip tickets between San Francisco and New
York, Hong Kong and London for trips he did not
intend to make, cashed in the tickets with airlines,
and submitted receipts to the firm for reimburse-
ment. The criminal complaint charged him with ten
such actions. (Newdorf 91) He altered receipts for
meals so that the reimbursements exceeded the
actual cost. (Osborne 95)
13 Richard Salomon Salomon overbilled Chrysler Corp. by at least
$214T $36,905, representing that he had worked more
(1990 to 1994) hours than he actually had worked. He was alleged
(Re Salomon) to have overbilled about 12 clients from Jan. '90
and Feb. '94. (Finkel 94; Re Salomon)
Some of Salomon's clients had policies specifying
limitations on payment for certain expenses. Salo-
mon directed that bills to those clients should be
altered to describe expenses that the client might
not pay as expenses the client would pay. (Re Salo-
mon) A partner said "if a client specified that it
would not pay for word processing charges, Salo-
mon reclassified them as LEXIS or photocopying
charges." (Nachman 94) He also collected fees for
referrals and client service which he never reported
to the firm, and charged the firm for personal
phone calls. (Re Salomon)
14 Sherman F Taub Taub charged personal expenses to the firm and to clients,
$225T -including $27,000 for flowers for his children's wed-
(1991-1994) dings, and the cost of meals, floral displays for the
(Statement of office, plane tickets and hotel accommodations for
Charges) non-business-related family vacations. (Notice of
Charges) Taub denied most of the charges, but admit-
ted billing clients for airfare and hotel accommodations
if he was working on a client's case during a particular
vacation. He said his "clients have approved and rati-
fied the specific expenses in question." (Answer to
Charges) Taub also arranged for legal fees to be paid
directly to him without finn approval. (Re Taub 96)
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Name, Alleged
Amt. Stolen,
Dates of Misconduct
Stanford Hess
$110T
(1984-1987)
(James 95a)
Methods of Billing and
Expense Fraud Alleged
Hess added extra units of time to hours billed to Fair-
fax (the client bank). Starting in '83 he did this by
hand. (AGC v. Hess 99, note 2). In '85 Hess and
Berman (President of Fairfax) agreed that the firm
would give the bank a 15% discount on fees, and
the bank would pay its bills on time. This discount
was approved by the firm and was to take effect
1/1/86 (Id. at 3). The bank did not pay. Hess then
began mannually to increase the amounts on some
pre-bills by 15% and then discount them by 15%.
(Id. at 5) Hess then directed an accounts clerk to
use a spreadsheet program that would add 15% to
every bill sent to Fairfax. (James 95a)
The judge who decided the malpractice case wrote
that "Hess did not act alone.... Implicated in the
scheme are the firm's administrative staff, the com-
puter division and individuals in the billing depart-
ment. Senior members of the finn, including ex-
ecutive committee members, also knew what Hess
was doing and how it was being accomplished."
(Bowling 95d)
16 Scott J. McKay Wolas allegedly billed clients for hundreds of hours
Wolas of work that he did not do; he continued to bill for
(1991-1995) legal work after he began to spend most of his time
(Vorobil 96) on liquor investing that involved a $100 million
Ponzi scheme. (Davis 97)
Many of the techniques described did not involve either "failure of judgment"
or "puffery", but reflect shameless, pre-meditated chronic thievery. Investigation
of Webster Hubbell turned up hundreds of instances of financial fraud. 137 Edward
Digges, his partners, and their wives spent a weekend fabricating time sheets to
137. See United States v. Hubbell, No. LR-CR-94-241, Information, Charging Document by Independent
Counsel, (E.D. Ark. 1994).
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put to rest a client's suspicions of billing fraud.13 8 William Appler spent hours
rewriting bills to attempt to increase his income and conceal his fraud. 139Maureen
Walsh set up files for fictitious clients. 140 Stanford Hess directed that a computer
program be set up to inflate fees systematically. 141
All of these people were licensed to practice law. Most of them undoubtedly
had some knowledge of the rules of ethics. Webster Hubbell chaired the
commission that proposed the adoption of a version of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct in Arkansas. How did these lawyers justify their behavior
to themselves? Did they become masters of rationalization and self-deception, or
did they lie awake at night tormented by guilt and fear of detection?
Many of the lawyers engaged in billing fraud over a period of years without
detection. Did others in their law firms know what they were doing? If so, why
were they not stopped? Were other lawyers in their firms engaged in similar
practices? Were some partners aware of the misconduct but reluctant to intervene
because they were profiting from their partners' behavior, or because of fear of
harm to the firm's reputation? Even if the lawyers didn't intervene, why didn't
accountants or secretaries raise questions? The methodical multi-year patterns of
fraud suggest profound failures of individual integrity and institutional failures.
The inventory of methods used to commit billling and expense fraud reveal
why some methods were preferred over others. A lawyer can obtain money more
directly through expense fraud than by inflation of hours. When Timothy Flato
was "reimbursed" for plane tickets he never used, he "cash[ed] in" his tickets
and then submitted the receipts to his firm. 142 If a lawyer inflates his hours, his
annual billables increase, and his annual draw might be larger. But because the
client usually pays the inflated fee to the firm, the lawyer receives no direct
financial benefit. This may explain why William Appler and Richard Salomon
illicitly billed some clients directly. 143
Another variable in choice of methods is taxation. Reimbursement for business
expenses ordinarily would not be reported as income, so the lawyers would not
138. See St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc. 972 F. 2d 341 (4th Cir. 1992) (unpublished opinion).
139. In re Appler, 669 A.2d 731, 734 n.5 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995).
140. John Flynn Rooney, Grand Jury Indicts Fairchild: Stole $900,000, Cm. DAILY L. BuLL., Nov. 14, 1996,
at 1.
141. Jane Bowling, Weinberg Rainmaker Hess Admits Padding Work Hours, DAILY REC., Apr. 26, 1995, at 1.
Maureen Walsh's attorney, George Collins, stated that Chapman & Cutler, Walsh's firm, had a similar system
under which a lawyer could key in a command to the computer billing system that would add ten percent to the
hours to be billed to a client. Collins said the lawyers added this premium when they believed that the work done
had been of particular value to the client. Telephone interview by research assistant Theresa J. Fuentes with
George Collins (Sept. 18, 1997).
142. D.M. Osborne, A Career Unravels at Latham, AM. LAW., Mar. 1995, at 19.
143. John Murawski, Should William Appler Be Disbarred: Ex-McDermott, Will Partner Claims Mental
Illness Drove Him to Embezzle $1 Million From Finn, LEGAL TiaSas, Jan. 3, 1994, at 1; In re Salomon, MR
10420 (Ill. S. Ct., Sept. 23, 1994).
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pay income tax on phony or inflated reimbursements. A perpetrator of expense
fraud would keep one hundred percent of the dollars stolen, while a time sheet
inflator might increase his annual salary or bonus by billing more hours, but even
if he did so he would keep only the after-tax portion of his inflated income.
Perhaps these issues were part of the thinking of H. Lawrence Fox, who
characterized some hourly fees as expenses. The amounts then were payable
directly to him rather than to the firm and were not taxed. 144
The methods of billing and expense fraud inventoried in Table 3 are those that
could be detected and proven by investigators. Expense fraud is considerably
easier to detect than billing fraud, because some items purchased (for example
Harvey Myerson's $89,000 gift purchased at Cartier 145) obviously are not
expenses associated with the delivery of legal services. Inflated hours are more
difficult to identify. The methods actually used by these lawyers to increase their
incomes may be more diverse than those described here.
B. WHAT THE LAWYERS BOUGHT WITH THE MONEY
Much criminal activity is responsive to the kinds of things for which we stand.
Individualism, hedonism, materialism - these are criminogenic values: they
have utility for the production of many social and individual boons, they may
be preferable on some grounds to different social emphases. But they have their
price, and part of that price clearly appears to be the phenomenon of white-
collar crime. 146
We don't know most of what these lawyers did with the bulk of the money they
obtained improperly. A sample of the uses of these funds is available, because
some of the lawyers asked the firm or their clients to reimburse them for personal
expenses, and some of those improper reimbursements were later traced and
identified. Examining what the lawyers did with even a portion of the stolen
money may help to understand the motivation for the billing and expense fraud.
In some cases it is clear that stolen funds were used for items listed below. In
other cases luxury purchases are listed simply to illustrate the lawyer's standard
of living, which may have been supported by billing or expense fraud.
144. Jonathan Groner, Who Was Bilked; Ex- Winston & Strawn Partner Prbed on Theft Allegations, LEGAL
TMEs, Aug. 5, 1991, at 1.
145. Brill, supra note 51.
146. James William Coleman, The Theory of White-Collar Crime from Sutherland to the 1990s, in WHITE
COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 53, 61 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 1992) (quoting a study by Meir and
Geis).
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TABLE 4
WHAT THEY BOUGHT
14 7
Name & Alleged
Amt. Stolen How the Lawyers Spent the Stolen Money
I Edward S. Digges, Spent about $1.2 million to renovate Hinchingham,
Jr. his 310 acre pre-Revolutionary War estate on
$3.IM the Eastern Shore of Maryland. (Groner 89, Geye-
lin 89, Greenberg 90) Expenses included "electri-
cal and architectural work, painting, carpentry,
well-digging, landscaping, furnishings, antiques,
a satellite TV system," and other things. (Green-
berg 90)
2 Harvey Myerson Improperly charged to Webster & Sheffield among
$2.5M other things, personal trips to Japan and Spain, and
his season hockey tickets. While at Myerson &
Kuhn, used a firm check to purchase a ring at
Cartier's for a female friend that cost $89,000.
(Brill 89, Geyelin 90) He also used firm funds for
vacations with his family, suits and fur coats.
(Geyelin 90)
Other expenditures included "dog food, dry cleaning
for his clothes and toupee .... Concorde tickets,
chartered helicopter rides, lawn furniture, Cuban
cigars, Hermes scarves, dresses at Giorgio of Bev-
erly Hills, visits to the spa at Baden-Baden, Ger-
many, a $20,000 weekend at the Kentucky Derby."
(Hurtado 92a) Myerson's personal chauffeur was
paid by the firm, listed as a "messenger." (Brill 89)
During his summation in the criminal trial, Myer-
son said to the jury: "I'm entitled to spend any of
my money for whatever I want to spend it on."
(Hurtado 92a)
3 Wilkes "Skip" Mor- Morgan reportedly "stole funds to support a lavish
gan lifestyle that including restoring World War II air-
$2.3M craft, owning six cars, including two BMWs and a
Mercedes, and cruising on a 22-foot boat." (Dietz
92)
147. Where information was not available on a lawyer's purchases, the lawyer's name is omitted from the
table.
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Name & Alleged
Amt. Stolen How the Lawyers Spent the Stolen Money
4 H. Lawrence Fox Purchased three Jaguars, first class trips to Europe,
$1.62M several thousand for a Rolex watch, $16,000 for
season tickets to Redskins games, $3,800 for bi-
cycles, and improperly charged for personal ex-
penses such as interior decoration and renovations
for homes in Alexandria, VA and Nag's Head, NC,
corned beef shipped from a deli in New York,
memberships in athletic clubs. (Fox 92, Outfoxed
92)
5 Maureen Walsh Hosted a birthday party for a friend at the Four Sea-
$1.48M sons Hotel that included makeup, manicures, mas-
sages, and lunch. The party was billed to the firm
as a seminar and lunch for minority business own-
ers. (Rooney 96b) She billed as business expenses
vacations in the Caribbean and Sun Valley, Idaho
with her male friend, and tickets to Broadway
shows. (O'Connor 96)
She hired a public relations consultant to create fa-
vorable publicity at the time of her husband's res-
ignation from Winston & Strawn and submitted the
bill to the firm for reimbursement, claiming that
this service had been performed for another client.
(O'Connor 96) She billed the firm and clients for
the cost of a high school reunion trip to the Carib-
bean for herself and three friends. (Buttry 96)
6 William F Duker Duker reportedly purchased a "luxurious vacation
$1.4M home in Miami and kept a yacht in Newport, R.I."
(Barrett 97)
7 William Appler Appler bought 900 bottles of wine. He billed clients
$1.iM $15,000 for meals and other personal expenses. He
went on "wild shopping sprees spending $120,000
on wine and $40,000 on ceramics." (Murawski 94)
1999]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
Name & Alleged
Amt. Stolen How the Lawyers Spent the Stolen Money
8 Gary Fairchild Charged at least $500,000 in personal expenses to the
$784T firm, including club memberships, insurance pre-
miums, and tickets to entertainment. (Herman 94)
He also billed as business expenses maid service,
orthodontist bills, and plumbing work. (O'Connor
96) He also bought clothing, jewelry, furniture,
catering services, and paid apartment fees using
funds charged to the firm or to clients. (Samborn
95)
9 Michael X. Morrell Charged the firm for personal expenses such as park-
$500T ing, DC Bar dues, credit card bills, tickets to bas-
ketball games at Georgetown, and club member-
ships. Also made donations to Friends of the
Kennedy Center (which he chaired). (Torry 95)
10 Webster Hubbell Hubbell had four children in private schools and a
$482T wife who loved to shop. He also had $106,000 in
credit card and unsecured loan debt and a $400,000
mortgage. Colleagues thought that Hubbell's bill-
ing fraud was motivated by a desire to maintain his
lifestyle. (Labaton 94)
11 James T. Crowley Used firm funds to pay medical and nursing home
$385T expenses for his ailing mother; charged the firm for
personal travel, auto repairs, and items bought at
Victoria's Secret. During the time when the finan-
cial misconduct occurred he hosted lavish parties
and paid tuition at private colleges for his two chil-
dren; (Solov 93a, 93b) The expense padding con-
tinued three years after Crowley's mother's death
until he left the firm. (UPI 93)
12 Timothy Flato Less extravagant than some of the others, Flato saved
$300-400T some of the money he stole and spent some of it on
home improvements. (Mintz 96b)
13 Richard Salomon One of Salomon's partners said Salomon "didn't
$214T pocket any of the money, and the number of hours
billed were not relevant to decisions about com-
pensation of partners." (Nachman 94)
14 Sherman F. Taub Charged the firm for personal expenses such as air-
$225T plane tickets, hotel rooms, meals, flowers for his
children's weddings. (Adams 94, Update 96)
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Many of the lawyers used stolen funds to purchase expensive luxury
items, Jaguars, a Rolex watch, a fur coat. A few used some funds for
tickets to sporting events or shows, or for membership in exclusive clubs.
Several of the lawyers used some of the money for home improvements.
Timothy Flato is described as frugal and as having saved some of the
money.' 48 Webster Hubbell is described as not having expensive tastes or
wearing expensive clothes. 149 Some of the others were clearly interested in
high-end living. Harvey Myerson was chauffeured around in a Cadillac limou-
sine driven by a chauffeur whose salary was paid by his firm.15 0 The Fairchilds
lived in one of the most exclusive apartment buildings in Chicago.' 5 Ed Digges
bought a large historic estate. 152 Bill Duker bought a luxury vacation home and
yacht.1
53
There are threads of simple greed in these stories. All of these lawyers earned
six-figure salaries before they began fraudulent inflation of their bills and
expenses. Some of them, including Maureen Walsh and Ed Digges, came from
wealthy families. Harvey Myerson was compared by a judge to the protagonist in
Bonfire of the Vanities, a master of the universe whose income needs grew faster
than his income. But many of the lawyers were not simply motivated by greed.
Maureen Walsh and perhaps Richard Salomon inflated their hours in a manner
that would produce no direct increase in their incomes. Timothy Flato seems to
have been driven by a compulsion that was not much affected by greed. Stanford
Hess claimed he was just recouping what he was entitled to from a client who
wasn't paying the bills on time. 154 Perhaps for some of the lawyers obtaining
extra money was a method of winning a competition with their partners over the
division of the law firm pie.1 55
One thing that comes through clearly in this composite picture is that there is
little in the way of mitigating circumstances, and not the slightest hint of altruism.
James Crowley used some of the money to pay for medical and nursing home
expenses for his elderly mother. 156 None of the others appear to have any morally
defensible claim to needing extra income.
148. Howard Mintz, The Meltdown of Timothy Flato, REcoRDER, July 24, 1996, at 1.
149. Stephen Labaton, Hubbell Friends Try to Visualize Pillar of Community as Thief, COM. APPEAL, Dec.
28, 1994, atA4.
150. Patricia Hurtado, Just Like "LA. Law ", NEWSDAY, Apr. 23, 1992, at 120.
151. Stephen Buttry, Lawyer Admits $2 Million Fraud of Firm, Clients, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Dec. 20,
1994, at 1.
152. Greenberg, supra note 128.
153. Paul M. Barrett, William Duker Reaps Riches of His Profession, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1997, at Al.
154. Berkman, supra note 24.
155. Sources for the information in this paragraph are identified in Appendix D.
156. Diane Solov, Lawyer Took $225,000 from Clients, Partners; Disciplinary Panel to Decide on Sanction,
PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 30, 1993, at IF.
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How then are we to understand what these lawyers did? One point of reference
is the work of John Braithwaite, who compares economic crime by poor and
wealthy people and finds economic inequality to be a dominant factor in
explaining the activities of both white and blue collar criminals.157 Braithwaite
posits that "inequality increases crime by (1) decreasing the goods available for
use by the poor to satisfy needs; and (2) increasing the goods available to rich
people (and organizations) who have needs satisfied, but whose accumulation of
goods for exchange constitutes criminal opportunities to indulge greed." 1 58
Avaricious behavior by wealthy people, then, may be in part caused by their
disproportionate access to a high standard of living, which may have the effect of
stimulating greed.
VI. WHY DID THEY Do IT?
The "why" question has always intrigued criminologists ... but it seems to
have special appeal in white-collar crime cases. This is, in part, because
white-collar crime seems counterintuitive. We can understand intuitively why
those who are down-and-out may commit economic crimes ..... But these
forms of reasoning apply less easily to persons well placed in the society, who
have more in the way of material goods to begin with and who have much to
lose if caught in the commission of crimes. 159
A. "FEAR OF FALLING"
White collar crimet6  has been studied extensively. Social scientists have
worked since the 1930s to understand both individual and institutional dynamics
that explain, cause or permit white collar crime to occur. Wheeler points out that
part of the fascination of studying white-collar crime is to understand why people
157. See generally John Brathwaite, Poverty, Power and White-Collar Crime: Sutherland and the Para-
doxes of Criminological Theory, in WHrrE COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 78 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd
eds., 1992).
158. Id. at 81.
159. Stanton Wheeler, The Problem of White-Collar Crime Motivation, in WarrE COLLAR CRIME RECONSD-
ERED 108-09 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 1992).
160. David Friedrichs identified some features that define white collar crime, including "trust and its
violation" that the actors are respectable people who take risks. He says that in white collar crime, "a calculated
gamble is taken; the chances of being caught and punished are quite remote compared with the benefits that
accrue from committing the crime." Friedrichs would include the study of billing and expense fraud by lawyers
as "occupational crime," one subspecies of white collar crime. He defines occupational crime as "illegal or
harmful financially driven activity committed within the context of a legitimate, respectable occupation. Forms
include retail crime, service crime, crimes of professionals, and employee crime." FRIEDRICHS, supra note 2, at
9,11,12,14.
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who have great material wealth, professional reputations, and institutional power
engage in conduct that risks the loss of all of the above. Some researchers have
focussed on the study of individuals who engage in white collar crime, looking at
motives, values, skills, and at the circumstances that created the opportunity for
their activities. 161 Some examine the social values or organizational structures
that permit or encourage white-collar criminal activity. 162 Others investigate the
phenomenon of "criminalization," in which certain events once not defined as
criminal come to be regarded or legally defined as criminal. 163 When conduct
once acceptable becomes criminal, those who fail to acknowledge the shift in law
and values may continue to engage in the conduct with only dim awareness of the
risks involved.164
Some scholars suggest that there are significant personality differences be-
tween people who commit white-collar crime and those- who do not. 165 One
researcher articulated a personality profile of white collar offenders, urging,
according to sociologist David Friedrichs, that they are "clever, easily frustrated,
aloof, and quite creative in rationalizing their illegal conduct." 166 Another study
compared the personalities of 350 jailed white collar criminals and 350 unin-
dicted corporate executives. Those in prison were less rule-oriented, less depend-
able, and less responsible than the noncriminal group.1 67 Others observe that
white collar criminals, like most people, are primarily motivated by a rational
analysis of their own interests. 168 The literature on white-collar crime provides
useful perspectives through which to examine lawyer billing fraud and allows
comparison of the individual and institutional causes and consequences of billing
fraud and other white collar criminal activity.
Could these accomplished people have suffered some deficit in their profes-
sional education? Five of them graduated from law school before 1970169 and
161. Id. at 214.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Common examples of this pattern include the resistance of some adults to wearing seat belts or placing
small children in car seats. See Todd Beamon, Police Urge Residents to Buckle Up, WASH. POST, May 29, 1997,
at Ji ("Only 68 percent of the drivers and passengers in the 49 states with mandatory seat belt laws use the
devices, according to the National Safety Council. And of the 3, 328 children age 16 and younger who were
killed in traffic accidents, only 35 percent wore seat belts or were in child safety seats, according to the National
Traffic and Safety Administration.") Some do not know that these precautions are required by law. Others know
the law but elect not to comply, believing that the rules are wrong or for some reason do not apply to them. See
Mark Curnutte, Buckling Up in the Back: A Seat Belt Might Have Saved Princess Diana, but Should Wearing
One be Law?, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 26, 1997, at D1 (noting that opponents of seat belt legislation state
that requiring seat belt use is unjust government intrusion and seat belt tickets unnecessarily clog up the courts).
165. FRIEDRICHS, supra note 2, at 217.
166. Id., citing W. Criddle, They Can't See There's a Victim, N. Y. TMEs, Feb. 22, 1987, at E3.
167. Id., citing J. M. Collins & F. L. Schmitt, Personality, Integrity, and White Collar Crime: A Construct
Validity Study, 46 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 295 (1993).
168. Id. at 225.
169. Harvey Myerson (1964), H. Lawrence Fox (1964), William Appler (1969), Gary Fairchild (1969),
Stanford Hess (1966). See Appendix B.
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may not have had a course in professional ethics. Even so, these lawyers
undoubtedly learned basic concepts of honesty and integrity from their families,
schools, and communities. Many or perhaps most of these lawyers are honest and
decent people. 170 There are a few who may have been power-hungry or
unscrupulous, but not most of them. The question, then, is what caused these
lawyers to behave in ways inconsistent with basic notions of honesty and
integrity?
One possible explanation for the billing and expense fraud of these lawyers is
that they were so successful that they became fearful of loss of professional or
financial status. Like straight-A students who feel pressure to maintain perfect
grades, some of these lawyers may have been affected by what sociologist
Stanton Wheeler describes as "fear of falling." 171 In a 1991 study, Wheeler and
some colleagues posited that some white-collar criminals
would be reasonably happy with the place they have achieved through
conventional means if only they could keep that place. But the fate of
organizational success and failure, or the changing nature of the economy in
their line of work, may put them at least temporarily under great financial
pressure, where they risk losing the lifestyle that they have achieved. They may
perceive this situation as a short-term threat that can be met through short-term
fraud - a temporary taking to be restored as soon as business fortunes turn
around. The motivation for their crime is not selfish ego gratification, but rather
the fear offalling - of losing what they have worked so hard to gain. 172
Wheeler suggests that this phenomenon helps to explain the disastrous financial
collapse of Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson &
Casey and that of Myerson & Kuhn. Harvey Myerson was the managing partner
of both of finns.1
73
B. ABSENCE OF STABLE PROFESSIONAL BONDS
Sociologist David Friedrichs reports that some social science research has
concluded that "people with strong bonds (attachment, commitment, involve-
ment and belief) to conventional institutions (such as the family, the school and
the church) are constrained from engaging in delinquent or criminal conduct." 174
170. See Wheeler, supra note 159, at 109 ("[Mlany white-collar offenders have led lives not only unmarked
by prior trouble with the law, but characterized by positive contributions to family and community life."). While
the background of these lawyers seems surprising in light of their subsequent conduct, then, this discontinuity
apparently is observed among other white collar offenders.
171. Id. at 115.
172. Id at 117. Wheeler explained further that "[tihe logic [of fear of falling] applies as well to the loss of
status and prestige as to the loss of money. It might explain why someone like former president Nixon would
engage in a massive cover-up and obstruction of justice rather than suffer the drop in prestige that would have
occurred had he acknowledged... [the plumbers] burglary." Id.
173. Id. at 114-15.
174. FamnlucHs, supra note 2, at 228. Friedrichs reports that one study by Lasley found that "automobile
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The declining stability of individual and institutional bonds in the legal profes-
sion may have reduced the collective perceived constraints on illegal or unethical
conduct. As income generation has become a central objective of law practice,' 7 5
financial competition among partners in law firms has intensified. Lawyers who
switch firms have shorter and less stable relationships with their partners than do
those who practice in one firm for their entire careers. Some firm-switchers might
be less constrained from billing fraud than those who have built relationships
over decades.
Many of the lawyers in this sample switched firms at least once. While this
frequency of movement may be typical of law firm partners in the 1990s, perhaps
the decreasing degree of continuity and institutional loyalty in many law firms
contributes to an increase in the frequency of billing or expense fraud. Lawyers
move from firm to firm, individually and in groups, often motivated by the
prospect of higher incomes. This appeared to be a central reason why Timothy
Flato left Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe in 1991 to become a partner at Latham &
Watkins. 176 These sixteen lawyers worked at at least thirty-two different private
law firms. Seven were affiliated with only one law firm, but five worked at two
firms, two at three firms, one at four firms, and one at five firms. Some of the
moves occurred because of individual initiative, a few were the product of firm
mergers. In some instances financial ambition appears to have been a factor.
Three of the lawyers, Edward Digges, Harvey Myerson, and William Duker,
established their own firms after having worked at some of the largest firms in the
country. In each case the lawyer became the managing partner of the new firm. If
one motive to set up a new firm was to increase the lawyers' income, one result
may have been a reduced level of financial monitoring.
C. BAD APPLES?
Who are these lawyers? What can one learn about their values, their ambitions,
and their motives for billing fraud by looking at their backgrounds, interests,
hobbies, demographic characteristics, and personalities? The collective picture of
these lawyers shows some commonalities and many divergences. One cannot
confidently correlate any personal characteristics with the lawyers' dishonest
behavior; I simply note a few patterns among the lawyers.
Fifteen of the sixteen lawyers are Caucasian males who were in senior
corporation executives with strong corporate attachments and commitments were less likely to report that they
had committed white collar offenses against their employers than were peers with weaker such bonds." Id.,
citing J. R. Lasley, Toward a Control Theory of White-Collar Offending, 4 J. QuANTrrATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 347
(1988).
175. See John J. Marquess, Legal Audits and Dishonest Legal Bills, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 637, 639 (1994)
(citing annual survey of law firm performance measurement techniques).
176. David Newdorf, Top Orrick Rainmaker Defects to LA. 's Latham, RECORDER, Feb. 20, 1991, at 1;
Newdorf, supra note 134, at 18.
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positions at respected law firms. Most of them were in their forties or early fifties
at the time that their billing fraud was discovered.177 Many engaged in billing
fraud over a period of years, often during their forties. Perhaps this simply
describes an age bracket in which some ambitious lawyers reach positions of
power in their law firms; for some it also is a period of mid-life crisis. The
lawyers' backgrounds are heterogeneous. Some are from wealthy families, others
are not. Their fathers were lawyers, businessmen, law enforcement officers, and
in other types of work. Some are Republicans, some Democrats. Among them are
Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and people with no identified religious affiliation.
The group includes some "solid family men" and others who had extramarital
relationships and/or multiple divorces. All of the lawyers for whom such
information is available have been married at least once; all but one (of the twelve
for whom this information was available) have at least two children. Some of
them fathered several children. At least two of them have five children (Digges
and Myerson), one has four children (Hubbell), and three have three children
(Fairchild, Flato and Hess). Perhaps the number of offspring is related to their
economic success - in other words, they didn't have to worry about whether
they would be able to pay for college for more children.
178
Some of the lawyers were collectors. William Appler had an impressive
collection of wine. 179 Scott Wolas collected antique toy soldiers.1 80 Gary Fairchild
collected suspenders. Richard Salomon collected stamps."8 Judging by the fact
that he used stolen funds to purchase three of them, H. Lawrence Fox collected
Jaguars.182 There is some suggestion that Webster Hubbell's expense fraud was
partly designed to cover the cost of his wife's frequent shopping sprees.' 83 This
pattern of collections may have no significance at all; many people enjoy
collecting various things. But perhaps these lawyers' interest in collecting things
or shopping reflects a tendency toward compulsive acquisition that might be
connected to their billing fraud. It would not be surprising to find some
psychological commonality among these people who manipulated time sheets
and expense vouchers. '
84
The lawyers appear to have widely divergent personalities. Some are described
by friends or colleagues as aggressive, driven, ambitious people. Harvey Myer-
son was described as "abrasive"and the "Agent Orange of the legal profes-
177. I subtracted the year of birth for those for whom I had that information from the year in which the
allegations of billing fraud became public (based on published sources) and determined that their approximate
ages when caught were as follows: Walsh (39); Salomon (41); Digges, Duker and Flato (43); Hubbell and
Morgan (46); Myerson (50); Fairchild (51); Fox and Hess (52); Appler (53). See Appendix D.
178. Sources for the information in this paragraph are identified in Appendix D.
179. Murawski, supra note 143, at 1.
180. Mary Voboril, A Lawyer on the Lam, NEWSDAY, June 5, 1996, at B4.
181. WHo's WHo IN AMERICA, 1992-93, Vol. 2 (47th ed. 1992).
182. Outfoxed, LEGAL TiMs, July 6, 1992, at 3.
183. Labaton, supra note 149, at A4.
184. See infra section VI-D.
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sion," 185 H. Lawrence Fox as argumentative and a bully,1 86 Timothy Flato as "a
hard-charging lawyer," "intense and obsessed," 187 Scott Wolas as a "pit-bull
litigator.' 18 8 In contrast, Gary Fairchild was polite and gentlemanly; he could
hardly bring himself to use the words necessary to inform some lawyers that they
had been laid off. 189 Webster Hubbell enjoyed the respect and admiration of
many of the lawyers who worked with him, not only as an able lawyer, but as a
really nice guy who had good judgment and a strong sense of fairness.19 Perhaps
in some cases there are personality clues that might suggest that a person lacked
the integrity or the sense of self-restraint necessary to be fair and accurate in
billing clients. But some people who engage in significant billing fraud seem
among the least likely suspects.
D. MENTAL ILLNESS?
Perhaps there is a medical explanation for these billing fraud cases. One might
hypothesize that no self-respecting professional in his right mind would engage
in a pattern of dishonest behavior that, if discovered, would destroy his or her
career. There is evidence that the percentage of lawyers who suffer from
depression is much higher than in many other professions; 9 perhaps these cases
reflect a disintegration that is produced by institutional pressure. One researcher
posited that some white collar crime, like other crime, is motivated at least in part
by a desire for the excitement or thrill that accompanies the risks and rewards of
financial fraud. 19 2 Mental disturbance of one sort or another could be a factor in
this type of thrill-seeking behavior. Some of the lawyers accused of billing fraud
introduced psychiatric testimony in an effort to avoid disbarment or to reduce
prison sentences. This provides some data which is useful in thinking about the
psychological ingredients of these cases.
At least seven of these lawyers presented psychiatric testimony to the effect
that their professional misconduct was caused, at least in part, by mental illness.
185. Andy Blum, Bookshelf. Law and Hate, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1990, at A20.
186. Jonathan Groner, Ex Winston & Strawn Partner Probed on Theft Allegations, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 5,
1991, at 1.
187. Steuart, supra note 133, at 1.
188. Ann Davis, Proud Firm Defends Its Reputation, Sullied by a Vanished Ex-Partner's Outside Deals,
NAT'L L.J., May 13, 1996, atAl.
189. Stephanie B. Goldberg, Partnership of Trouble; Embezzlement Scandal of Law Firm Winston & Strawn,
CHI. MAG., Dec. 1994, at 84.
190. Labaton, supra note 149, at A4.
191. Professor Manuel Ramos notes that "Lawyers, some say, experience more mental health problems than
the population at large. Compared with persons involved in 104 other occupations, lawyers are almost four
times as likely to suffer from depression as the average person." Ramos, supra note 53, at 1699, citing William
W. Eaton et al., Occupations and the Prevalence of Major Depressive Disorder 32 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1079,
1083, 1086 (1990). The study cited by Professor Ramos indicates that the "rate of alcoholism and depression
among lawyers is two to three times the national average." Id. at 1716.
192. FRIEDRICHS, supra note 2, at 228, citing J. KATz, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME: MORAL AND SENSUAL
ATr, ACTIONS OF DOING EVIL (1988).
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Digges and Appler were found to have narcissistic personality disorder. Appler
was also found to have manic-depressive illness (also called bipolar disorder) and
to have engaged in alcohol abuse. Walsh was found to have developed a
manic-depressive state in part as a result of taking prednisone and tranquillizers.
Salomon was found to have obsessive-compulsive personality disorder. Flato
was found to be suffering from depression and anxiety. On the other hand,
various people who were familiar with the professional performance of Digges,
Morgan, Walsh, or Flato commented about each of them that they did not believe
that these lawyers were suffering from mental illness. Some of the comments
reflected skepticism about the psychiatric reports. 193
Maybe the psychiatrists and the skeptics are all correct in their observations.
These people were all highly-educated, intelligent, competent professionals who
displayed superior performance in many professional activities. Most were
high-functioning overachievers. They are a far cry from patients languishing in
mental hospitals. On the other hand, one sees in these cases patterns of intense
ambition, compulsive behavior and perfectionistic tendencies that reflect various
degrees of disturbance. The billing fraud itself suggests some degree of mental
disturbance because the behavior has such self-destructive potential. A mental
health professional might find a diagnosis that would describe any of these
sixteen lawyers. Perhaps, in fact, anyone accused of criminal conduct could be
described as having some sort of mental disorder. And, to turn the picture around,
one might look around the law firms that employed these lawyers and find many
professionals not engaged in billing fraud who exhibit some degree of mental
disturbance.
The mental health picture offers one important perspective on these stories, but
it raises as many questions as it answers. There is no bright line by which to
conclude that some of the lawyers' conduct can be explained by reference to
individual psychology while others are morally culpable competent people.
These lawyers exhibit different degrees of mental disturbance. The extensive and
credible evidence presented about William Appler would place him at one end of
the spectrum. He suffered from a serious disorder that is widely recognized to
cause behavioral disturbance. His billing fraud apparently occurred during a
period when he had stopped both medication and psychotherapy. Some of the
other lawyers were known to be obnoxious or aggressive or otherwise difficult to
work with, but none was conspicuously mentally ill.
E. THE LAWYERS' EXPLANATIONS
The lawyers' public comments about their misconduct, made after the charges
became public, offer snapshots of their reactions to the charges when first made
and, in some cases, of their publicly expressed sentiments prior to sentencing.
193. Sources for the information in this paragraph are identified in Appendix E.
[Vol. 12:205
BLUE-CHIP BILKING
These comments, which are collected at Appendix F, cannot be presumed to
reveal the lawyers' true feelings - they were comments made in public, often for
a specific instrumental purpose, damage control or sentence reduction. Neverthe-
less, they offer a window into the lawyers' view of their own conduct.
1. Denial and Rationalization
One striking pattern among the lawyers' statements is how many of them
reacted to the charges of billing fraud by denying any wrongdoing. Many of their
initial statements suggested that the very idea that they would engage in financial
misconduct was preposterous. William Duker commented that the goverment
audit "was an administrative annoyance that at worst would be settled with a
reimbursement to the goverment."' 94 Harvey Myerson denied that there were
any financial problems in the firm. Maureen Walsh's lawyer asserted that the
accusations against her husband bore no relationship to her. Michael Morrell's
lawyer said all the charges against him were incorrect. Webster Hubbell painted
his situation as a sort of gentleman's spat between himself and his partners.
1 95
How real were these denials? Did these lawyers persuade themselves that there
was nothing improper in their own conduct? Might the denials have been
disingenuous, intended to induce prosecutors to make lesser charges? Lawyers
are trained to rationalize, to place events in a favorable light. Did some of these
lawyers snooker themselves? Could a managing partner in a law firm add a digit
to a credit card receipt to increase his reimbursement and not know that he was
doing something improper? Could he persuade himself that he was simply
recouping unreimbursed expenses for which he had forgotten to get receipts?
Could he persuade himself that the inflation of hours on a timesheet was
legitimate because his partners were doing it also, or because a particular client
could afford to pay extra, and other clients would not be able to pay?196 Some
lawyers who engage in billing or expense fraud rationalize in this manner, and
sometimes their sense of financial propriety slips. One lawyer I interviewed
whom I called "Michael Williams" described the impact on his values of his
work in a large law firm:
I think law firms have stretched or redrawn many lines, and it's hard to think of
something that one can't justify doing .... It is a different world than it was
194. Barrett, supra note 153.
195. Sources for the information in this paragraph are identified in Appendix F.
196. "Michael Williams" (not his real name), a large-firm lawyer I interviewed for Lying to Clients, supra
note 97, said many lawyers at his firm would think: "[Wlell they are a rich client, they can pay, we can put a
couple more hours sown than we worked." Of his own attitudes he commented: "My billing is certainly
influenced by the size and ability of the client to pay. There's pressure to bill. .. at least eight hours a day and I
generally bill as much as I can to the richest client [and underbill] clients who can't afford standard rates .... It's
rough justice." Id. at 709.
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twenty years ago. I don't think some things that are generally accepted [now]
would have been accepted then. 1
97
A lawyer named Thomas Schneider was disciplined for expense fraud that
occurred in 1981, when he was a first year associate at Seyfarth, Shaw,
Fairweather & Geraldson. 19 8 Schneider collected $800 extra in travel reimburse-
ments by altering eight credit card receipts; he put a "1" before the amount listed,
overstating each expenditure by $100. The D.C. Court of Appeals described
Schneider's explanation for this behavior:
The hearing committee found that Schneider was attempting only to recoup
money that he believed he personally had advanced for other legitimate
client-related travel expenses. He believed each of these eight alterations
represented an accurate estimate of his out-of-pocket expenditures for the client
and were no more than the amount of money he believed he had advanced for
the client.' 9
9
Schneider was suspended from practice for thirty days.200 Schneider's rationaliza-
tion reflects at best a rough estimate of other expenses for which he might have
been entitled to reimbursement if he had kept some records of them. It is not
likely that he had eight sets of unreimbursed expenses of exactly $100 each.
Schneider's explanation illustrates how a lawyer might skip over the improper
aspects of his own conduct and look for a plausible justification. Did Schneider
consider whether this was a proper means of obtaining reimbursement? Did he
consider how his employer or his client would react to this practice if it were
disclosed? One D.C. Court of Appeals judge even suggested that the wrongful-
ness of deceptive behavior depends on the materiality of the gain.20'
The ability to rationalize is undoubtedly a useful tool for lawyers engaged in
billing and expense fraud. In the Schneider case this process seems understand-
able. (not to be confused with excusable), since the lawyer in question was
inexperienced and the amount of money involved was small. It is more striking to
find experienced lawyers (whom one would assume have had time to cultivate
and even polish their standards of integrity) rationalizing thievery.
This pattern of rationalization corresponds with studies of how other white-
197. Id. at 744. This, like the other interviews that were quoted in the article, were confidential in that I
promised not to identify the lawyers or the law firms where they worked. I assigned each lawyer a fictitious
name.
198. In re Schneider, 553 A.2d 206,206 (1989). Schneider received an undergraduate degree and a J.D. from
Harvard University, and a Ph.D. in industrial and organizational sociology from Oxford University in England
before he began work at Seyfarth, Shaw. L.J. Pendlebury, The $800 Showdown: DC Lawyer Fights Bar
Suspension, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 22, 1986, at 1.
199. Schneider, 553 A.2d at 206.
200. Id. at 212. The dissenting opinion suggested that this sanction was too harsh, and urged that a public
censure would be more appropriate. Id. at 215. The dissenting judge was concerned by the characterization as
"dishonest" of conduct that was not materially so. Id.
201. Id.
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collar criminals have explained their misconduct to themselves or others. One
important work is Donald Cressey's book, Other People's Money.20 2 Cressey
noticed that many of the embezzlers he studied occupied positions of trust and
that when they began to steal money, they said that in fact they were only
"borrowing it." 20 3 Stephen Box, another scholar, found that many white collar
criminals use five distinct strategies to rationalize criminal actions. 2° Friedrichs
summarizes these strategies as follows:
First, corporate officials can deny responsibility for any intentional wrongdoing
... by claiming that the relevant laws are vague or ambiguous, that the incident
was an accident, or that other parties made the key decisions. Second, they can
deny injury... by rationalizing that their activities have actually been economi-
cally beneficial. Third, they can deny the existence of a victim.., by claiming
that no one was really harmed by their activity. Fourth, they can condemn the
condemners ... by claiming that the laws themselves are an unwarranted
interference with free enterprise. And fifth, they can appeal to higher loyalties
... by affirming that the needs of the corporation and its stockholders (or their
own families) should take precedence over obedience to mere laws.20 5
At least three of the lawyers - Digges, Myerson, and Walsh - claimed that
while the bills showed amounts due based on a multiple of hours worked times
the lawyer's hourly rate, the clients understood that the lawyers used factors other
than time in setting the fee. The lawyers essentially claimed that they properly
inflated the number of hours worked to make the fee correspond with the value
conferred on the client. Maureen Walsh went as far as to wrap herself not only in
law firm policy but in the ethical rules, pointing out that Rule 1.5 explicitly
authorizes lawyers to consider other factors besides the amount of time worked in
setting fees.2 °6 Ed Digges claimed that there had been a gross misunderstanding;
202. DONALD R. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (1953).
203. FRIEDRICHS, supra note 2, at 231 (describing Donald R. Cressey's book, Other People's Money).
Friedrichs observes that "because rationalizations, neutralizations, and accounts most typically surface after the
crimes have been committed, it is not always clear to what extent they facilitated the lawbreaking in the first
place, or developed later as attempts to excuse wrongdoing." Id.
204. Id., citing STEvEN Box, POWER, CRIM AND MYSTIFICATION (1983) and G. M. Sykes & D. Matza,
Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency, 27 AM. Soc. REV. 664-670 (1957).
205. Id.
206. Model Rule 1.5 says in part:
A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of
a fee include the following: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent
to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the
lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; the amount involved
and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by he client or by the circumstances; (6) the
nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation and
ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MODEL RULES Rule 1.5.
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he never intended to bill solely on the basis of time spent but his own scheme of
"ad hoc 'value billing' "instead. 20 7 Harvey Myerson claimed that his agreement
with Shearson Lehman entitled his firm to bill $800,000 per month regardless of
the number of hours worked.2 °8 Myerson also claimed that other lawyers in his
firm had engaged in overbilling without his knowledge. 20 9 This "standard
operating procedure" defense has been used by other white collar offenders. One
study of convicted violators of the antitrust laws reported that they often claimed
that the conduct that led to their convictions was a common business practice or a
business necessity.
210
2. Prosecution Breeds Remorse
Several of the lawyers expressed anguish and remorse at the conclusion of the
criminal proceedings. Just before sentencing, each of these lawyers had every-
thing to gain by acknowledging wrongdoing and expressing regret. But at least in
some cases the expression appears to have been quite sincere. The confrontation
that occurs when billing fraud is investigated or prosecuted may be an effective
antidote to self-deception through rationalization .2 1 Gary Fairchild, for example,
said at his sentencing hearing: "What I did was wrong, terribly wrong .... I've
disgraced my profession, betrayed my former law firm, irreparably harmed my
family and destroyed my life." 21 2 When confronted about his fraudulent scheme,
Wilkes Morgan confessed that he had done what was charged and turned over all
his assets (worth approximately $1 million) to the firm, including his home, his
cars, and his plane. 2 13 Gary Fairchild repaid a substantial sum of money.
214
The lawyers' comments are significant, but a more persuasive measure of their
remorse is their efforts to compensate the losses they caused. In this regard there
appears to be some divergence among the lawyers. Some appear to have been
good people who did bad things and then tried to make it right. Others made only
207. St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 341, 1992 WL 189491, at *1 (4th Cir. 1992)
(unpublished opinion).
208. Brill, supra note 51, at 5.
209. Jonathan M. Moses & Richard B. Schmitt, Myerson Trial Scrutinizes Subject Close to Most Law Firms:
Billing, WALL ST. J., April 6, 1992, at B7.
210. FRIEDRICHS, supra note 2, at 231, citing Michael L. Benson, Denying the Guilty Mind: Accounting for
Involvement In a White-Collar Crime, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 583-608 (1985).
211. One lawyer who worked with Wilkes Morgan described Morgan as having been so distraught [after the
billing fraud was discovered] that he "contemplated suicide before coming clean with Bronson partners."
Howard Mintz, Bronson Embezzler Blames Vietnam, RECORDER, Dec. 17, 1992, at 1.
212. Matt O'Connor, Ex-Top Lawyer Gets 2 Years for Stealing from Firm. Clients, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 22, 1995,
at 9.
213. Mintz, supra note 211, at 1.
214. Goldberg, supra note 189, at 84.
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minimal acknowledgments of wrongdoing and repaid only such sums as they
were legally compelled to. Perhaps they also are good people who did bad things,
but perhaps some of them have yet to rediscover their values.
VII. PENALTIES: PROSECUTION AND DISCIPLINE
Having explored what the lawyers did and some possible explanations of the
causes or motivations of the misconduct, I now turn to look at how these cases
were treated by law enforcement agencies and lawyer disciplinary agencies. This
exploration will show that in many of these cases, once an investigative agency
became involved, the lawyers' conduct was treated as serious criminal or
unethical behavior, deserving of substantial prison sentences and/or disbarment.
There are several cases, however, in which there was no criminal prosecution.
A. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Nine of the sixteen lawyers have been indicted on criminal charges, all by
federal prosecutors. Of the nine, one was convicted after a trial (Myerson); the
other eight plead guilty. Eight were sentenced to prison: 70 months for Myerson,
55 months for Fox, 33 months for Duker, 30 months for Digges, 24 months each
for Morgan and Fairchild, 21 months for Hubbell, and 12 months for Walsh. Flato
got six months home detention. Their criminal sentences included other sanctions
as well: some were ordered to pay restitution, some to submit to probation after
release from prison, some to pay fines, and a few to perform community
215
service.
What about the other eight? A couple of them are or may be the subject of
pending criminal investigations, but some others avoided prosecution. Why?
Perhaps William Appler was not charged because of the significant role played in
his conduct by mental illness.21 6 The others are more difficult to understand.
Perhaps resource constraints contributed to decisions not to indict some lawyers.
Prosecuting criminal cases against partners in large well-heeled law firms is a
resource-intensive business. Professor Charles Wolfram observed that prosecu-
tors are reluctant to indict lawyers in large law firms because "[y]ou're just up
against so much firepower, and the firm has so much at stake in terms of
reputation."217
Table 4 describes the criminal charges made against some of the lawyers and
the penalties imposed after conviction or guilty plea.
215. Sources for the information in this paragraph are identified in Table 5.
216. See infra Appendix E.
217. Amy Stevens & Milo Geyelin, Chapman & Cutler's Client Billing is Said to Be Investigated By US,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1994, at B6.
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TABLE 5
CRIMINAL CHARGES AND DISPOSITION
Name, Alleged
Amt. Stolen,
and # of
Months of
Prison Sentence Criminal Charges and Disposition
Edward S. Indicted November '89, charged with 6 counts of mail
Digges, Jr. fraud. (Marcotte 90) Pled guilty to 1 count of mail
$3.1M fraud, sentenced to 30 months prison and 3 years pro-
30 months bation, ordered to pay $1 million in restitution to
Dresser Industries and a $30,000 fine. (Legal 90)
Harvey Myer-
son
$2.5M
70 months
Charged with 15 counts of racketeering, fraud, con-
spiracy, and obstruction of justice, including charges
of fraudulent billing six clients over $2.5 million, and
stealing $1 million from his former partners. (Geyelin
90) Convicted of 9 counts, those involving defrauding
his clients, acquitted on charges of theft from his part-
ners. (Moses & Lambert 92, Jensen 'final act' 92)
Sentenced to 70 months in prison, 3 years supervised
release, restitution. (Lubasch 92) The judge imposed
the sentence recommended by the sentencing guide-
lines. He concluded that Myerson lacked remorse.
(Moses 92) When Myerson was convicted, federal
prosecutor Sean O'Shea said "The verdict itself is
unprecedented in that it addresses fraud at a top-flight
law firm with top-flight lawyers.... It means we can
apply this law to lawyers no matter how powerful
they are. We're talking about Harvard and Columbia
trained lawyers." (Myerson Guilty)
Convictions affirmed on appeal; (US v. Myerson 93) US
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Myerson later was
convicted of tax fraud and mail fraud for writing
checks for over $400,000 to his brother-in-law, who
then returned to the money to Myerson. Also charged
with mail fraud for obtaining a $1.75 million loan by
forging releases on liens against art works he owned.
(Frost 92, Lubasch 92)
3 Wilkes "Skip" Indicated October '92; pleaded guilty to mail fraud and
Morgan tax evasion December '92. (Mintz 92) Sentenced to 2
$2.3M years in prison. (Faked 92)
24 months
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Name, Alleged
Amt. Stolen,
and # of
Months of
Prison Sentence Criminal Charges and Disposition
4 H. Lawrence Indicated on felony charges '92; (Outfoxed 92) pleaded
Fox guilty to 2 felony counts of mail fraud and tax eva-
$1.62M sion. Sentenced in October '92 to serve 55 months in
55 months prison with no possibility of parole. After completing
the prison term, Fox was to be on supervised release
for 3 years. In addition, Fox was ordered to pay $1.62
million in restitution, 21 8 and to perform 300 hours of
community service after release at an organization
that provides food for the homeless or some similar
service. (Ex-Lawyer 92)
At the sentencing hearing, Judge Hogan said: "The
court does not enjoy sentencing an attorney to jail.
At the same time, faced with the massive scheme in
this case and the evident greed that generated it, it
does not see in fairness to the public and society
at large and to the other members in our profes-
sion,... any other sentence that is appropriate."
(Ex-Lawyer 92)
5 Maureen Indicated for and pled guilty to 23 counts of mail, wire
Walsh and bank fraud in April 1997. Plea was fashioned as
$1.4M an "Alford" plea, acknowledged that government
12 months could prove the charges but did not admit guilt.
(O'Connor 97) In entering her guilty plea, Walsh said
"I now understand my mental capacity was dimin-
ished during this period.... I buckled under the pressure
... I flunked the character test.... I regret my actions and
the harm they caused my clients." (Stephens 97a) Sen-
tenced to 1 year in prison.
Commenting on the case, U.S. Attorney James Bums
said that part of the blame for Walsh's conduct falls
on the culture of a "prestigious silk stocking law firm"
where those who aspire to make partner must make
a "track record" by billing a lot of hours. (Van Duch
96)
218. $1,214,985 to Winston and Strawn; $229,892 to Sierra Pacific Resources; $123,255 to Kidder, Peabody
& Co.; $52,109 to Rohm & Haas Co. Ex-Lawyer Draws 55 Months in Prison, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at 12.
1999]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
Name, Alleged
Amt. Stolen,
and # of
Months of
Prison Sentence Criminal Charges and Disposition
6 William F. Pled guilty to charges of "mail fraud, filing false claims,
Duker making false statements, and obstructing a federal
$1.4M audit." (Duker Pleads) In a related civil settlement,
33 months Duker and his firm agreed to pay the government $2.9
million. Of that amount, the firm will pay $349,000;
Duker will pay the remainder. (Duker Pleads 97) Sen-
tenced to 33 months in prison. (Weiser 97)
7 William Ap- Appler was not criminally prosecuted. He "apparently
pier avoided criminal prosecution by reaching a settlement
$1.1M with McDermott." (Re Appler)
8 Gary Fairchild Pled guilty to 1 count each of mail fraud and tax evasion
$784T in December '94. Indictment alleged theft of
24 months $784,200 from his firm and his clients. Fairchild
asked to begin serving time in prison immediately
upon entering his guilty plea. This request was
granted, time to be credited toward his sentence.
(Geyelin 94) Sentenced to 2 years in prison, the mini-
mum available under the federal sentencing guide-
lines. Fined $36,000, ordered to perform 5 hours a
week of community service after release.
The judge graduated from Northwestern law school one year
before Fairchild. He said the sentence reflected Fairchild's
"contrition, remorse, and his restitution to the firm and all
clients." (O'Connor 95)
9 Michael X. None reported in the press.
Morrell
$500T
10 Webster Hub- Charged with mail fraud for a statement of services sent to
bell FDIC "for the purpose of executing the ... scheme to
$482T defraud and to obtain money and property by means of
21 months false and fraudulent pretenses." (Infonnation) Billed RTC
twice for $30,000 of work. (Isikoff 94) Charged with tax
evasion for not reporting as income money improperly
obtained from his firm and his clients. (Information) Pled
guilty December '94. Agreed to provide information to
Independent Counsel Ken Starr and to file amended tax
returns for the years '89 to '92. (Plea Agreement)
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Name, Alleged
Amt. Stolen,
and # of
Months of
Prison Sentence Criminal Charges and Disposition
Began serving sentence of 21 months in August '95 at a
minimum security prison in Cumberland, Maryland.
The complex "resembles a college campus, with a
softball field, pool tables, two handball courts, basket-
ball courts and a jogging track." (Prison) Possible
work assignments included landscaping, auto me-
chanics, warehouse work and janitorial work. (Prison
95) Hubbell kept an extensive journal while in prison
and used it to write a book. (Ahrens 97)
11 James T. Crowley's conduct did not lead to criminal charges.
Crowley (McCarty 97)
$385T
12 Timothy Flato Pled guilty to 2 counts of mail fraud (8 other counts dis-
$300-400T missed), April '96. (Crawford 96b) The prosecutor
6 months recommended probation with 6 months at a halfway
home deten- house. The plea agreement also included a promise to
tion pay restitution of at least $139,000 and $20,000 in
fines. (Crawford 96a) Flato was sentenced to 6
months home detention. The prosecutor attributed the
light sentence to Flato's "extraordinary acceptance of
responsibility" for his conduct and his extensive co-
operation with investigations by the firm and the US
Attorney. (Mintz 96c)
13 Richard Salo- None reported in the press.
mon
$214T
14 Sherman F None reported in the press.
Taub
$225T
15 Stanford D. In April '95 the chief of criminal investigations for the
Hess state attorney general's office reported that there had
$11OT been no complaint alleging criminal activity relating
to Hess' billing scheme. (James 95a)
16 Scott J. Criminal investigation of Wolas' investment scheme
McKay pending. (Meier 96)
Wolas
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Timothy Flato's case presents a good example of the complexity that
lies behind the tidy numbers of dollars alleged to have been stolen. The
charges against Flato focused only on $139,000 of his falsified expenses,
all of which involve fraudulent reimbursement for airplane tickets. Of
the various misconduct that turned up in the investigation, this was
deemed the most certain to be proveable. 2 t9 The amount Flato was
charged with stealing was an important point of negotiation because it would
determine the range of penalties to which Flato would be subject.22 ' Flato
apparently admitted in court papers, however, to having stolen $300,000 to
$400,000 through expense fraud between 1991 and 1994.221 Professor Stephen
Barnett of Boalt Hall School of Law commented that the public charges were
confined to expense fraud, but ".... Flato billed $4 million to $5 million a year. If
he was cheating heavily on expenses, how likely is it that all those hours were
legitimate? ' ' 222 U.S. Attorney Michael Yamaguchi said he had asked Latham
managing partner Robert Dell "about that, and they said they would take all that
into consideration., 2 3 Even so, the issue of inflation of hours never really
surfaced. Under the terms of Flato's guilty plea, he would repay at least $139,000
in restitution and $20,000 in fines. The prosecutors agreed not to oppose a
sentence of probation for Flato.2 24
It is discomfiting to imagine a sophisticated corporate lawyer negotiating with
a federal prosecutor over the amount that the lawyer will be charged with
stealing, when both the lawyer and the prosecutor are fully cognizant that the
actual amount stolen is much larger than the amount publicly alleged. After Flato
was sentenced to home detention, Robert Dell, the managing partner of Latham
& Watkins, said the firm had not intended that the prosecution would result in
Flato's incarceration. "We had no intention of seeing Tim put away. That was not
our goal.", 225 Was the firm in a position to direct the outcome of the plea
negotiations?
The records of the criminal and disciplinary cases against these lawyers do not
tell the whole story. They tell the part of the story that came to light. Many of the
219. Howard Mintz, Ex-Latham Partner Could Skip Jail Under a Plea Deal; Rainmaker Accused of Fraud
Would Have to Repay Firm, RECORDER, Apr. 16, 1996, at I ("Flato has been suspected of skimming as much as
$300,000 to $400,000 from the firm, but it appears the airline tickets became the most irrefutable evidence
assembled by the firm and the U.S. Attorney's Office.").
220. Id.
221. Howard Mintz, The Meltdown of Timothy Flato, TfE RECORDER, July 24, 1996, at 1.
222. Stephen R. Barnett, If Lawyers Cheat on Expenses, Why Not Billable Hours Too?, Letters to the Editor,
RECORDER, Jan. 23, 1995, at 5.
223. Barbara Steuart, Yanaguchi Keeps a Watchful Eye on Flato Investigation, RECORDER, Jan. 30, 1995,
at I.
224. Krysten Crawford, Former Partner at Latham & Watkins Makes Guilty Plea, RECORDER, Apr. 29, 1996,
at 1.
225. Mintz, supra note 221, at I.
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actors in these dramas, including the lawyers themselves, their firms, and their
clients, have powerful incentives to minimize the amount of information that
emerges. Even so, the stories are dramatic and, in some cases, almost unbeliev-
able. Imagine what the numbers and the facts of these stories might look like if
the whole picture was disclosed.
One reason Flato's timekeeping practices never became an issue is that the two
clients who had been the target of Flato's expense fraud were reimbursed and
continued to be represented by the firm.226 One client representative, Deutsche
Bank director Robert Simmons, wrote a letter on Flato's behalf during the
criminal proceeding, saying "[I1t is interesting to note that despite the disclosure
of overbilling, the legal fees charged ultimately to the client [by Flato] were
always reasonable relative to the charges of other legal counsel also involved in
the various transactions., 227 If the client is happy, did the lawyer do anything
wrong? Perhaps if the client is an individual spending his own money to pay the
lawyer, client concurrence in the billing practices after full disclosure would at
least suggest that no harm was done to the client. Even in the absence of
economic harm to the client, however, one might argue that any deceptive billing
practice by a lawyer is "wrong" simply because it is dishonest. A crime may be
punished without proof of damage to an individual; the purpose of law enforce-
ment is to implement the state's interest in punishing and deterring fraudulent
behavior. Deceptive or dishonest billing behavior may be harmful even if a
particular client is not aggrieved. Lawyers who rationalize billing and expense
fraud in one matter may repeat the misconduct in other cases. Lawyers who
engage in deceptive behavior may experience an erosion of their sense of
integrity.
But suppose, as in this case, the "client" is a bank? Or a corporation? And the
client representative is informed that the lawyer has been getting reimbursed for
plane trips not taken, and says "no problem"? The client representative may not
be concerned about the excess expenses because they don't cost him anything.
Further, he may have a close relationship with the lawyer and honestly believe
that the lawyer deserves a bonus for his excellent work. But perhaps the client
representative in this hypothetical scenario is violating his duty to the client entity
to avoid excess expenses, to conserve resources, and to make truthful records of
expenditures so that others in the organization may review them. The absence of
an angry client may reduce the likelihood of prosecution or discipline, but still the
conduct may involve serious wrongdoing.
The duration of the prison sentences was determined in some part by the
amounts of theft that were charged, but, as explained above, in some cases the
226. Id.
227. Id.
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amount that was to be charged was subject to negotiation during plea bargaining.
In many cases, the compromises made by the prosecutors during plea bargaining
are evident. Many counts were dismissed; some of the lawyers pled guilty to only
one or two counts of a longer indictment. The single exception is Maureen Walsh,
who pled guilty to all twenty-three counts in her indictment. In sentencing, the
judges took account of various other factors besides the amount of theft charged,
including evidence of remorse, restitution, and cooperation with investigators.
Maureen Walsh, who received the shortest of the prison sentences, was found to
have suffered from diminished mental capacity because of the medications she
was taking.228
Query whether this collective picture represents a group of privileged people
who evaded or minimized adverse consequences for their misconduct, or whether
the law is being enforced against them as it might be against others. Case studies
cannot provide a definitive answer to this question, but in this limited picture one
sees some vigorous law enforcement and some who apparently got away.
Most researchers who study white-collar crime posit that the odds of getting
caught are quite low. James William Coleman writes that "the idea that white-
collar offenders commit their crimes because they are unlikely to be punished has
been repeated so often that it has become something of a sociological truism....
Most [scholars] have simply chalked it up to the vast economic and political
power of the corporations and left it at that.",2 29 Perhaps these sixteen lawyers'
education, wealth, connections and reputations led them to suffer less onerous
consequences as a result of their crimes than they might have in the absence of
some of those advantages. William Duker, for example, was charged with
stealing only $1.4 million, but agreed in a civil settlement to repay the govern-
ment $2.58 million.2 3 ° If Duker had been criminally charged with theft of the
higher amount, the sentencing guidelines would have required the judge to
impose a longer prison sentence than he will receive for the lower amount. One
can identify some factors that may have affected prosecutors' attitudes toward the
plea negotiations in these cases. Each defendant and prosecutor share the same
profession. Some prosecutors and defendants probably had other things in
common professionally or socially. This type of affinity might lead to greater
compassion or leniency than might be shown toward another defendant. Alterna-
tively, it might evoke a higher than normal degree of moral outrage because the
prosecutor is evaluating the conduct of a fellow professional. Regardless of
whether economic privilege led to leniency, these sixteen cases show that some
lawyers in positions of enormous power and influence are being caught and
punished for misconduct that not very long ago was simply absent from criminal
228. United States v. Fairchild, No. 96-CR-718-1 (N.D. I11. 1997).
229. Coleman, supra note 146, at 62.
230. Walsh, supra note 122, at G3.
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law enforcement. These cases suggest that lawyer billing fraud has been "crimi-
nalized" during the last ten years.
Why? Is there more billing fraud today than there was ten years ago? I suspect
that there may be less billing fraud now than there was in the late 1980s. A high
water mark for lawyer billing fraud may have been set in the late 1980s. Partly in
response to the "feeding frenzy, 231 of the late 80s, now there are many more
formal and informal regulatory mechanisms in place. Corporate clients have
published billing policies for outside counsel; they routinely employ auditors to
identify excessive charges.232 More law firms now have explicit billing policies,
ethics committees, ethics training, and more extensive systems for review and
monitoring of billing practices. 23 3 This scrutiny may have deterred some billing
fraud. The increased formal and informal monitoring also reflects a change in
attitudes toward lawyer billing practices, and has precipitated some of the
investigation that led to the criminal charges against some of these lawyers.
B. LAWYER DISCIPLINE
All of the sixteen lawyers became the subject of disciplinary investigations. A
table showing what rules were alleged to have been violated by each appears as
Appendix G. Surprisingly, very few of the lawyers have been charged with
violation of Rule 1.5, charging an unreasonable fee, or the equivalent rule in the
jurisdiction. The most common of the alleged violations is 8.4(c): "dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation". Dishonest billing appears not to be regarded
as a per se violation of Rule 1.5. Perhaps this is because Rule 1.5 does not
describe - even in general terms - the prohibited conduct.234 The language of
Rule 8.4c is of course broad enough to cover billing fraud (as well as any other
dishonesty), but the language of the rule is too general to give notice to
231. See Lerman, Lying to Clients, supra note 97, at 714 (including comment by "Winston Hall," former
associate in a large law firm).
232. Smith, supra note 67 and accompanying text.
233. Epstein, supra note 72 and accompanying text. A few firms have gone so far as to implement a computer
program that "sweeps time entries from individual lawyers into a central file every 24 hours, sums up a lawyer's
daily fees and costs, and transmits the information electornically to clients' computers." Amy Stevens, Clients
Second-Guess Legal Fees On-Line, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1995 at B1.
234. See Lerman, Lying to Clients, supra note 97, at 750-53 (proposing changes in Model Rule 1.5 to set
consistent standards for hourly billing practices.) These proposed changes were of course not intended as a
complete solution to the problem, but only to suggest that people are in a better position to follow consistent
practices if they have guidelines. My proposal, which was intended to stimulate discussion, may have been
more specific in its mandate that is feasible or even appropriate. Nevertheless, I continue to believe that one step
in the prevention or deterrence of billing fraud would be to draft a rule on fees which would identify proper and
improper practices. Such a rule would put lawyers on notice of what was required or prohibited. Some lawyers
object that a specific rule on billing and expense fraud is not needed, that it would only state the obvious. My
experience leading discussions of lawyers at CLE programs and law students in Professional Responsibility
classes suggests that we are far from consensus on what billing practices are ethical.
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practicioners as to what types of dishonesty may result in discipline. Since some
rules explicitly permit some deception,235 a lawyer cannot read rule 8.4 simply to
prohibit all dishonesty.
Unlike many other white collar offenders, for many of these lawyers, the
discovery of their misconduct led to the termination of their professional careers.
To date, thirteen either resigned from bar membership or were disbarred. At least
six of those sought voluntary disbarment (Fox, Fairchild, Hubbell, Flato, Salo-
mon, and Taub). Crowley and Wolas were indefinitely suspended. Hess was
suspended for three years. The disciplinary action against Walsh is still pending,
but a divided panel recommended disbarment.236 These sanctions are consistent
with those imposed in many other overbilling cases. Where a lawyer represents
having worked more hours than were actually worked for the purpose of
increasing the fee charged to the client, disbarment is a common outcome.2 3 7
TABLE 6
DISCIPLINARY DIsPosrrIONS
Name & Alleged
Amt. Stolen Disciplinary Dispositions
I Edward S. Digges, Disbarred, Maryland, 1990, disbarred, US Sup. Ct.,
Jr. 1990. (Re Digges)
$3.1M
2 Harvey Myerson Disbarred, New York, 1998. (Discipline)
$2.5M
3 Wilkes "Skip" Mor- Disbarred by consent, California, 1992. (Re Morgan)
gan
$2.3M
235. Rule 4.1(a), for example, prohibits a lawyer from making a false statement of fact or law to a third
person , but the comments specify that some false statements are not to be regarded as statements of material
fact and therefore are nor prohibited by the rule.Rule 4.1(b) permits a lawyer to withhold information from a
third person even when the disclosure would avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, if the
information is protected by Rule 1.6. ABA, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1998).
236. Patricia Manson, Split Disciplinary Panel Urges Ex-Partner Fairchild's Disbarment, Chm. DAIy L.
BULL., April 28, 1999, at 3.
237. See, e.g., Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Okoch, 697 N.E. 2d 594, 597 (Ohio 1998) ("[O]btaining fees
by padding client bills with hours not worked... is equivalent to misappropriation of the funds of the client and
warrants disbarment."); Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Batt, 677 N.E. 2d 349 (Ohio 1997) (same); In re Miller, 735 P. 2d
591 (Or. 1987) (stating disbarment appropriate where attorney regularly added five to 15 hours to client's billing
statements); In re Jennings, 468 S.E.2d 869 (S.C. 1996) (concluding attorney disbarred for repeated doubling of
associates time without justification). These cases were cited by the Maryland Court of Appeals in its opinion
suspending Stanford D. Hess for three years. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hess, Misc. Docket AG No 55
(Md. Ct. App., Jan. 14, 1999)
[Vol. 12:205
BLUE-CHIP BILKING
Name & Alleged
Amt. Stolen Disciplinary Dispositions
4 H. Lawrence Fox Disbarred, US Supreme Court, 1992; disbarred VA,
$1.62M 1992, DC, 1993. (Re Fox 93)
5 Maureen Walsh Interim suspension ordered 1997, Illinois. (Manson)
$1.48M
6 William F. Duker Disbarred, New York, 1997. (Re Duker 97); dis-
$1.4M barred, DC, 1999 (Re Duker 99)
7 William Appler Disbarred, DC, 1995. Petition for rehearing denied.
$1.1M (Re Appler, Re Appler 2)
8 Gary Fairchild Disbarred by consent, Illinois, 1994. (Rooney 94)
$784T
9 Michael X. Morrell Disbarred, DC, 1996.
$500T
10 Webster Hubbell Disbarred by consent, Arkansas, 1995. (Re Hubbell)
$482T
11 James T. Crowley Indefinitely suspended, Ohio, 1994. (Re Crowley)238
$385T
12 Timothy Flato Disbarred by consent, California, 1996. (Montz 96a,
$300-400T Slind-Flor 97)
13 Richard Salomon Disbarred by consent, Illinois, 1994. (Re Salomon)
$254T
14 Sherman F. Taub Disbarred by consent, New York, 1996. (Re Taub 96)
$225T
15 Stanford D. Hess Disbarred, US Supreme Court 1999; (Re Hess); Sus-
$110T pended for three years, Maryland, 1999. (Opinion
99)
16 Scott J. McKay Suspended until conclusion of disciplinary proceed-
Wolas ing, New York 1997. (Re Wolas)
238. The court noted "the calculated, deliberate manner in which Respondent conducted and concealed his
fraudulent schemes," and found that he had committed a "gross abuse of a position of trust and responsibility
for personal gain... [and had] demonstrated a fundamental lack of appreciation for lawyers' ethical obligations
to the profession and the public." (Re Crowley)
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VIII. LAW FIRM RESPONSIBILITY FOR BILLING AND EXPENSE FRAUD
We have considered the individuals in the sixteen cases and the responses of the
criminal justice system and the disciplinary system. Now we turn to examine the law
firms where these lawyers worked. How was the billing fraud uncovered and by
whom? How did the firms respond to allegations of billing or expense fraud? Did they
report the lawyers to the bar? To a prosecutor? Did they conduct internal investigations?
At the time the misconduct occurred, did each firm have in place an ethics counsel or
committee, an internal procedure to audit billing practices, or some other system to
prevent and detect billing and expense fraud? Some of the variation in firm responses
and systems reflects absence of institutional consensus about whether the conduct
alleged was criminal or unethical and about whether the firm should handle the matter
internally or report it to the authorities.
A. HOW THE BILLING FRAUD WAS UNCOVERED
The detection of white collar crime depends on the interest and the courage of
informers and whistleblowers.2 39 People report misconduct by others for various
reasons. One group, who have been called "ethical resisters," report misconduct out of
felt moral obligation.24° This obligation may arise from personal beliefs or principles or
from a felt need to comply with a legal obligation. A lawyer might be obliged to report
unethical behavior or a service provider to report child abuse. Another group may report
misconduct for "blatantly self-interested or instrumental reasons." 24 One person in a
firm might report misconduct by another as retaliation for poor treatment, to gain
competitive advantage, or because of personal animosity. In evaluating the reporting
stories below, it is possible to identify all of these dynamics at work.
Many interesting questions arise in connection with the discovery and report-
ing of these lawyers' billing fraud. One is who first raised questions? Among the
lawyers listed above, the most common whistleblowers were other lawyers in
their firms. The press reported that Flato, Hess, Myerson, Salomon, Walsh, and
Wolas were the object of inquiries by other lawyers within their firms. 242 Some of
the lawyer-whistleblowers were associates who worked for the partners who
were investigated. Digges and Appler were investigated based on concerns raised
by secretaries. Morgan's investigation was triggered by a report from the firm's
accounting office. Hubbell appears from the available information to be the only
one whose investigation was triggered partly by a client inquiry. Only Timothy
Flato was reportedly caught by a partner reviewing an expense report.
243
239. FamDsicHs, supra note 2, at 22-23.
240. Id. at 24, citing M.P. GLAZER & P.M. GLAZER, THE WHISTLEBLOWERS (1989).
241. Id.
242. Much of the information presented in this article is drawn from published reports. It is possible that in
some cases the firm made an incomplete or an inaccurate report of how the lawyer's billing fraud was
discovered.
243. Sources for the information in this paragraph are identified in Appendix H.
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This composite picture raises as many questions as it answers, but a few
observations can be made. One is that the accountants, auditors, and firm
management are, with the exceptions of Flato and Morgan, largely absent from
the whistleblowers' club. Perhaps they were genuinely unaware of what in many
cases consisted of multi-year patterns of billing and expense fraud. If so, one
might conclude that the monitoring systems in the law firms were utterly
inadequate. With the benefit of hindsight it is apparent that many of these people
were engaged in patterns that could have been noticed and stopped much earlier.
You don't have to be Sherlock Holmes to know that a purchase at Cartier's or
Victoria's Secret might not be a legitimate business expense.
The least sinister of the possible explanations of institutional failure is
institutional ineptitude. But none of these firms was in other respects inept.
Perhaps the billing and expense fraud was known to other lawyers and not
investigated. Why? At some of the firms other lawyers may have been engaged in
similar practices. In some cases the lawyers in question were powerful enough
within their firms that no one wanted to challenge them. Perhaps some associates
were reluctant to question the conduct of partners for whom they worked. 24
Economic self-interest may have constrained some from intervention.
One might expect that complaints about lawyer billing practices would be
initiated by overbilled clients.245 In some states, more than twenty-five percent of
all client complaints of lawyer misconduct allege misconduct relating to fees.2 46
The clients are almost entirely absent, however, from the initial discovery of
these cases of billing and expense fraud. Why? One reason is that billing and
expense fraud is extremely difficult to detect. If a lawyer simply pads his
timesheets, who can tell? How could an auditor tell that four hours was really
two, or that a dinner at an elegant restaurant was with a date rather than with a
client? Even legal auditors cannot detect most of these deceptions.24 7
One reason that the clients in these cases are not the principal complainers is
that they may not have known that they were being bilked. Some of them were
apparently pleased with the legal services that they were receiving, and were not
244. In other research I have interviewed many law firm associates who were critical of what they regarded
as unethical billing practices by some of the partners they worked for, but who did not raise questions within the
firm. One lawyer, whom I called Chris Warden, explained that "you couldn't run and tell the management of the
firm... because they were the ones doing it." Lerman, Gross Profits, supra note 97, at 646.
245. Professor William G. Ross reported a study in which he asked eighty in-house lawyers if they believed
that their outside counsel deliberately padded their bills. Stevens, supra note 64, at B9. 15.2% of the lawyers
answered "frequently," 40.0% answered "occasionally," 35.6% answered "rarely." Id. Only 8.5% responded
"never." Id.
246. See, e.g., Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regulation, 1976
Am. B. FouND. REs. J. 917, 976 (1976) (listing categories of complaints recaived by a Michigan disciplinary
agency from clients, professionals, and others).
247. One law firm managing partner commented: "While some audit firms actually do uncover instances
where there has been outright fraud and totally unnecessary time spent, by far the most common 'audits' are
ones in which the 'auditor' has no idea what the case is about, who's working on it, why they're doing what
they're doing, and who's authorized them to do so." Counting the Coinage, CONN. L. TRIs., Jul. 15, 1996, at 23.
1999]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
concerned about how the bills were calculated.248 Many of these were large
corporate clients, accustomed to paying large legal bills to multiple firms every
month. The corporate representatives who reviewed the bills were not personally
responsible for the payments, and may have been less careful about reviewing the
bills than than they would have been if they were spending their own money.
249
Another interesting aspect of the whistleblowing chapter of these stories is
why and how each of these lawyers became the subject of scrutiny. Some lawyers
appear to have earned the deep and enduring animosity of their partners. If you
really detest one of your partners, and you happen to learn that he is writing
fictitious timesheets, you might be more inclined to initiate an investigation than
if your closest colleague is doing the same thing.
Some partners of the lawyers whose cases are examined here had ethical
questions about the conduct of the partner later caught overbilling before the billing
fraud was discovered. For example, some lawyers at Mayer, Brown & Platt questioned
whether Richard Salomon really graduated magna cum laude from Harvard Law
School long before concerns arose about his financial misconduct.25 °
In some cases interpersonal disputes appear to have led to investigation of billing
practices. Maureen Walsh, for example, was reportedly upset by the way she was
treated by James Spiotto, the managing partner of her firm.25' There were unconfirmed
allegations that she was the source of the leakage of information about Spiotto's
astronomical annual billings. 2 The investigation of Maureen Walsh's billings, in turn,
may have been a response to her conduct toward Spiotto or other lawyers in the finn.25
One could almost chart a history of attitudes toward billing fraud in large law
firms by looking at the emergence of information about Harvey Myerson's billing
practices over the years and the firms' responses to them. The first public report of
Myerson's overbilling related to a problem found by a comptroller at Webster &
Sheffield in 1979.254 The resulting investigation concluded that Myerson had
committed $120,000 worth of expense fraud. 255 The firm did not make a report to
the disciplinary authorities or to the US Attorney. The firm did not terminate
Myerson's employment. Instead, the managing partner had what was character-
248. For example, in mitigation of the disciplinary charges against him, Taub stated not only that "all of his
clients have actively declared their support" for him, but also that "virtually every one of [his] clients has
approved and ratified the [inappropriate expenses] and waived their right to be reimbursed." See In re Taub,
Before the Departmental Disciplinary Committee of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York,
First Judicial Department, Docket No. HP 34/95, Answer to Charges, Sept. 15, 1995.
249. See Duncan A. MacDonald, Gross Profits: A Client's Perspective, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 655, 656 (1994)
(noting that lawyers and clients who do not "manag[e] their relationship to get the most value for the expense"
are guilty of "gross mismanagement").
250. Sherrie F. Nachman, Mayer Brown Partner Exiled, Am. LAW., May 1994, at 26.
251. Dillon, supra note 52.
252. Id. James Spiotto reportedly billed 6,022 hours one year, and well over 5,00 during some other years. Id.
253. Jeffrey Bernfeld, Devotion to Client Welfare, Am. LAW., July-Aug. 1994, at 61.
254. Rita Healey Jensen, FinalAct Plays Out for 'The Harv', NAT'L L.J., Nov. 30, 1992 at 8.
255. Id.
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ized as a "Dutch-uncle" conversation with Myerson.256 Apparently $120,000 of
expense fraud was not regarded in 1979 by other lawyers at Webster & Sheffield
as anything to get too excited about. Not a crime, not a basis for disbarment, not
even a reason to fire a lawyer.
In 1983, one of Myerson's clients complained of large-scale overbilling. Myerson
persuaded the firm that the client was trying to avoid payment of a legitimate bill. The
firm wrote off $1 million in billings.257 Myerson's partners either believed his story or
were not concerned enough about the client's complaint to investigate. When Myerson
went to Finley Kumble in 1984, the managing partner knew that Myerson was
financially overextended, but Myerson was made a partner anyway.
258
In Myerson's case there were many warnings, but nothing was done. In 1989,
two former associates turned over some disturbing information to Shearson
Lehman, one of Myerson's clients.259 Perhaps those associates felt ethically
obliged to avoid further harm to a former client. Perhaps they were angry about
things that happened while they worked at the firm. Perhaps the slow escalation
of concerns about Myerson's financial shenanigans reflects a shift in professional
attitudes to regard cavalier behavior about billing and expenses as misconduct. And
perhaps the prosecution of Harvey Myerson legitimated the concerns of lawyers in
other firms who were aware of other lawyers engaged in billing and expense fraud.
B. INVESTIGATION AND REPORTING BY THE LAW FIRMS
In most jurisdictions, Rule 8.3 or its equivalent requires that "A lawyer having
knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the rules of
professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropri-
ate authorities." 260 (emphasis added) The responses of the law firms to discovery
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Brill, supra note 51.
259. Id.
260. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 8.3 (1999). Rule 8.3c says that Rule 8.3 "does not
require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6..." Most jurisdictions have a mandatory
reporting rule similar or identical to Model Rule 8.3. See STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 408-10 (1999) The prececessor to the ABA Model Rules was the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which was adopted in nearly every state. The Model Code included
an even stricter requirement to report misconduct. (It required reporting of known violations regardless of their
seriousness). The Model Code DR 1-103(a) provided that "a lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a
violation of [rules governing moral turpitude, dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation] shall report such
knowledge" to the appropriate authorities. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(a).
In California, where Wilkes Morgan and Timothy Flato practiced, there is no equivalent of Rule 8.3. See
STEPHEN GILLERS & RoY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 408 (1999) In the
District of Columbia (where H. Lawrence Fox, Michael X. Morrell, and William D. Appler practiced), there was
no obligation to report misconduct by other lawyers except if the lawyer was asked for such information by "an
investigating authority." DC Bar Ethics Committee Opinion No. 130, September 20, 1983; DC Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 8.3 (adopted 1991). But the jurisdictions in which the other eleven lawyers
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of billing and expense fraud by these lawyers offers one snapshot of the operation
of the reporting rules.
Rule 8.3 is perhaps the most widely violated and the most underenforced of the
disciplinary rules.26 ' The composite story of these sixteen lawyers reflects
variability in compliance with Rule 8.3. Among these cases, at least seven of the
firms reported the allegations of billing and expense fraud to disciplinary
authorities and/or to prosecutors.2 62 At least two other lawyers, Appler and
Fairchild, turned themselves in to the disciplinary agencies after they had been
informed that their firms had decided to report them.2 63
Some of the firms did not report the misconduct or delayed reporting for a year
or two. Harvey Myerson was the subject of an anonymous report to the New York
bar.26 Michael Morrell was reported to the DC bar by Akin, Gump, but not until
twenty-three months after the misconduct had been discovered. 65 This was
explained as the product of the firm's desire to learn all the facts.26 6 Scott Wolas'
alleged overbilling was not investigated by Hunton & Williams until a year and a
half after the first of three associates had raised questions about Wolas' billing
practices.267 The firm then conducted an internal investigation and concluded that
it could not be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt" that Wolas had engaged in
overbilling. At that time, the firm did not report any misconduct by Wolas to the
bar.268
Partners of Stanford Hess at Weinberg & Green met several times after
learning of Hess' computer program that inflated his bills by fifteen percent to
decide how the firm should respond.269 The partners differed about whether this
practiced, Arkansas, Illinois, Maryland, New York, and Ohio have had mandatory reporting obligations in effect
under the ethical rules that govern lawyers during the periods in which these lawyers engaged in billing and
expense fraud. See generally Michael J. Burwick, You Dirty Rat/ Model Rule 8.3 and Mandatory Reporting of
Attorney Misconduct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics 137 (1994).
261. In 1985, I conducted a continuing legal education program for the West Virginia Bar in collaboration
with the state Bar Counsel. One focus of our joint presentation was West Virginia's "tattle-tale" rule. The Bar
Counsel contended that this rule should be treated with the same seriousness as any other rule. I set out to prove
to him that his aspiration was far from reality. I asked him to turn his back (to protect him from knowledge of
reportable violations) and asked the assembled audience of about 100 lawyers to raise their hands if they had
seen disciplinary violations that met the standard in the rule and had not reported them to the disciplinary
authorities. Almost to a person, the lawyers in the audience raised their hands. Many acknowledged having
observed and not reported numerous instances of serious misconduct.
262. The seven identified lawyers whose misconduct was reported by their firms to the disciplinary
authorities and/or to prosecutors are Crowley, Flato, Fox, Hubbell, Morrell, Salomon and Taub. Sources for this
information are identified at Appendix "I".
263. Sources for this information are identified at Appendix "I".
264. Id.
265. Saundra Torry, Lawyer's Career Sinks Under Allegations; D.C. Bar Panel Finds Client Was Cheated,
Firm Was Decieved, WAsHi. POST, Au.g 5, 1995, at Al.
266. Id.
267. Ann Davis, Firms Handling of Allegations of Overbilling Brought Out in Suit, WALL ST. J., June 16,
1997, at B6.
268. Id.
269. Marcia Myers, Trial in Law Firm Overbilling Case Ends, BALTIMORE SUN, July 12, 1995, at B3. Marcia
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conduct was criminal, unethical, or no problem.270 These discussions eventually
led to a decision to tell the client about part of the overbilling.27' Some
allegations of billing fraud may not be reported because there is some uncertainty
even in reputable firms about what are the rules on billing practices and whether
certain questionable activities do or do not "raise a substantial question as to the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.",
272
These stories may reflect a rate of compliance with Rule 8.3 that far exceeds
the norm. A firm might be more likely to report to the bar misconduct that was
likely to become public and had the potential to harm the firm's reputation or
result in liability.
Four of the lawyers who were reported to the bar worked for law firms in or
based in Chicago. All of these reports occurred after the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court in the Himmel case.2 73 Himmel was the first American lawyer to
be disciplined exclusively for failure to report misconduct by another lawyer.27 4
In the wake of the Himmel decision, reports by lawyers of disciplinary violations
by other lawyers rose astronomically in Illinois, first to an annual peak of 922 in
1989, and then dropping to 602 reports in 1996, still an unusually high level of
reporting compared to other jurisdictions.27 5 The high rate of compliance with
Rule 8.3, in Illinois, then may be another reason for the high rate of reporting of
these cases. Illinois may be leading the nation in the discipline and prosecution of
billing fraud by powerful lawyers because of a ripple effect from the Himmel
Myers reported that the partners met eithteen times to discuss Hess' overbilling, Deborah Shortridge, ethics
counsel at Weinberg & Green, reports that the actual number of discussions was much smaller, and that some of
the eighteen meetings in firm records that show discussion of "Fairfax", Hess' client, focussed on matters
unrelated to the billing problem. Telephone interview with Deborah Shortridge, Esq., June 10, 1999.
270. James, supra note 24, at Al.
271. Myers, supra note 269, at B3.
272. MODEL RuLEs Rule 8.3 (1997).
273. In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988).
274. See Ronald Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's Unethical Violations in the Wake
of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 977, 982 (1988). Himmel involved a woman named Tammy Forsberg who was
injured in a motorcycle accident. Forsberg retained attorney John R. Casey to represent her in a personal injury
lawsuit against the driver of the motorcycle under a one third contingency fee agreement. Casey settled with the
defendant for $35,000.00, but failed to remit the $23,233.34 due to Forsberg. After several unsuccessful
attempts to collect her share of the settlement money from Casey, Forsberg hired attorney James H. Himmel to
collect it for her. Forsberg agreed to pay Himmel one third of any funds recovered in excess of $23,233.34.
Forsberg told Himmel that she only wanted to collect her money from Casey and had no interest in reporting
Casey to the disciplinary or other authorities. Casey agreed to pay Forsberg $75,000 in exchange for Forsberg's
agreement not to pursue a civil, criminal or attorney discipline action against Casey. Casey paid $15,400 of the
settlement, but failed to pay the remainder. Because of the default, Himmel obtained a civil judgment against
Casey for $100,000. Casey never paid the judgment. Himmel received no legal fees because the amount
collected was less than $23,233. Casey was disbarred by consent as a result of this incident. Himmel was
charged with unethical conduct for failure to report Casey's conduct. He was suspended for one year. See
Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 793-96.
275. Laura Gatland, The Himmel Effect, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 24 (chart entitled "Complaint Depart-
ment").
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case. 2 7 6 This suggests that better implementation of the reporting rules may be an
effective tool in efforts to deter and punish billing fraud.
C. REACTIONS OF PARTNERS AND OTHERS
One of the mysteries of these long-term large scale thefts is how the partners of
the lawyers engaged in billing fraud could not have noticed what was going on.
Perhaps they did notice but did not object because the partners got substantial
financial benefit from these "loose" and "messy" billing practices. In Harvey
Myerson's case, the jury found Myerson guilty of stealing $2.5 million from his
clients, but acquitted him of stealing $1 million from his partners. 277 Why?
Perhaps they thought Myerson's partners really knew what was going on. Lenora
Small, one Myerson juror, said of Myerson's partners: "All of them were sharing
in the good times and they didn't complain. The chauffeur's salary was right there
[on the monthly financial reports] in his Expense Reimbursement Limit. We
thought they had an obligation to ask questions. ' 278 Gregory Lambert, the
foreman, said of Myerson's partners: "None of them gave a s-t as long as they
were getting their money." 
279
A review of the public statements made by the lawyers' partners, and in a few
cases by clients, indicates that some were genuinely shocked to discover what
was going on, while others seemed to have known about the misconduct for a
long time. The firms' official reaction to charges generally conceals the possibil-
ity that anyone else in the firm had the slightest glimmer about the billing fraud.
The institutional voice claims high moral ground and denounces the discovered
corrupt behavior as aberrational. This type of organizational self-protection can
be seen even in the comments of some of the lawyers' clients; one example is the
Harris Bank, which issued a statement after Maureen Walsh's years of overbilling
were made public that "we are convinced it was an isolated incident.",
280
. D. WAS THERE ANY INSTITUTIONAL MONITORING OF BILLING PRACTICES?
One obvious lesson from these stories is that many firms need better systems to
monitor the billing practices of the lawyers in the firm, even, and perhaps
especially, the most senior lawyers. After Ed Digges' partners were held jointly
and severally liable for his billing fraud, and the firm's malpractice insurer was
276. See Darryl Van Duch, Best Snitches: Illinois Lawyers, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 27, 1997, at A l (noting that the
number of cases of Illinois lawyers reporting misconduct by other lawyers after Himmel is a "benchmark no
other state even approaches").
277. Rita Healy Jensen, Myerson Jurors Deliver Message; Never Trust an 'A'Student, NAT'L L.J., May 11,
1992, at 3.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Amy Stevens, Ex-Partner at Large Chicago Firm Accused of Overbilling $1.3 Million, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 14, 1994, at B3.
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found not obliged to cover the $3.6 million judgment ($3.1 million plus interest),
a vice president at St. Paul, the malpractice insurer, advised law firms to conduct
monthly reviews of all time sheets, and to make sure that the partners have access
to the billing records of all the lawyers in their firms.28' Professor Stephen Gillers
of New York University noted that the consequences of failing to discover billing
fraud can be dire. He said:
At least one court has used the failure to supervise (even a partner) as a basis for
vicarious liability [citing Dresser].... But ... agency law will make the firm
liable even if it had no reason to know of the default so long as the lawyer acted
within the scope of the partnership. Overbilling and stealing client money will
be within the scope because billing and maintaining escrow accounts that hold
client money are things law firms do.282
The Digges case illustrates that partners of a high-billing rainmaker may have
powerful financial incentives to turn a blind eye to improper billing practices.
"Nobody wants to kill a rainmaker," said Professor Roy Simon of Hofstra Law
School, commenting on the failure of partners at Hunton & Williams to intervene
in the improper activities of partner Scott Wolas. Even partners at firms known
for integrity may "worship the golden goose," said Simon.28 3
Sociologist Stanton Wheeler suggests that institutional culture is an important
contributing factor in the occurrence of white-collar crime. Wheeler asks, in the
context of the brokerage industry, what might happen where a firm that had
established a climate of risk aversion "hired a few greed seekers... ? Might they
not shift the climate in the firm from one of risk aversion to risk seeking?, 284
When corporate employees experience conflict between their own personal
values and those of their institutional employers, the institutional values tend to
have a dominant impact on the employees' behavior. Of this phenomenon,
sociologist Sally Simpson writes:
[I]n situations where individual morality and business concerns clash, the
former typically is relegated to the nonbusiness (and therefore irrelevant)
sphere. Similarly, in the corporate world ... there is little room for personally
held convictions and principles. Instead, morality is situational, always in flux,
changing along with social relations and networks within the organization.2 85
281. Adrienne C. Locke, Ruling to Force Law Firms to Watch for Misconduct, Bus. INs., July 15, 1991, at 2.
282. On Discipline, Troubled Lawyers, and the ADA, LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 17, 1994, at 12, citing Dresser Indus.
v. Digges, 1989 WL 139234 (D. Md. 1989); Roach v. Mead, 722 P.2d 1229 (Or. 1986); and New York v.
Grandeau, 526 N.E.2d. 270 (1988).
283. Ann Davis, Scandal Embarrasses Virginia's Hunton, NAT'L L. J., May 13, 1996, at Al.
284. Wheeler, supra note 159, at 118-19. Wheeler urges other researchers that a fruitful method of learning
about this phenomenon would be to interview offenders "who have been in the organizations that populate the
financial world [because they] might be able to tell us how they experienced the corporate culture, and whether
and how it encouraged or discouraged risk taking and illegality." Id. at 119.
285. Sally S. Simpson, Corporate-Crime Deterrence and Corporate-Control Policies: Views from the Inside,
in WHiTE COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 289, 291 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 1992).
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IX. FALLOUT FROM BILLING FRAUD
A. CIVIL LITIGATION
In addition to the criminal and disciplinary proceedings initiated in response to
the allegations of billing fraud in the sixteen cases, most of the cases spawned a
variety of civil litigation. Some clients sued the firms for legal malpractice or simply for
a refund of amounts improperly billed. Some of the firms sued the lawyers for
reimbursement of amounts stolen from the firm or from clients of the firm. In some
cases, other lawyers in these law firms have sued for wrongful discharge, alleging that
they were terminated at least in part for complaining about billing or expense fraud by
the lawyers whose conduct is examined in this article. While it was not possible to
identify all of the litigation generated as a result of these cases of billing and expense
fraud, that which could be identified is summarized in Table 7.
TABLE 7
CIVIL LITIGATION RESULTING FROM BILLING FRAUD
2 8 6
Name & Alleged
Amt. Stolen
Edward S. Dig-
ges, Jr.
$3.1M
Civil Litigation Resulting From Billing Fraud
Dresser Industries sued the law firm, Digges, and his
partners for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and
breach of contract. Partners Wharton and Levin were
found jointly and severally liable for $3.1 million, the
amount by which Digges overbilled Dresser. The part-
ners were held liable because "under Maryland law,
all partners are bound by a co-partner's malicious act
which is committed within the scope of the business
of the partnership, even if the co-partners did not au-
thorize, participate, or ratify the tortious conduct."
287
Also the partners were found to have benefitted finan-
cially from the billing fraud. The firm was found to
have breached its contract with Dresser "by charging
... for the time of... secretaries and... reception-
ists, whose job titles were misrepresented on bills.
DWL also failed to represent Dresser at a cost as
modest as the firm could maintain." (Dresser 89)
The firm's malpractice insurer was not obliged to pay
the $3.6 million (including interest) judgment because
the partners "at the very least... 'remained passive'
after having knowledge of Digges' overbillings," and
for other reasons. (St. Paul 94)
286. Information was not available on civil litigation resulting from some of these cases. Where information
was not available, the lawyer's name is not included in the table.
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Name & Alleged
Amt. Stolen Civil Litigation Resulting From Billing Fraud
2 Harvey Myerson Shearson Lehman sued Myerson & Kuhn for $2 million,
$2.5M alleging that the firm had billed for more hours than
the lawyers had worked. (Cohen 89a) The firm denied
overbilling, claimed that it was entitled to a fixed
amount of fees each month, regardless of the number
of hours worked. (Cohen 89c) The firm agreed to pay
nearly $1.1 million to settle this lawsuit. (Cohen 89d)
However, the firm failed to pay almost $500,000 of
the settlement, and Shearson obtained a judgment
against the firm for that amount. (Shearson v. Myer-
son & Kuhn 93)
3 Wilkes "Skip" Bronson, Broson & McKinnon and Hartford, its mal-
Morgan practice insurer, had agreed that the insurer should
$2.3M pay the firm $2,669,000 under the firm's policy for
losses suffered as a result of Morgan's theft while he
was at the firm. The firm claimed Morgan had stolen
$3.5 million from the firm and its clients. The insur-
ance company initially paid $1,685,000 of the amount
promised, but claimed that it should not have to pay
the remainder because the firm had recovered that
amount from Morgan's assets. An arbitration panel
awarded the firm $984,000, finding that Hartford had
to pay the full amount before it could assert its right to
the money. (Steuart 94)
4 H. Lawrence Fox Fox was alleged to have colluded with Richard McCos-
$1.62M tis, outside general counsel to Barr Labs, to overbill
Barr, a client of Fox's, by $756,251.75, which was
divided between them. Winston & Strawn reimbursed
Barr Labs, and sued McCostis and Fox for reimburse-
ment. McCostis' insurer declined to defend him based
on a policy exclusion of suits for "the return of or
restitution of legal fees." (McCostis 94) The Second
Circuit found the clause ambiguous as to its applica-
tion to disputes over fees paid to third parties, and
remanded for consideration of extrinsic evidence on
intent. (McCostis 94)
287. Dresser Indus. v. Digges, 1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17396 at 16 (1989), quoting Meleski v. Pinero Int'l
Restaurant, 47 Md. App. 526, 531 (1981).
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Name & Alleged
Amt. Stolen Civil Litigation Resulting From Billing Fraud
6 William F. Duker Duker and his former firm agreed to a civil settlement
$1.4M under which Duker and the firm would pay nearly $3
million dollars to the US in settlement of civil claims
arising out of Duker's fraud against the FDIC and
RTC. (Press Release 97)288 The firm was to pay
$350,000 of the $3 million settlement, and Duker was
to pay the balance. (Fitz-Gibbon 97, Walsh 97)
8 Gary Fairchild Chester Nosal, a former partner at Winston & Strawn,
$784T sued the firm for wrongful discharge. Nosal was one
of 20 partners laid off in '93. The partner layoff was
orchestrated by then-managing partner Gary
Fairchild. Nosal alleged bad faith retaliation by the
firm for Nosal's repeated requests to examine firm
books and financial statements. Nosal asserted that if
he had been permitted to review financial records, as
provided in the partnership agreement, he might have
discovered Fairchild's embezzlement.
In 1996, an Illinois appellate court found summary judg-
ment improper because there was a question of fact
whether the expulsion of 20 partners was a violation
of their duty of good faith to each other.2 89 If the firm
is found to have wrongfully fired Nosal, it could be
subject to judicial dissolution. (Nosal 96, Winston 96)
9 Michael X. Mor- Akin, Gump paid $3.2 million in settlement to two of
rell Morrell's clients to avoid being sued for malpractice.
$500T (Torry 95) The firm sued Morrell for reimbursement.
The case was dismissed because Morrell had paid a
$50,000 settlement to one of the companies; the
settlement was found to preclude additional liability.
(Relief 95)
288. This is more than the amount stated in the guilty plea; different factors were used in the calculation of
civil damages.
289. The opinion stated that "It is well-established that a fiduciary relationship exists between partners and
that each partner is bound to exercise the utmost good faith and honesty in all matters relating to the partnership
business." Ill. App. Ct. Revives Expelled Partners 'SuitAgainst Chicago Firm, PROF. LtABILITY LmG. REP., May
1996, at 3 (summarizing Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, No. 1-95-0819 (Ill. App. Ct., I Dist. 1996).
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Name & Alleged
Amt. Stolen Civil Litigation Resulting From Billing Fraud
10 Webster Hubbell In '96 the Rose Law Firm sued Hubbell for $457,000
$482T in damages for fraud, larceny and embezzlement.
Hubbell was ordered to pay $135,000 in restitution
when he was sentenced after pleading guilty to
criminal charges. (Rose 96) The suit was settled by
consent judgment in '96. Hubbell agreed to reimburse
the firm $300,000, including all but $25,000 of the
restitution ordered by the criminal court. (Consent
Judgment)
Stanford D. Hess
$110T
Fairfax Savings Bank, Hess' primary client at Weinberg
& Green, sued the firm for $70 million for legal mal-
practice, alleging that Hess padded bills, sometimes
by more than 30%, and that Weinberg handled a mat-
ter in which it had a conflict of interest and failed to
provide the bank with sufficient advice regarding
some loan documents. (Bowling 95a) The firm
claimed it had disclosed the potential conflict,
and that Fairfax had waived malpractice claims
in exchange for payment of $275,000. (Berk-
man 95a)
The trial judge ruled that the firm was not liable for mal-
practice because the bank had waited too long to sue.
The firm had disclosed the fee inflation to Berman in
1987 and reimbursed him. Berman had signed re-
leases from any liability for the overbilling. (Bowling
95d) The bank waited until '94 to file suit over the
events that occurred between '84 and '87. Meanwhile
Hess and others at W & G continued to represent Fair-
fax. (Torry 95) The judge called Hess "greedy" and
described his conduct as "outrageous." Without find-
ing civil liability, the judge noted that criminal pros-
ecution and disciplinary action could still be brought.
(Bowling 95d)
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Name & Alleged
Amt. Stolen Civil Litigation Resulting From Billing Fraud
16 Scott J. McKay Two of the former associates are suing for wrongful dis-
Wolas charge because they claim they were forced out of the
firm after they complained about Wolas' billing prac-
tices. (Davis 97) One of these suits was dismissed
after a successful summary judgment motion by the
law firm; the court concluded that the associate was
terminated before he raised any concerns about
Wolas' billing practices. (Geary 97, Geary 99) At least
two lawsuits have been filed against Wolas and
Hunton & Williams by investors in the liquor scheme,
alleging fraud and securities violations. The suits as-
sert that the firm knew Wolas was engaged in an ille-
gal investment scheme and failed to intervene.
(Shoket 96)
One important benchmark in this snapshot of civil liability for billing fraud is
the Maryland decision that Ed Digges' partners were jointly and severally liable
with him for the $3.2 million malpractice judgment that resulted from Digges'
overbilling. 290 The malpractice insurer was found not to be obliged to pay this
judgment.291 The Digges story may be the most resonant of these cautionary
tales.292
Many firms have elected to reimburse clients for amounts improperly billed
and then attempted to collect from the lawyers who engaged in overbilling. Some
of the lawyers have worked valiantly to pay for all of their misconduct, but in
other cases the firms have had some difficulty collecting reimbursement from the
offending lawyers. Michael Morrell, for example, escaped liability to Akin Gump
by making a separate (relatively modest) settlement with one of the clients.2 93
Recently a few lawyers who were professionally harmed by these lawyers'
misconduct have sued to obtain compensation from the law firms. Among these
are the wrongful discharge suits brought by lawyers at Winston & Strawn and
290. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Digges, No. JH-89-485, 1989 WL 139234, at *5--6 (D. Md., 1989), affd, 972
F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1992).
291. Id. at 5-6.
292. For a general discussion of partner liability, see Robert R. Keating, Liability of Members, 243 A. L. I.
125 (1996); Charles O. Lorenson, Firms Should Consider Limited Liability Entities, 9 W. VA. LAW. 14 (July
1996); John Richards, Illinois Professional Service Firms and the Limited Liability Partnership: Extending the
Privilege to Illinois Law Firms, 8 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 281 (1996); Walter D. Schwidetzky, Is It Time to Give the S
Corporation a Proper Burial?, 15 VA. TAx REV. 591 (1996); Developments in the Law, Lawyers Responsibilities
and Lawyers Responses: Shifting the Costs of Liability, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1651 (1994).
293. A source for this information is identified at Table 7.
[Vol. 12:205
BLUE-CHIP BILKING
Hunton & Williams, claiming that the firms retaliated against them for attempting
to intervene in the billing practices of, respectively, Gary Fairchild and Scott
Wolas.2 94 These represent one corner of the burgeoning litigation by lawyers
against their law firms.
295
B. CONSEQUENCES TO THE LAWYERS
Almost all of the lawyers resigned or were fired from the law firms at which the
billing and expense fraud took place. Some of them then became partners at other
firms or carried on practicing law in the face of allegations of serious unethical
and/or criminal conduct. Stanford D. Hess left Weinberg & green to become a
partner at Neuberger, Quinn, Geilen, Rubin & Gibber, P.A., where he remained
until he was suspended. James Crowley was forced to resign from Thomson,
Hine, but two weeks later had become a partner at Reminger & Reminger, a
smaller Cleveland firm. 2 9 6 This affiliation apparently terminated when he was
indefinitely suspended from practice in Ohio.297 William Appler rented office
space at Epstein, Becker & Green and set up a solo practice that lasted four years
until he was disbarred in D.C.2 9 8 More recently Appler has worked as a
consultant on FDA matters in D.C.
2 9 9
Part of the story told by this "where are they now?" inquiry is that life goes on
and people survive enormous adversity. After Gary Fairchild was released from
prison, he began working as a sales executive for a corporation that he once
represented. 300 Harvey Myerson availed himself of the Florida homestead
exemption, which protects any personal residence from the reach of creditors,
and bought a historic mansion in Key West, Florida.
30 1
James Crowley was not able to survive the adversity that followed his billing
fraud. He committed suicide on October 6, 1997.302 Crowley purchased and
managed a restaurant and bar after he was suspended from the practice of law. He
later separated from his wife and moved into an apartment above the restau-
294. Id. See Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 106, 110 (1992) (stating that a firm's efforts to impede or
discourage a lawyer's compliance with the disciplinary rules followed by a discharge is sufficient to state a
cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee at will).
295. See Richard C. Reuben, Suing the Firm, A.B.A. J., _ 1995 at 68 (discussing the increase in wrongful
termination of employment suits filed by lawyers against their law firms).
296. Solov, supra note 156, at Fl.
297. Chris Thompson, State High Court Bans Lawyer: Ex-Thompson Hine Partner Suspended for Overbill-
ing Scam, CRAIN'S CLEVELAND Bus., July 25, 1994, at 2.
298. Murawski, supra note 143, at 1.
299. Summit, Visx Venture Files Suits to Collect Eye-Laser Royalties, WALL ST. J, Sept. 11, 1996 at B7.
300. Rooney, supra note 140, at I.
301. Dan J. Schulman, The Constitution, Interest Groups, and the Requirements of Uniformity: The United
States Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator Programs, 74 NEB. L. REv. 91, 109 (1995).
302. James F. McCarty, Lawyer's Suicide Leaves Questions, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 14, 1997, at lB.
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rant.30 3 Although Crowley made "a lot of new friends" in the restaurant and bar
business, his employees reported that he was "distraught." ' 30 4 In contemplating
why Crowley would kill himself, managing partner at Remington and longtime
friend Mario Ciano recalled Crowley's comment at his suspension hearing: "Law
is my life."
305
Scott Wolas disappeared with some unknown millions obtained from his Ponzi
scheme. He is reported to have repaid his partners who had invested in the
scheme prior to his departure.
30 6
C. WHO GOT REPAID BY WHOM?
A number of the sixteen lawyers have made valiant efforts to repay the people
they defrauded. In a way these efforts offer an impressive display of moral
character. Many people get into some type of trouble or engage in some sort of
illegal conduct. Some of them get caught and a few really work at making it right.
William Appler, Gary Fairchild, Timothy Flato, and Skip Morgan did not wait to
be compelled to make restitution, but undertook to do so on their own initiative.
Most notable perhaps is Skip Morgan, who admitted the alleged misconduct as
soon as the questions were raised, and simply turned his assets over to the firm,
including his home, his cars, and his airplane.30 7
One cannot avoid the contrasting image of Harvey Meyerson residing in his
$1.8 million seaside villa in Key West.30 8 A similar contrast is the saga of H.
Lawrence Fox, whose homes in Alexandria and Nags Head and his pension
account were seized by court order to provide funds for restitution.
A significant number of firms repaid their clients for proven overbilling. Some
clients continued to use the services of the firms, and assisted the firms in damage
control after the billing fraud became public. After Chapman & Cutler repaid the
Harris Bank, a spokeswoman for the bank reported that the bank had been fully
reimbursed. She said "We felt Chapman & Cutler handled the matter appropri-
ately and our relationship with them has not changed... No customer has
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Voboril, supra note 180, at B4. Scott Wolas is not the first lawyer to go into hiding to avoid facing
allegations of massive theft. Another lawyer who (presumably) took the money and ran is Steven Romer, who
disappeared on New Year's Eve claiming to have a terminal illness after he was accused of having stolen over $7
million from client trust accounts. Arlynn Leiber Presser, The Case of the Vanishing Lawyer: Prosecutors Say
N.Y Attorney's Friends, Clients Lost Millions, A.B.A. J., __ 1991, at 26. Timothy O'Leary vanished after
admitting to stealing from his former clients' trust accounts. Paul Langner & Frank Phillips, O'Leary is Indicted
on Charges of Embezzling, BosTON GLOBE, Jan. 14, 1992, at BI. David M. Murray, Sr. committed suicide after
the FBI raided his law office upon receiving reports from clients of theft and embezzlement. Claims Stack Up
Against the Estate, RicHMoND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Mar. 19, 1992, at B I. Claims against Murray's estate totaled
$41 million. Id.
307. Mintz, supra note 221, at 1.
308. Peter Maas, Harvey Myerson Redux; Indicted New York, New York Attorney, ESQUIRE, Dec. 1992, at 77.
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suffered any financial loss and we are convinced it was an isolated incident. ' 3°9
This statement evidences a pretty cozy lawyer-client relationship. How could
billing fraud of $1.1 million over approximately eight years can be characterized
as "an isolated incident"? If Maureen Walsh perpetrated billing fraud unchecked
for eight years, it seems apparent that the firm structure for supervision of lawyers
and for review of time and expense records was grossly deficient. So why is the
client so unconcerned?
Not all the clients are so protective of their lawyers, however. One client of the
Rose Law Firm, Mahlon Martin, president of the Winthrop Rockefeller Founda-
tion, said "[t]he Webb Hubbell thing creates in the minds of people [a question
of] whether that was an isolated incident or something that went on regularly." 31 0
Concerns about billing led to the demise of the lawyer-client relationship
between Harvey Myerson and Donald Trump. At the time that he started Myerson
& Kuhn, Myerson boasted that Trump was among his clients. Trump, however,
said that he was not a client of Myerson's at the new firm; Trump had fired
Myerson because of excessive billing. Trump was quoted in the Wall Street
Journal as saying "Harvey 'started billing me four times more than he should
have.... The bills were too high and I wasn't satisfied."
311
TABLE 8
REPAYMENT OF STOLEN MONEY
3 12
Name & Alleged Amount Repaid by Lawyer or by Firm
Amt. Stolen to Finn, Clients, or Firm's Insurer
2 Harvey Myerson After Myerson & Kuhn declared bankruptcy,
$2.5M partners were given the option of contribut-
ing to a firm bankruptcy fund in exchange
for immunity against personal law suits.
Although approximately ninety percent
of Myerson's partners coniributed to
the fund, Myerson elected not to do
SO.
3 13
309. Stevens, supra note 280, at B3.
310. Michael Weisskopf& Susan Schmidt, Rose Fades as Potential Clients Smell Problems with Law Firm,
COM. APPEAL, Dec. 29, 1994, at A4.
311. Laurie P. Cohen, Big Spender: Law Firm That Tried to Buy Instant Stature is Coming Unglued, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 11, 1989, 1989 WL-WSJ 464340.
312. In cases in which information on amounts repaid were not available, or where the information is
reported in Table 7, the information or the lawyers' names are omitted from the table.
313. Telephone interview conducted by Theresa J. Fuentes with Ronald Cohen, bankruptcy attorney of
Myerson & Kuhn (Oct. 29, 1997). See Table 7 for further information on monies repaid.
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Name & Alleged
Amt. Stolen
Amount Repaid by Lawyer or by Firm
to Firm, Clients, or Firm's Insurer
3 Wilkes "Skip" Mor- When confronted about his fraud, Morgan con-
gan fessed and turned over all of his assets to the
$2.3M firm, including his home, his cars, and his
plane. His assets were worth approximately
$1 million. (Mintz 92) The firm indicated in
December '92 that it had "recovered roughly
$500,000 in cash from, among other things,
insurance payments and credits to client ac-
counts." (Osborne 92)
4 H. Lawrence Fox Restitution order resulted in the sale of Fox's
$1.62M homes in Alexandria, VA and Nag's Head,
NC, and the use of the proceeds toward pay-
ment. (Groner 92) Court order also required
retirement account to be placed in escrow for
restitution, except for $100,000 to be used to
pay taxes and legal fees. (Ex-Lawyer 92)
5 Maureen Walsh Chapman & Cutler repaid $1.8 million to
$1.48M Walsh's former clients. (Glodberg 94,
Rooney 95) The firm reportedly reimbursed
all clients who were overbilled. (Stevens
94b) Walsh agreed to pay $50,000 in restitu-
tion to Chapman for expenses improperly
billed to the firm. (Buttry 97)
7 William Appler Appler agreed to reimburse his former firm and
$1.1M the firm's insurer over $1 million. (Murawski
94) As of January '96, he had repaid over
$600,000. (Ponce 96)
8 Gary Fairchild Fairchild repaid the firm about $700,000; (Dun-
$784T can 94) assigned the firm control over his
capital investment in the firm, over
$200,000. (Dillon 94)
11 James T. Crowley The firm repaid or credited the accounts of the 10
$385T affected clients and recouped $94,916 from
Crowley's capital account and money he was to
have earned. The firm expected to collect some
of the remaining monies from insurance. (UPI
93, Re Crowley 94)
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Name & Alleged
Amt. Stolen
Timothy Flato
$300-400T
Amount Repaid by Lawyer or by Firm
to Firm, Clients, or Firm's Insurer
Mark Snell, chief financial officer at Latham &
Watkins, stated that all clients who had been
overbilled as a result of Flato's misconduct
had been reimbursed. (Mintz 96) Two of
those clients were the Deutsche Bank and the
James River Corporation, a paper company.
Both were reimbursed and continued to be
clients of the firm. (Crawford 96b) Flato
promised to repay all excessive or improper
charges that he made. (Steuart 95a) As of
April, 1996, Doron Weinberg, Flato's attor-
ney, said he had paid approximately
$200,000. (Crawford 96a)
13 Richard Salomon Mayer, Brown & Platt said it would repay cli-
$254T ents $415,000 in overcharges plus interest.
(Nachman 94)
14 Sherman F. Taub Taub entered into an agreement with Tenzer,
$225T Greenblatt under which the firm would reim-
burse clients and Taub would repay the firm.
(Statement of Charges)
15 Stanford D. Hess Weinberg & Green repaid Fairfax $475,000,
$110T which included the amount by which the firm
had overbilled Fairfax and the "conse-
quences" of the overbilling. (Berkman 95b)
At the disciplinary hearing, Bar Counsel
stated that $10,000 of the money repaid to
Berman by the firm was for release of mal-
practice liability. Hess claimed that the re-
payment agreement resulted in a windfall for
Berman. (Memorandum)
D. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS AT THE LAW FIRMS
It is impossible to draw clear causal connections between the recent develop-
ments at the law firms and the billing fraud described in this article. In the more
egregious cases, some impact on the firms was inevitable. Here I comment not on
the impact of the billing fraud, but on what has happened to these law firms since
the lawyers' misconduct was discovered. I raise questions but draw no conclu-
sions about whether some of these changes were triggered by the discovery of
billing and expense fraud.
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Two of the firms have been dissolved. Myerson & Kuhn filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcy in December, 1989 in the Eastern District of New York;314 Bronson,
Bronson & McKinnon dissolved in 1999. 3 15 Two firms have changed their
names.3 16 Two firms have diminished in size since the events described in this
article. Some lawyers have left Weinberg & Green, including its managing
partner. The loss is attributed by some to the Stanford Hess matter and to other
malpractice litigation. In 1999 Weinberg & green merged with Saul, Ewing,
Remick & Saul, and became Saul, Ewing, Weinberg & Green. Chapman & Cutler
also has shrunk in recent years; this might be related to the negative publicity
generated by the investigation and indictment of Maureen Walsh. Chapman also
had a change in management, including the election of a new management
committee that did not include James Spiotto, whose high billings also had been
questioned.317
After H. Lawrence Fox was fired from Winston & Strawn, his group, which
handled transactions relating to waste disposal, moved on to another firm. Gary
Fairchild's resignation from Winston was followed by a reorganization of the
firm management, and the substitution of a pair of managing partners for the
position previously held by Fairchild alone. Unlike some of the other firms,
Latham & Watkins appears to be untouched by difficulty. In 1996, for example,
Latham increased in size by thirty lawyers.318
Some of these cases generated substantial negative publicity and were exten-
sively covered in both mainstream and legal newspapers. The high-visibility
cases include Webster Hubbell, Harvey Myerson, Gary Fairchild, Maureen
Walsh, and Ed Digges. Other cases, such as those of James Crowley, Sherman
Taub, and Michael Morrell, remained almost unknown to the public. The Flato
matter received limited coverage even though Timothy Flato was recognized as a
rising star in the profession.
What accounts for the difference in coverage? One factor must be the lesser
notoriety of certain of the lawyers, and the greater fame of certain others, such as
Webb Hubbell. Another is the careful management of some of these cases to
avoid publicity. The lawyers who quickly admitted the allegations, resigned from
the bar and plead guilty to criminal charges tended to get less press attention than
those who fought the charges. Harvey Myerson was the only one who went to
trial on criminal charges. Maureen Walsh resisted admitting to criminal charges,
and remains a respondent in a disciplinary proceeding.
314. Myerson & Kuhn's bankruptcy plan was confirmed in December, 1991. The plan was funded primarily
by partner contributions. Creditors received twenty-five to thirty cents on the dollar over a five-year payout plan.
Telephone interview conducted by Theresa J. Fuentes with Ronald Cohen, bankruptcy attorney of Myerson &
Kuhn (Oct. 29, 1997).
315. Kevin Livingston, Bronson Hits the End of the Line, RECORDER, April 5, 1999, at 1.
316. Digges, Wharton and Levin is now known as Wharton, Levin, Ehrmantraut, Klein & Nash. Duker,
Barrett, Gravante and Markel is now known as Barrett and Gravante.
317. Sources for the information in this paragraph are identified in Appendix M.
318. Id.
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All of these cases have received some journalistic attention but virtually no
attention from legal scholars. Why? Perhaps it is that billing fraud is not yet
recognized as a significant category of lawyer misconduct.
X. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study is not to bring the legal profession into even greater
disrepute than is the current view of the American public, 319 but to open a
dialogue about billing and expense fraud with an eye to prevention and deter-
rence of this type of professional misconduct. Prevention or deterrence could
occur through education of lawyers, clients or firm managers, through implemen-
tation of institutional controls designed to guide and monitor billing practices, or
through formal legal action against lawyers who engage in billing or expense
fraud, including criminal, disciplinary and malpractice action. Each enforcement
action, whether private or public, formal or informal, may impact the lawyer or
firm involved directly but may indirectly affect many other lawyers, clients and
law firms by increasing their awareness of this type of conduct and its risks.32°
Billing and expense fraud are complex and elusive problems. Their solution
requires use of the whole public and private repertoire of methods that might
prevent or deter billing fraud.
Much social science research on white collar crime tends to overemphasize
criminal or other formal regulation or punishment, and not to give enough
attention to the role of private organizations (in this case law firms and client
corporations) in solving the problem.321 In fact, the study of the prevention or
deterrence of billing fraud could offer useful guidance for policy makers in
thinking about control of other financial misconduct within large organizations or
for understanding mechanisms for social control.32 2
319. One recent Harris poll reports that only 19% of the American public views law as a "very prestigious"
profession, down from 36% in 1977. Chris Klein, Lawyers Not Liked, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 25, 1997, at A6. In a
different study, Harris found that only 7% of respondents had "a great deal of confidence" in people who run
law firms. Id. Law firms were the lowest ranked of fourteen types of organizations. Id.
320. Sociologist Sally Simpson writes that:
Compliance and deterrence, as two distinct types of social control, have different aims. The former is
preventative, the latter postmonitory.... Corporate compliance systems can be both. Deterrence may
be achieved through sanctions levied by the company against the wrongdoer (for example dismissal,
demotion or other disciplinary action). Prescriptive remedies, on the other hand, are nonpunitive.
Through policies, programs and informal mechanisms, they provide support and direction for
managers who must make ethical choices. However, not all compliance systems are effective.
Simpson, supra note 285, at 300.
321. Id. at 302-03.
322. Authors Kip Schlegel and David Weisburd made this point about the study of white collar crime:
we are struck by the opportunities that white collar crime study offers for the development of a
broader understanding of the role of noncriminal governmental and nongovernmental social controls.
The choice of civil sanctions in prosecution, the role of governmental and professional agencies in
establishing compliance mechanisms, and the attempts of corporations to "police themselves" . ..
make the study of white-collar crime a fertile area in which to develop theories about the relationship
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These sixteen cases, though diverse, evidence some common patterns that
could be useful in thinking about how to prevent or to detect individual
misconduct and about institutional changes that would support honest billing and
offer training, supervision, and monitoring to ensure honest billing.
A. PATTERNS AMONG THE FIFTEEN LAW FIRMS
Some of the patterns relate to the structure of the law firms in which these cases
occurred; these patterns are typical of large and other elite law firms in the United
States.
Most of the law firms at which these cases occurred bill most of their clients by
the hour323 This alone is a prescription for dishonest conduct. As long as lawyers
are making records of how long they work on particular matters, and the time
recorded translates into dollars billed, there is an incentive to record more time
.than was actually worked, and/or to do unnecessary work in order to bill for it.
Many lawyers, of course, would not inflate their hours or their work, but those
whose moral compass is less focussed will do so. The use of hourly billing is
recognized to be a disincentive to efficient work or to settlement.324 By setting
annual billable hour targets for lawyers, law firms may invite-perhaps almost
require--dishonest recordation of time.325
Most of the law firms at which these cases occurred set annual targets or
minimums for lawyers; many large firms have annual targets of 2000 or more
hours per year 326 The firms at which the sixteen lawyers practiced law are not
unusual in this respect.. But the setting of targets combines with the hourly billing
structure to provide incentives to record more time than was actually worked or
to work on a matter longer than is needed to accomplish the desired goal. This is
particularly so because most lawyers need to work three hours to bill two.3 2 7 This
between alternative social control mechanisms. Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd, Returning to the
Mainstream: Reflections on Past and Future White-Collar Crime Study, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME
RECONSIDERED 363 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 1992)
323. See Appendix C, which refers to the annual amounts billed or the number of hours billed annually by
many of these lawyers.
324. William D. Underwood, Divergence in the Age of Cost and Delay Reduction: The Texas Experience
with Civil Justice Reform, 25 TExAs TECH. L. REv. 261,272 (1994) ("Hourly billing thus encourages lawyers to
resolve doubts on whether to conduct discovery in favor of doing so."); Eugene R. Gaetke, Sarah N. Welling,
Money Laundering and Lawyers", 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1165, 2000 (1992)("Hourly billing promotes delay and
time-sheet padding and in criminal and civil cases tempts defense lawyers to reject settlement and go to trial.")
325. See Ross, supra note 54, at 12-14. Professor Ross urges that "it is highly questionable whether the
overwhelming majority of attorneys are able to bill significantly more than 2,000 hours per year without making
very liberal allowances for the way in which time is recorded." Id. at 14.
326. See Section HA for discussion of the increasing number of billable hours demanded of lawyers by large
law firms.
327. WILLIAM G. Ross, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED BILLING BY ATrORNEYS 27 (1996)
(articulating assumption that "an attorney normally must spend three hours in the office for every two billable
hours.")
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means they would need to work 3000 hours a year to bill 2,000.328 Three
thousand hours per year translates into a sixty hour workweek for a lawyer who
takes two weeks vacation and no sick days. If the lawyer works six days a week,
she must work ten hours a day. Those who cannot or do not wish to mortgage
their entire lives to work must either risk dismissal for billing too few hours or
must bill more hours than are properly billable.32 9
Most of the law firms at which these cases occurred use the number of hours
billed per year as a primary criterion to evaluate and compensate lawyers. The
incentive to overbill already present as a result of hourly billing and as a result of
the annual targets is intensified by this enforcement mechanism. A lawyer whose
hours are too low might lose his job. A lawyer who meets or exceeds the annual
target is more likely to be made a partner and is more likely to receive a bonus
than a lawyer who fails to meet the target.
Many of the law firms are among the largest, wealthiest, and most respected
law firms in the United States, or are spin-offs from such firms.3 3 0 Perhaps the
incidence of large-scale billing fraud is greater in firms that send huge bills to
large institutional clients every month. This could mean that billing and expense
fraud are less likely to be noticed. It could be that there is so much money around
that the temptation to steal is greater.
There are some patterns in the way that these sixteen cases of billing and
expense fraud came to light, and in the response of firms and others to the
allegations.
Many of the initial inquiries about billing or expense fraud came not from
clients or partners of these lawyers, but from associates, secretaries, and other
non-lawyer personnel within the firms. 331 Many of the discoveries were happen-
stance, almost none resulted from any routine institutional monitoring of billing
practices.
The cases show some tendency of partners of these sixteen lawyers to wink at,
deny, minimize or conceal the misconduct.332 In some cases some of the lawyers'
partners knew of the misconduct before questions were raised by others. In many
cases the firms reported the misconduct to the disciplinary agencies, but often
they waited months or even years to do so.
B. PATTERNS AMONG THE SIXTEEN LAWYERS
Some of the patterns relate to the individuals who committed the billing and
expense fraud.
328. This ratio takes account of time spent on firm administration, pro bono work, and other non-billable
work, coffee breaks, personal phone calls, errands, and so on. Id.
329. See Ann Davis, Lug a Box, Scan Mail: Is It all Billable Tlime?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1998, at B 1.
330. See Section 1VC and Table 2.
331. See Section VIIIA and Appendix H.
332. See Sections VILIB and C and Appendices H and I.
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Most of these lawyers were highly educated, very successful, and respected for
their professional skills and their integrity.333 This suggests that one cannot
confidently assume that any lawyer is honest simply because he is well-educated,
successful, and highly respected.
Seven of the lawyers were managing partners, either of their firms or of the
branch offices where they worked.334 They may have been subject to less
oversight than other lawyers in the firms; in fact they were responsible for the
oversight of other lawyers.
Most of the lawyers were ambitious, high-income, high-billing lawyers.33 5
Some of them had annual draws exceeding $500,000 per year; some of them
billed over 2,500 hours per year.
Most of these lawyers have moved firms once or more than once, often in
search of higher incomes; their ambition has resulted in a loss of professional
continuity and stability. 336 This pattern does not differentiate these lawyers from
other powerful, successful American lawyers, but it is possible that absence of
lifelong collegial relationships and long-term institutional loyalty are ingredients
in the occurrence of billing and expense fraud.
All but one of the lawyers are (or were) affluent Caucasian men. 33 In case one
thought that race, class or poverty was a good predictor of economic crime, one
might infer from this set of cases that high social status and high economic
bracket correlate positively with economic crime. The almost total absence of
women raises a question as to whether women are less likely to engage in billing
and expense fraud than men, or whether it is only that few women are in the kind
of powerful positions in their firms occupied by most of the lawyers in this
sample. Perhaps the temptation to overbill is greater if one is subject to less
oversight.
There are some patterns that describe a few or several but not all of the
lawyers.
Some of the lawyers seem to be aggressive, obnoxious, even abusive toward
other lawyers or toward staff in the law firms, and/or self-centered, hedonistic, or
greedy.338 Perhaps the lack of respect for others that manifested itself in
demanding, hot-tempered behavior also is an ingredient in decisions to manipu-
late time sheets or expense claims. Another ingredient for some of the lawyers
may be an almost compulsive acquisitive urge for unusual quantities of luxury
items.
333. SeeAppendix B.
334. Id.
335. See Section IVB and Appendix C.
336. See Appendix B for information on the movement of these lawyers through two or more firms during
their careers, and Section VIA for discussion of the negative impact on professionalism of lack of stable
professional bonds.
337. See Section VIC and Appendix D.
338. See Table 3 and Table 4, which give examples of behavior that fits this description.
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Some of the lawyers seem to have had significant problems with mental illness
or alcohol abuse.33 9 What is more striking, perhaps, is that many of the lawyers
were not suffering from mental illness or addiction, but were high-functioning
lawyers. Some of the mental illness and substance abuse problems that appear
may be one ingredient in the lawyers' misconduct. But since the competitiveness,
intense work demands, and stress of the legal profession probably cause some
mental illness and substance abuse,34° one cannot dismiss the individuals who
exhibit such problems as atypical of successful lawyers.
Many of the lawyers had elaborate rationalizations for their billing and
expense fraud.34 1 This ability to explain and defend questionable behavior is an
important skill for any lawyer; used on behalf of a client, it may be well within
the bounds of acceptable advocacy. Once the skill is developed, it is not suprising
to see it used to justify dishonesty toward and theft from clients and partners.
Several of the lawyers did an unusual amount of public service work or spent a
great deal of time on firm management.342 It is possible that these lawyers were
unable to work as many billable hours than some of their partners who had fewer
community or firm commitments. If they were compensated less than others who
billed more hours, the resulting resentment could be an ingredient in the billing
and expense fraud.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
The elimination of billing and expense fraud from the legal profession is an
essential part of the project to restore public confidence in lawyers and in the
legal system. Like attacking any endemic problem, the changes needed to
accomplish this goal are many and varied. Every lawyer must concern himself
with this issue. Every law firm should attend to it. Every bar association, every
disciplinary agency has an essential role in this project. This is not a narrow or
particularistic problem. It is a problem of restraining greed, of restoring integrity,
of placing candor and respect for others above self-interest. Unfortunately many
of the processes and dynamics that produce billing fraud are deeply entrenched in
the norms of law firm culture.343 Some of these suggestions may seem unrealis-
tic. If so, perhaps greed cannot be disentangled from the practice of law.
Hourly billing should be abandoned.344 Billing by the hour creates perverse
339. See Section VID and Appendix E for information about mental illness and alcohol abuse.
340. See supra note 56.
341. See Section VIE and Appendix F for examples and discussion of the explanations offered by the lawyers
for their misconduct.
342. See text accompanying notes 116 and 117.
343. See generally RICHARD Zrr~N AND CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN
LAWYER: TRUTH, JUSTICE, POWER, AND GREED (1999).
344. See Anthony E. Davis, Fees, Billings and Collections: Maximizing the Profits, Minimizing the Risk,
RISK MANAGEMENT REPORT, Dec. 1998, at 1 (argues for abandonment of hourly billing as a prudent risk
management measure).
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incentives and has contributed to the apparent erosion of the integrity of many
lawyers. Large firms should negotiate fees in advance with institutional clients
and with individual clients. Fees should be negotiated in advance of work being
performed. Lawyers, like construction contractors, automobile mechanics, and
many other purveyors of complex services should learn to predict and estimate
the cost of service. They should encourage clients to price shop, to foster
competitive pricing and to allow clients to be confident that the fees they agree to
pay are fair and reasonable.
Firms that continue to use hourly billing should abandon the use offormal or
informal targets or minimums. The setting of incentives to bill more hours than a
piece of work requires should be recognized as unethical, both because it offers
tacit encouragement to padding and churning and because it encourages lawyers
to work more hours in a day than they can possibly provide competent profes-
sional service.
Law firms should not evaluate or compensate lawyers on the basis of the
number of hours billed. Lawyers who contribute to the firm through management
work or to the community through pro bono work should be rewarded rather than
penalized for such work. Likewise, lawyers who do quality work while raising
children or caring for family members should not be penalized for their other
obligations. Firms should hire more lawyers rather than taking over the entire
lives of a smaller number of lawyers.
Law firms should establish internal ethics counsels or ethics committees to
develop expertise on issues of ethics and professionalism. 345 An ethics committee
should:
- establish written policies on billing practices and reimbursement for ex-
penses
- offer regular training to partners (including managers), associates, law
clerks, paralegals, secretaries and other staff, on billing practices and other
ethical issues.
- encourage all firm employees to report possible misconduct to the ethics
committee, and ensure that those employees are protected from retaliation for
raising questions.
Law firms should engage independent auditors to monitor billing practices.3 4 6
The monitoring function should include routine review review of time logs and
expense vouchers of associates, partners, and managers, and systematic audits of
the billing practices of lawyers who bill 2,000 hours per year or more. Auditors
and ethics counsel must have the unambivalent support of firm management to
carry out these tasks.
345. See Espstein, supra note 72 for discussion of the role of ethics counsels.
346. See Erin White, More Law Firms Are Auditing Themselves to Catch Billing Errors, WALL ST. J., July 14,
1998, at B8 (noting that the law firm of Proskauer Rose hired a full time auditor to monitor billing practices).
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Disciplinary agencies should be authorized to discipline law firms as well as
individual lawyers.3 47 This authority should include (at minimum) the authority
to impose discipline for failure to institute proper training, supervision and
monitoring of lawyers and other staff to ensure compliance with ethical rules, and
to impose discipline for failure to report serious misconduct within the law firm.
Disciplinary .agencies should enforce Rule 8.3, which requires reporting of
serious misconduct by other lawyers. Bar counsels should impose discipline on firm
managers for failure or long delay in reporting misconduct by a lawyer in the firm.
Lawyers should lower their income aspirations,3 4 8 and should restructure their
firms to foster a more humanistic and less competitive environment. Firms should
aspire to other values than maximum production of wealth, such as high quality
professional service, client satisfaction, collegiality, mentoring, balanced lives
for employees, work conditions that support the growth and development of all
employees.349 Firms should seek to regain a higher degree of continuity of
personnel. 350 These goals cannot be achieved unless or until successful lawyers
recognize the adverse consequences of their ever-higher income aspirations and
scale them down.35 1
Prosecutors and lawyer disciplinary agencies should pursue major billing
fraud cases vigorously. While considerable resources are needed to investigate
and prosecute allegations of billling or expense fraud, the investment of such
resources is likely to be a very efficient deterrent. The lawyer regulatory system
has focussed most of its attention on lawyers whose practices are far more modest
than the sixteen lawyers on this list.352 More attention should be devoted to the
347. See Schneyer, supra note 6.
348. Professor Deborah Rhode draws a connection between the profit orientation of firms and the setting of
policies that increase the risk of billing fraud and cause other problems as well. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics,
supra note 6, at 710-11. She notes that "[a]t an increasing number of firms, annual billable hour requirements
exceed 2000 hours .... The partners who benefit from 2000 hour demands generally earn many times the
national average for lawyers .... Those who would benefit from more humane expectations .... [include]
attorneys who are reluctant to fudge, yet who cannot honestly fulfill current requirements without compromis-
ing family, pro bono, or other commitments. Id.
349. For an example of the ultimate consequences of disregard of human needs resulting from preoccupation
with maximizing profits, see UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906) (describing the human devastation caused by
the relentless work demands and exploitation of employees of the meat packing industry in Chicago in the early
twentieth century).
350. Higher rates of retention and greater stability in firms would contribute to environments that would
allow senior lawyers to mentor less experienced lawyers, and would have a greater institutional motivation to
attend to the quality of life and other issues that contribute to high professional performance and satisfaction.
See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM: REPORT OF THE PROFESSIONALISM COMMrrTEE (1996).
351. See Schlitz, supra note 87 (discussing the damage to mentoring and professionalism that has resulted
from lawyers' desire for higher incomes).
352. See ABEL, supra note 43, at 145 (stating that "[m]ore than 80 percent of those disciplined in California,
Illinois and the District of Columbia in 1981-82 were sole practitioners, and none practiced in a firm of more
than seven lawyers, even though sole practitioners represented fewer than half of all private practitioners in the
nation (48.6 percent) and firms with more than seven lawyers contained almost exactly the same proportion
(47.2 percent) (emphasis added).
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prevention and correction of fiduciary failure by lawyers who represent large
institutions.
APPENDIX A: TWENTY OTHER CASES OF BILLING AND EXPENSE FRAUD
The table below presents an overview of the other twenty cases in the group of
thirty-six recent cases of billing and expense fraud from which the sixteen studied
in detail are drawn.
Name Firm
Where Alleged
Misconduct Amount Prison Discipline or
Occurred, Stolen, Sentence Resignation
Lawyer's Methods, (months) Yr. From Bar
Position Dates Imposed Membership
Lionel "Lon" expense fraud none reported. no public re-
Allan; Ho- and bill cord of dis-
kins and inflation. cipline
Carley, Firm (phone in-
Santa Clara, claimed that terview) 353
CA, partner Allan's
"billing
impropri-
eties forced
the firm to
refund over
$257,000 to
clients."
(Barlas 94)
2 Richard Ar- over $75,000 guilty plea interim sus-
nold; Dins- expense 1995 (Kauf- pension
more & fraud, June man 95) based on
Shohl, Cin- 1994-Au- felony con-
cinatti, part- gust 1995 viction,
ner (Kaufman Ohio, July
95) 1997
(phone in-
terview)
353. The telephone interviews referenced in this table were with officials at the relevant disciplinary
agencies, and were conducted by research assistant Therese Fuentes on November 13, 1997.
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Name Finn
Where Alleged
Misconduct Amount Prison Discipline or
Occurred, Stolen, Sentence Resignation
Lawyer's Methods, (months) Yr. From Bar
Position Dates Imposed Membership
3 Lloyd Clare- $1.2M inflated none reported. public censure
man;* bills, April Cooperated NY 1996
Myerson & 1988-Janu- in Myerson (Re Clare-
Kuhn, NY, ary 1989 prosecution, man)
partner, (Re Clare- (Re Clare-
executive man) man)
committee
member
4 Daniel James false billing none reported. one year sus-
Cooper;* statements pension,
Myerson & (Re Cooper) NY 1992,
Kuhn, New reinstated
York 1994. (Re
Cooper)
5 James F. $5M inflated 6/ years, automatic sus-
Dougherty; bills, 1987 1997 (Jour- pension,
solo practi- to 1992 nal of Com- FL, 1997
tioner, (Lyons 94, merce 97) after felony
Florida Richey 94) conviction
1997 (Re
Dougherty)
6 Forriss D. El- over $250T, 5 years, 1995 suspended
liott; solo bill inflation (Bryant 95) Missouri
practitioner, (80 hour 1995 after
St. Louis, days), 1989- conviction
Missouri 1992 (Bry- (phone in-
ant 95) terview)
7 Stephen A. $54T, expense none reported disbarred NY
Geiger; Sid- fraud, 1988- 1991 (Re
ley & Aus- 1989 (Re Geiger)
tin, partner, Geiger)
NY office
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Name Firm
Where Alleged
Misconduct Amount Prison Discipline or
Occurred, Stolen, Sentence Resignation
Lawyer's Methods, (months) Yr. From Bar
Position Dates Imposed Membership
8 Mark Clayton $1.5 million 15 months, disbarred NC
Kirby; 354  overbilled; 1995 (Pay- February
Brown, (Saker 98) ton 95) 1997.
Kirby & billed (phone in-
Bunch, 13,000 terview)
North Caro- hours in 13
lina, partner months
(1990-1991)
by inflating
time (Pay-
ton 95)
9 David over $200T, 12 months resigned from
Kohnen; false time probation Ohio bar
Kohnen & entries, 95 (Nor- 1995
Patten, Cin- 1988-1992 wood 95)
cinatti, Monk 94)
managing
partner
10 Wayne E. hundreds of 15 years 1997 voluntary sus-
Legg; Kill- thousands (Az. Busi- pension, AZ
ian Nicho- of $, ficti- ness Ga- pending
las, Ari- tious work, zette 97) disposition
zona, senior double bill- of criminal
partner ing, 1987 to charges
1992 (Az. Repub-
lic 94)
354. Mark Clayton Kirby died in an automobile accident in June, 1998, about two years after his release from
prison. His 11-year old daughter received minor injuries in the accident. During the years after his release he had
moved with his family to a small town in Virginia and had obtained a real estate license. Anne Saker, Ex-Lawyer
Killed in Crash, NEWS AND OBsERVER, June 24, 1998, at BI.
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Name Firm
Where Alleged
Misconduct Amount Prison Discipline or
Occurred, Stolen, Sentence Resignation
Lawyer's Methods, (months) Yr. From Bar
Position Dates Imposed Membership
11 Gary Noth- $40T expense No criminal disbarred, MD
stein; Shaw, fraud, 1980- prosecution and D.C.
Pittman, 1982 while Committed 1984 for
Potts & at Venable. suicide in expense
Trowbridge, Later posed 1995 (Berk- fraud at
associate as Gary man 95) Venable
(94-95) Notestein, firm.
Venable, recent law
Baetjer, school
Howard & graduate, to
Civilietti, become
partner (pre associate at
82) Shaw, Pitt-
man. (Berk-
man 95)
12 Arthur Rueg- inflated bills convicted of one year sus-
ger;* Myer- (Re Rueg- misde- pension NY
son & ger 95) meanor, 1995, rein-
Kuhn, New fined, resti- stated 1996
York tution or- (Re Rueg-
dered (Re ger 95, 96)
Ruegger 95)
13 Mark Segall;* inflated bills no criminal public censure
Myerson & (Re Segall) prosecution; 1996 (Re
Kuhn, New cooperated Segall)
York in Myerson
case (Re
Segall)
14 Glenn Nadell; $3 IT, expense none reported. three year sus-
Katten, Mu- fraud, 1989- pension,
chin & 1994 Ohio and IL
Zavis, NY, (Rooney (Re Nadell)
partner, 95)
head of tax
dept
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Name Firm
Where Alleged
Misconduct Amount Prison Discipline or
Occurred, Stolen, Sentence Resignation
Lawyer's Methods, (months) Yr. From Bar
Position Dates Imposed Membership
15 Thomas $800 expense none reported 30 day suspen-
Schneider; fraud, add- sion 1989
Seyfarth, ing digits to (Re
Shaw, asso- credit card Schneider)
ciate, then receipts
partner at over seven-
Quasha month pe-
Richter, NY riod in 1981
(Re
Schneider)
16 Kenneth Solo- $22T 1982 to none reported. one year sus-
mon; Lay- 1990, pension IL
enthol & double bill- 1993 (Co-
Howarth, ing for ex- hen 93)
Chicago penses,
(accting 1982-1990
firm), nat. (Cohen 93)
chair, Shef-
sky & Fro-
elich, part-
ner as of
1993
17 Charles E. $8 IT, padding 2 years, 9 suspended PA
Steele; hours, July months March 1997
Steele & 1992-April 1997 (Pitz after crimi-
Hoffman, 1993 (Pitz 97) nal convic-
Pittsburgh, 97) tion (phone
managing interview)
partner
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Name Firm
Where Alleged
Misconduct Amount Prison Discipline or
Occurred, Stolen, Sentence Resignation
Lawyer's Methods, (months) Yr. From Bar
Position Dates Imposed Membership
18 Lynn Boyd $50M-$200M, over 12 years suspended CA
Stites; solo billing for 1994 (Pitzer 1994 (Pitzer
practitioner, unnecessary 94) 94)
Los Ange- work, inflat-
les, CA ing bills,
1984-1988,
involved 25
other law-
yers (Ander-
son 94)
19 Robert C. $40T expense pleaded guilty, disbarred DC
Zimmer; fraud mail fraud, 1994, FL
Eckert Sea- (Kessler 92) other 1994 and
mans, charges PA 1995
Washing- 1992 (Re Zim-
ton, DC, (Kessler 92) mer)
partner
20 Bob Zocccola; $48T, expense none reported. Resigned IN
355 Locke, fraud and August 1995
Reynolds, inflation of (Re Zoccola
Boyd & hours during 1); disbarred,
Weisell, six year pe- US Sup.
Indianapolis, riod (Kueter- Court 1995
IN partner man 95) (Re Zoccola
2)
*Partners or associates of Harvey Myerson, who is discussed in detail in this article.
Myerson's partners are not included because their misconduct occurred under Myerson's
direction. They were penalized less severely than Myerson in part because of their
cooperation with investigators, and in part because Myerson was regarded as primarily
responsible for the billing fraud committed by his partners.
In addition to the twenty cases on the "B" list, I excluded from this study cases
involving several other types of stealing by lawyers. I did not include cases that
involved the better-known and better regulated phenomenon of trust account
355. Zoccola was at one time president of the Indianapolis Bar Association. Greg Kueterman, Expert: Many
Firms Not Set Up to Stop Fraud, INDIANA LAWYER, Oct. 4, 1995, at 5.
1999]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
fraud, nor in misconduct by lawyers who fit the "bad apples" stereotype. I
excluded:
" lawyers who stole money out of their client trust accounts, such as:
" Steven Romer stole seven million dollars from his clients. He claimed that
he moved to Sierra Leone, had an inoperable brain tumor and had given away
$15 million to charity. He returned to New York one year later and was
convicted of fourteen criminal charges. Romer was sentenced to a maximum of
twenty-two and a half years in prison and ordered to repay the stolen funds. 356
- Jack B. Solerowitz, an 86-year-old New York lawyer was sentenced to five
to fifteen years in 1990 after conviction on criminal charges alleging that he had
stolen $6.8 million from his clients.357
- Barry Grandeau was disbarred in 1982 after he was indicted for stealing
from client trust accounts. The New York State Client Security Fund made
reimbursements to Grandeau's clients totaling $589,829.00 on 373 separate
claims. 3
5 8
- Peter Schmidt was disbarred in New York and charged with stealing $3.1
million from the estates of two clients; one was the former president of the New
York Yankees.
359
- James O'Hagan, a partner at Dorsey & Whitney, the largest firm in
Minnesota, stole $3 million of client funds. He was convicted of criminal
charges and disbarred, and eventually repaid his former clients.
360
- Lloyd Cohen, a New Jersey lawyer, was convicted in 1989 of charges that he
had stolen $1.4 million from clients. He was sentenced to spend eleven years in
prison. Cohen also was sentenced to ten concurrent five-year terms for writing
bad checks totaling $17,000. This sentence was to run concurrent with the
eleven-year sentence.
36 1
* Robert Anderson, a New York lawyer and former US Secretary of the
Department of the Treasury, stole over $250,000 from one client.36 2
* Thomas Bartch, another Minnesota lawyer, stole $800,000 and was dis-
barred.363
- lawyers who engaged in "settlement fraud", misrepresenting the amount for
356. Henry J. Reske, Romer Convicted, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1992, at 35; How Many Lawyers Steal How Much
Money, BILLINGS GAZEtrE, January 8, 1992, at 5-A.
357. Rick Hampson, Caseload of Attorneys' Bilking Clients Grows, HARRISBURG EVENING NEws, Jan. 7,
1992, at Al.
358. Clients' Security Fund v. Grandeau, 500 N.Y.S.2d 997, 999 (N.Y. 1986).
359. N.Y. L. J. Mar. 30, 1992, at 1, col. 1.
360. Randy Furst, Dorsey & Whitney Ex-Partner Suspended, May Be Disbarred, MNNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL
STAR-TRIBUNE, Dec. 6, 1989, at lB.
361. Ex-Lawyer Gets New Sentence. NORTHERN NEw JERSEY REc., Mar. 19, 1989, at 13.
362. Margaret Zack, Lawyers on the Wrong Side of the Law: Rash of Serious Misconduct Cases are Reported
in State, MINNEAPOLS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIBuNE, Apr. 15, 1991 at BI.
363. Id.
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which a case had been settled on behalf of a defendant client, collecting an
inflated damage payment from the client, and pocketing the excess;
3 6 4
• lawyers who committed fraud in charging contingent fees;
" court-appointed criminal defense lawyers prosecuted for overbilling states
for services rendered to indigent clients;
" government lawyers prosecuted for stealing from their employer agencies;
" lawyers prosecuted or disciplined for billing fraud involving smaller sums.
APPENDIX B: EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL ACHIEVEMENT OF THE
LAWYERS
Name and
Alleged
Amt. Stolen
Edward S. Digges,
Jr.
$3.1M
Educational and Professional Background,
and Areas of Practice
Digges, Wharton & Levin, Annapolis, MD, managing
partner. Princeton Univ. A.B. 1968; Univ. of Maryland,
J.D. 1971. Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, MD, associate
1971-1977; partner, 1977 to 1984, managing partner,
Digges, Wharton & Levin, 1984 to 1990, co-founder,
managing partner. Federal and state civil litigation,
product liability defense, asbestos litigation for Dresser
Industries. Active in Inns of Court, American Board of
Trial Advocacy. (Groner 89) Publications: The Impact
of Liability for Enhanced Injury, 4 BALT. L. REv. 1
(1975); Product Liability in Maryland Revisited, 7
BALT. L. REv. 1 (1977); Comparative Fault in Mary-
land: The lime Has Come, 41 MD. L. REv. 275
(1982); Choice of Law in Product Liability Actions:
Order for the Practitioner in a Reign of Chaos, 12
BALT. L. REv. 395 (1983); Product Liability in Mary-
land: Traditional and Emerging Theories of Recovery
& Defense, 15 BALT. L. REv. 1 (Fall 1986); MARY-
LAND CIVIL PROCEDURE FORMs, 2 vol. (Aspen Publ.
Co. 1984) (co-author).
364. For example, James O'Hagan was alleged to have told his client, the Mayo Clinic, that he settled a
lawsuit against the clinic for $596,000, when he had really only settled it for $270,000. When the Clinic sent
O'Hagan the $595,000 check, O'Hagan paid the plaintiff $270,000 and kept the rest for himself. Furst, supra
note 360, at B 1.
I I
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Name and
Alleged
Amt. Stolen
Harvey Myerson
$2.5M
Educational and Professional Background,
and Areas of Practice
Myerson & Kuhn, New York, managing partner, at-
tended University of Chicago, 1957-1959; Temple
University, B.S. 1961; Columbia University School
of Law, LL.B. 1964. Hughes, Hubbard & Reed,
New York, associate, 1964-1970; Webster & Shef-
field, partner, 1970-1984; co-managing partner.
Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Man-
ley, Myerson & Casey, New York, partner, 1984-
1987, managing partner, head of litigation depart-
ment (firm went bankrupt 1987). Federal civil
litigation, administrative and regulatory practice,
antitrust. Clients included Shearson, Lehman, Hut-
ton, Inc., United Food and Commercial Workers'
Union, ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Martindale 89)
3 Wilkes "Skip" Mor- Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon, managing partner,
gan Santa Rosa office. University of California at
$2.3M Berkeley, A.B. 1967, Hastings College of Law,
University of California, J.D. 1973. Real estate,
commercial litigation, wine industry specialist,
toxic torts; Cessna Corp., Gulfstream Aerospace
Corp. (Martindale 89)
4 H. Lawrence Fox Winston & Strawn, managing partner, DC office,
$1.62M University of Virginia, B.A., 1961; LL.B. 1964;
New York University, LL.M. in taxation 1965. Law
clerk, Counsel for commandant, United Stated Ma-
rine Corps, DC 1964; Chief Counsel's Office, IRS,
Washington, DC 1965-1969; assistant bureau
chief, 1968-1969; Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz,
Washington, DC office, associate, 1969-1972,
member, 1972 to 1977, managing partner, Wash-
ington office, 1976-1977; Cadwalader, Wicker-
sham & Taft, member, 1977-1979; Dawson, Rid-
dell, Fox, Holroyd & Jackson, which merged with
Bishop, Cook, Purcell & Reynolds, which merged
with Winston & Strawn. (Groner 91) 1980s Fox
shifted to helping cities and counties finance and
build solid-waste treatment plants. (Groner 91 a)
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Name and
Alleged
Amt. Stolen
Maureen Walsh
$1.48M
6 William F Duker
$1.4M
Educational and Professional Background,
and Areas of Practice
Chapman & Cutler, Chicago, non-equity partner.
Notre Dame B.A.; Northwestern University, J.D.
Moot court national team at Northwestern. Sum-
mer associate at Winston and Strawn when Gary
Fairchild was the hiring partner. Sidley & Austin,
associate, 1981 to 1984. One friend reported that
when she left Sidley, someone at the firm had ques-
tioned her handling of a check. (Goldberg 94)
Chapman & Cutler, associate, 1984 to 1990, be-
came junior partner 1990, three years later was
turned down for an equity partnership. (Goldberg
94b) Municipal bonds, commercial litigation.
Duker, Barrett, Gravante & Markel, New York, New
York, managing partner. State University of New York
at Albany, B.A., summa cum laude 1976; University of
Cambridge, England, Ph.D., 1978; Yale University,
J.D., 1981; Phi Beta Kappa, Law Clerk to Chief Judge
Patricia M. Wald, D.C. Circuit, 1981-82. Associate,
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 1982-1985. Assistant Pro-
fessor, Albany Law School, 1985-1987. (Martindale
97) Founded Duker & Barrett, 1987, resigned 1997.
Publications: A CONSTInTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS
CORPUs (1981); English Origins of Habeas Corpus: A
Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.YU.L. REv. 983 (1978);
The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional
History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 475 (1978); The
Case of Ex Parte Young: Lochnerizing Munn & Illi-
nois, 1980 BRIGHAM YOUNG L. REV. 539 (1980).
7 William Appler McDermott, Will & Emery, DC office, non-equity partner
$1.1M (1984-91). Northwestern University, B.A., 1963, M.A.,
1965; Georgetown University, J.D. 1969; National
Merit Scholar. Dept. of Justice, Civil Division, 1969 to
1973, Adjunct Faculty, Georgetown Law Center, 1969
to 1971, 1978 to (at least 1991); food and drug law.
(Murawski 94)
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Name and
Alleged
Amt. Stolen
Educational and Professional Background,
and Areas of Practice
8 Gary Fairchild Winston & Strawn, Chicago, managing partner.
$784T Wheaton College, B.A. 1965, University of Illi-
nois, M.A. 1966; Northwestern University, J.D.
1969. Assistant to Governor of Illinois, 1969-1970;
United States Dept. of Justice, Chicago, 1971-
1972; Winston & Strawn, associate 1973-75; part-
ner 1976-94; managing partner, 1987-93. American
Lawyer reported that "For seven years, Gary
Fairchild enjoyed unparalleled trust and respect as
one of the country's most well-known firm lead-
ers." (Dillon 94)
9 Michael X. Morrell Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, DC, of counsel.
$500T Georgetown University, A.B., 1965. J.D. 1968,
M.I.C.L. 1985. Meritorious Service Award, U.S.
Department of Justice, 1972. President of LaSalle
Laboratories, US affiliate of his French pharmaceu-
tical client. Board of Regents, Georgetown Univer-
sity; Chairman, Friends of the John E Kennedy
Center for the Performing Arts. (Torry 95, Martin-
dale 89) Publications: CERTIFICATE OF NEED: AN
EXPANDING REGULATORY CONCEPT, MEDICINE IN
THE PUBLIC INTEREST, INC. (1978); Maintenance of
Opiate Dependent Persons in the United States: A
Legal Medical History, Drug Use in America:
Problem in Perspective, Appendix IV, Government
Printing Office 1977, reprinted in LEGAL ASPECTS
OF DRUG DEPENDENCE (CRC Press 1975); Pharma-
ceutical Industry Regulation by the Department of
Justice, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 19 (1972), reprinted
in 2 DRUG ABUSE LAW REv. 186 (Clark Boardman
Co. 1974).
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Name and
Alleged
Amt. Stolen
Webster Hubbell
$482T
Educational and Professional Background,
and Areas of Practice
The Rose Law Firm, Little Rock, 1973-93, managing
partner. University of Arkansas, B.S.E.E. 1970
(electrical engineering degree), J.D. with Honors,
1973. Managing Editor, Arkansas Law Review,
1973; star offensive left tackle for the Univ. of Ar-
kansas Razorbacks football team, the Razorbacks
won the Sugar Bowl in 1969, Hubbell's senior year
in college. (Ahrens 97) Mayor, Little Rock, Arkan-
sas, 1979 to 1981 (non-salaried position). Member,
Board of Directors, Little Rock, Arkansas, 1978 to
1984. Chief Justice, Arkansas Supreme Court,
1984. (non-salaried position). Associate Attorney
General of the United States, January 1993 to
March 1994. Chairman of the Ethics Committee of
the Arkansas Bar Association; Chair of the Arkan-
sas Board of Bar Examiners. 365 Commercial law,
securities law, professional liability litigation.
(Martindale 93, Eisler 95) At the time of Hubbell's
Senate confirmation hearings, Senator Dale
Bumpers (D-Ark) said "You'd have to go a long
way in my state to find anybody who commands
more respect, both professionally and as a person,
than Webb Hubbell." (Schneider and Walsh 94)
11 James T. Crowley Thompson, Hine and Flory, Cleveland, partner and
$385T chairman of the litigation department. Case West-
ern Reserve University, B.A. 1965; University of
Michigan, J.D. 1968. Phi Beta Kappa. (Martindale
89, 93, Who's Who 94-95)
365. Mr. Hubbell is "the highest ranking Justice Department official to stand convicted of crimes since the
fall during the Watergate scandal of Attorney General Richard G. Kleindeinst and Attorney General John
Mitchell." Stephen Labaton, A Clinton FriendAdmits Mail Fraudand Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 7, 1994, at
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Name and
Alleged
Amt. Stolen
Timothy Flato
$300-400T
Educational and Professional Background,
and Areas of Practice
Latham & Watkins, San Francisco, partner starting in
1991, Lewis and Clark College, B.A. 1975, M.P.A.
1978, University of Southern California, J.D.
1981; Order of the Coif, Notes and Articles Editor,
University of Southern California Law Review,
1980-81. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, associate
1981 to 1987, partner 1987 to 1991, 1988 head of
project-finance group. (Newdorf 91a) Project fi-
nance law, real estate. "A premier international
banking lawyer." (Mintz 96b) When Flato became
a partner at Latham & Watkins, Ernest Schmider, a
tax partner, said of Flato, "He is a very hard
worker. That is something we think fits well in the
Latham & Watkins culture." (Newdorf 91a)
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Name and
Alleged
Amt. Stolen
Educational and Professional Background,
and Areas of Practice
-+ I
Richard Salomon
$254T
Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago; associate, 1981-86, part-
ner, 1986-1994. Attended University of Chicago,
1973-1974; Carleton College, B.A. magna cum laude
1975; Harvard University, J.D. 1979. Jones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue, Cleveland, associate, 1979; Law
Clerk, US Dist. Ct. (N.D. 111), 1980; Asst. Attorney
General, Illinois, 1981-83; advisor to American Law
Institute. Special assistant to Chairman of ABA Com-
mission on Professionalism; Salomon described a
Commission report in a letter to the Wall Street Journal
as "premised on the view that if the profession does
not reform its own house, other bodies may do so in
perhaps more extreme and less-considered ways."
(Sambom 94) A former partner at Mayer, Brown &
Platt described Salomon as an "up-and-coming" part-
ner and "a prot6g6" of finn chairman Robert Helman.
(Nachman 94) Publications: Countering a Move to
Depose, Nat. L. J. (Dec. 9, 1991) (co-author); Expert
Witness Rule Out for Former Employee, LEADERS
PRODUCTS LIABILrrY (Oct. 1991) (co-author); Dealing
with the Turncoat Expert, BNA PRODUCr LIABILITY &
SAFETY REPRTER (May 31, 1991) (co-author); Those
Damaging Punitive Damages, CHICAGO TIBUNE 25
(Apr. 20, 1989); Rekindling Lawyer Professionalism,
41 MERCER L. REv. 597 (1990); Professionalism:
Should There Be Limits on Lawyer Zeal?, NAT'L L. J.
(July 21, 1996); Summary Judgment: A Notable De-
parture for the Court, LEGAL ThiES 12-13 (Sept 1,
1986) (co-author); Discover from those At the Top,
LmGATION MAGAzNE 15 (Summer 1987); Shades of
Gray and Other Myths, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs 463
(1987) (urging that there should be more instruction in
ethics in professional schools, stressing the importance
of "restoring ethics to its rightful place at the center of
the universe of professional and educative values"); A
Primer on Civil RICO Issues, RICO Monograph, De-
fense Research Institute (1988) (co-author); The Rekin-
dling of Professionalism, CHICAGO LAWYER, Special
Report (Nov. 1986); CrvIL RICO PRACTICE: CAUSES OF
ACTION (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1991); Privilege
Under Fire, 10 ACCA Docket 40 (summer 1992),
reprinted in N.J. LAW J. (Oct. 12, 1992); CORPORATE
CouNsEL's GuIDE: ArRNEr CLm WoRK PRODUCt
SELF-EVALUATIVE PRIvLEGES (Dec. 1992); The Privi-
lege is Ours, AMERICAN LAWYER (Dec. 31, 1991).
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Name and
Alleged Educational and Professional Background,
Amt. Stolen and Areas of Practice
14 Sherman F Taub Tenzer, Greenblatt, Fallon & Kaplan, New York, partner.
$225T Roosevelt University, B.S.B.A., 1967; New York Law
School, J.D. 1971; New York University, LL.M. in
Taxation, 1972. (Martindale 94)
15 Stanford D. Hess Weinberg & Green, Baltimore, associate 1974-77, part-
$110T ner, 1977-1994. University of Maryland, B.A. 1964;
LL.B. 1966. Sauerwein, Boyd & Decker, Baltimore,
associate 1966-1969; Assistant Attorney General of
Maryland, 1969-1974; Neuberger, Quinn, Geilen, Ru-
bin & Gibber, PA., member, 1994 to the present.
Banking law. (Martindale) Outstanding Young Man of
the Year, Baltimore Junior Chamber of Commerce,
1970; Army Reserves 1966-72.
16 Scott J. McKay Wolas Hunton & Williams, partner, New York office, 1989-
1995; Georgetown University School of Foreign Ser-
vice, B.S.FS. 1971; Fordham University, J.D. 1976;
associate, Shearman and Sterling, 1976-1980; associ-
ate, then partner at Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt &
Mosle, 1980-1989. (Davis, 96a, Matindale 95)
APPENDIX C: LAWYERS' INCOMES, ANNUAL BILLINGS,
AND ANNUAL BILLABLE HOURS
Name &
Alleged Lawyers' Annual Incomes, Billings,
Amt. Stolen and/or Billable Hours
Edward S. Digges, Income: 1985: $416,235; 1986: $678,803; 1987:
Jr. $645,344. (Dresser) Top biller at Piper & Marbury,
$3.1M billed $2.2 million between 1978 and 1982, 40%
more than the second-highest biller. (Greenberg
90) 1986: billed 5,800 hours. (St. Paul) 366
366. Digges was not the only person in his firm engaged in overbilling. Andrew Vernick, an associate who
worked for Levin, billed 537.86 hours in one month, which is over 17 hours per day. During one four-month
period, Vernick billed 24 or more hours on each of nine days. St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F. 2d
341 (4th Cir. 1992).
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Name &
Alleged
Amt. Stolen
Lawyers' Annual Incomes, Billings,
and/or Billable Hours
2 Harvey Myerson Myerson reportedly had a "near seven-figure salary"
$2.5M at Finley, Kumble. (Furman 87) Prior to its demise,
"about 50 of Finley, Kumble's 250 or so partners
earned around $300,000, with members on the ex-
ecutive committee getting between $300,000 and
$1,000,000." (Furman 87) Myerson was firm's
"rainmaker," bringing in $23 million of firm's $30
million in annual revenues. (Hurtado 92) Myerson
& Kuhn had only one successful year before it
filed for bankruptcy. (Hurtado 92)
3 Wilkes "Skip" Mor- In 1992, Bronson profits per partner were approxi-
gan mately $210,000.00. (Orenstein 93)
$2.3M
4 H. Lawrence Fox Mr. Fox was a "top-billing partner." (Groner 91a)
$1.62M The average equity partner at Winston and Strawn
earned $400,000 in 1991. (Barker 93)
5 Maureen Walsh Walsh earned $200,000 in 1990. Walsh claims that
$1.48M she received only "a minor fraction of one percent
of the income of the firm after all expenses."
(Rooney 95)
6 William F. Duker Duker was "the most highly compensated attorney at
$1.4M the firm, collecting from $1 million to $5 million a
year from 1990 to 1995, the years he overbilled the
government." (Walsh 97) 1996 earnings reported
to be in same range. (Barrett 97)
7 William Appler Starting salary at McDermott, Will & Emery was
$1.1M $125,000 in 1984, the year the Appler joined the
firm. Appler never gained full-equity partnership.
(Murawski 94)
8 Gary Fairchild Estimates of Fairchild's income range from $500,000
$784T to $800,000 during period when the billing fraud
occurred. (Greenburg, Crawford & O'Brien 94)
9 Michael X. Morrell Annual salary at Akin, Gump of $120,000 to
$500T $165,000, simultaneously President of LaSalle
Laboratories, US affiliate of French pharmaceutical
client. (Torry 95)
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Alleged Lawyers' Annual Incomes, Billings,
Amt. Stolen and/or Billable Hours
10 Webster Hubbell Others at Rose firm reported that during his last years
$482T there, Hubbell's gross income was between
$120,000 and $150,000. (Labaton 94b) 1992 re-
ported taxable income was $122,074; in fact 1992
taxable income was at least $309,168. (Informa-
tion)
11 James T. Crowley In his last year at Thompson, Hine & Flory, Crowley
$385T "billed $2 million worth of business and earned a
salary of $200,000.00." (McCarty 97)
12 Timothy Flato One Latham lawyer estimated Flato's annual draw in
$300-400T 1994 at $600,000, above the firm average. (Os-
borne 95) At his previous firm, Flato was respon-
sible for annual billings of over $3 million, and
averaged over 3,000 billable hours per year. Judy
Pollner, a legal recruiter, said "There are not many
attorneys in the country who have established
themselves [as rainmakers] at such an early age."
(Newdorf 91a) At Latham, Flato brought in be-
tween $4 million and $6 million per year. (Mintz
96b)
13 Richard Salomon Salomon routinely billed over 3,500 hours a year,
$214T often arriving at work between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m.
(Samborn 94)
14 Sherman F. Taub One of five top rainmakers in firm, generated billings
$225T of $1.5 million per year. (Adams 94)
15 Stanford D. Hess Annual billings estimated to be $1 million per year.
$110T (Mullaney 94a) During the mid-1980s he was the
highest billing lawyer at Weinberg and Green.
(Bowling 95b) At his disciplinary hearing, Hess
claimed never to have billed 2,000 hours. (Memo-
randum)
16 Scott J. McKay Salary in the range of $500,000. (Vorobil 96)
Wolas
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APPENDIX D: PERSONAL AND FAMILY BACKGROUND OF THE LAWYERS
Name Personal and Family Background
Edward S. Digges, Born 1946, Caucasian, male, Democrat, Roman
Jr. Catholic, wealthy family, father was lawyer. Dig-
$3.1M ges' uncle, J. Dudley Digges, 367 and grandfather,
Walter Mitchell Digges, were justices on highest
court in Maryland. Married 1969, five children.
(Geyelin 89) Bought and renovated a 310-acre pre-
Revolutionary war estate on Eastern shore of Md.
(Groner 89)
"Partners, friends... knew Digges as a solid family
man, a tough litigator, and a star pitcher on Piper &
Marbury's baseball team." (Groner 89) Digges
"seemed to have no motive for crossing the line.
He had everything: money, power, prestige, a po-
tent family name, unlimited potential, a great wife,
and a loving family.... But Digges' appetite for
self-aggrandizement and validation proved to be
insatiable." He worked 14 to 17 hours a day, 7
days a week. (Greenberg 90)
2 Harvey Myerson Born 1939, Caucasian, male, Republican, Jewish.
$2.5M Married 1961, three daughters; married 1975, two
daughters. Father was a wholesaler of silk and
wool in Philadelphia. Myerson wore a raccoon
coat, smoked big cigars, drove a Rolls Royce.
(Cohen 89e) After firm collapsed, Myerson moved
to Florida, (Cohen 90) where a person's home can-
not be seized to satisfy debts.
368
3 Wilkes "Skip" Mor- Born 1946, Caucasian, male. Served in Marines in
gan Vietnam, awarded a Silver Star Medal for his per-
$2.3M formance in one battle. (Mintz 92) Morgan had an
"addiction to flying and buying expensive air-
planes." (Mintz 93)
367. Digges' uncle wrote an opinion in 1974 disbarring Spiro Agnew for criminal conduct. Maryland State
Barr Ass'n, Inc. v. Agnew, 318 A.2d 811 (Md. Ct. App. 1974).
368. Fl. Const. Art. 10, section 4.
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Name Personal and Family Background
4 H. Lawrence Fox Born 1939, Caucasian, male. Described by colleagues
$1.62M as bullheaded, egotistical, argumentative, used
crude language. One client said "He had a damn
good reputation as a tough-as-nails negotiator." A
former colleague said "He accomplished what he
wanted by bullying and horse-trading..... He al-
ways had an angle." Another said Fox "would al-
ways get into arguments in what was supposed to
be a friendly game of basketball." (Groner 91a)
5 Maureen Walsh Born 1955. Caucasian, female. Debutante from
$1.48M wealthy Omaha family, youngest of five daughters.
Father was president of the Nebraska Association
of Trial Attorneys. (Triedman 95) He died when
she was in high school; her mother then married a
multi-millionaire who owned a chain of discount
stores; (Rooney 96b) family moved to a mansion
with 52 rooms, bowling alley, movie theater, and
two swimming pools. (Goldberg 94)
A law school classmate described Walsh as tall,
blonde and stately, with "beautiful clothes, beauti-
ful jewelry, and a really nice apartment." (Gold-
berg 94) Before the billing fraud was discovered,
Walsh was sued several times because of bills she
had not paid. Among these were claims brought by
a bank, two clothing stores and two landlords. The
federal government filed a lien against a condo she
owned to collect about $8,000 in unpaid taxes.
(Goldberg 94, Duncan and Chanen 94)
6 William F. Duker Born 1954 in Albany, New York. Caucasian, male.
$1.4M (Matindale 97) Michael Ross, lawyer at firm, said
Duker was "hard-working, smart lawyer and a
good family man." (Walsh 97)
7 William Appler Born 1941. Caucasian, male. Father was an FBI
$1.1M agent. Collected wine, stored over 900 bottles at
firm; meticulously inventoried his wine by year,
place and harvest. Collected ceramics, went on
shopping sprees in which he spent $120,000 on
wine, and $40,000 on ceramics. Two marriages,
extramarital affair during the second with an em-
ployee of a client company. Appler represented the
employee personally against employer. This led to
a conflict of interest charge. (Murawski 94)
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Name
-I.
Gary Fairchild
$784T
Personal and Family Background
Born 1943. Caucasian, male, Republican, Episcopa-
lian. Married 1970, one child, divorced 1982. Mar-
ried Maureen Walsh 1984, two children. From
middle-class family in Johnstown, Pennsylvania.
Raised as an observant Presbyterian, later became
Episcopalian. Head of College Republicans at
Wheaton College, later became national chairman.
Classmate described him as a "Goldwater conser-
vative." Served as captain in Vietnam after law
school. (Goldberg 94) Director of Chicago chapter
of Boy Scouts of America. Had largest collection
of suspenders of any lawyer in Chicago. (Margol-
ick 94)
9 Michael X. Morrell Born 1943, Caucasian, male. (Martindale 89) Mar-
$500T ried, served on Georgetown Board of Regents,
member of Board of Directors of Kennedy Center.
(Torry 95)
10 Webster Hubbell Born 1948, Caucasian, male, Democrat, 6'5", 290
$482T pounds. Married Suzanna Ward, daughter of mil-
lionaire Seth Ward 1971. Four children. College
football star. Father was engineer who established
construction company in Little Rock. Undergradu-
ate degree in electrical engineering. Leader of
Boys' Club in Little Rock. Law school classmate
James Pitts, now at Winston & Strawn, said "He
was a painfully honest person.... We had some
guys in law school you could say, 'That guy cuts
corners, he's going to get into trouble.' That wasn't
Webb. He was straight, very straight, a good guy
and a hard worker." (Eisler 95)
Hubbell did not have an extravagant lifestyle. During
his confirmation hearings it was disclosed that he
had debts of at least $176,000 plus a $400,000
mortgage. He "wore rumpled suits and took the
subway to work in Washington," and "he routinely
had no cash and would borrow change." (Labaton
94b)
11 James T. Crowley Born 1943, Caucasian, male. Married, two children.
$385T (Who's Who 94-95) Crowley separated from his
wife in early 1997. Later that year he committed
suicide. (McCarty 97)
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Timothy Flato
$300-400T
Personal and Family Background
Born 1953, Caucasian, male, married, three children.
"A handsome former basketball star and high
school valedictorian who married his college
sweetheart and bringing home an epic lawyer's
salary." (Mintz 96b) Coached children's basketball
and soccer teams. (Mintz 96b) One former Latham
associate, upon learning of charges of billing fraud
and resignation, said he was "a hard-charging law-
yer, a loving father of three, a 'great, great guy'
who was kind and generous to associates and staff.
If he did anything unethical, the lawyer said, 'that
would surprise me.' " (Steuart 95a)
Early in career, a journalist described Flato: "Intense
and obsessed, with an air of self-importance,
[Timothy] Flato is one of Orrick's most prolific
performers.... In the last five years he has turned
the firm's fledgling project finance practice into a
top money-maker.... [Orrick partner Mark] Levie
says Flato's compensation has risen faster and far-
ther than that of any lawyer his age in the history
of the firm .... [Flato] often jokes about leaving
the law .... Maybe I'll just give up being a law-
yer and be a short-order cook," he says. (Prophecy
96)
Richard Salomon Bom 1953, Caucasian, male, Jewish, married 1988,
$254T two children. (Who's Who) Enjoyed philately, ten-
nis, photography, piano. Speaks French and Ger-
man. (Martindale 93)
Sherman F. Taub Born 1944. (Martindale 94) Caucasian, male.
$225T
Stanford D. Hess Born 1943, Caucasian, male, Democrat, Jewish. Mar-
$110T ried 1965, three children; married a second time
1991.
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Name Personal and Family Background
16 Scott J. McKay Born 1949, (Martindale 95) Caucasian, male. Two
Wolas marriages, both ended in divorce, each resulted in
the birth of one son. (Vorobil 96) Wolas' father
operated Great Eastern Liquors, one of the largest
US retail liquor outlets. (Meier 96) "Disheveled,
portly, a pit-bull litigator" who "took long lunches
... and came back with a glazed look." (Davis
96a) Collector of antique toy soldiers, which he
took with him into hiding. (Vorobil 96) Wrote 500-
page spy novel while in hiding. (Davis 96b)
APPENDIX E: EXPLANATIONS RELATING TO MENTAL HEALTH
3 6 9
Name & Alleged Mental Health Information Offered by the
Amt. Stolen Lawyers in Connection with their Billing Fraud
I Edward S. Digges, "Digges' colleagues and friends are certain this is not
Jr. the story of a lawyer who became impaired by
$3.1M drugs, alcohol or mental illness." (Groner 89)
However, a psychiatrist testified at the sentencing
hearing in the criminal proceeding that Digges suf-
fers from a "narcissistic personality disorder" that
made him unable to comprehend the magnitude of
his crime." (Legal 90)
2 Harvey Myerson Myerson stated that he was "crazed" when his ex-
$2.5M wife sued for divorce and custody. He said he was
"possessed in some way to stop this woman."
(Hurtado 92b)
3 Wilkes "Skip" Mor- Morgan served in Marines in Vietnam, claimed that
gan billing fraud was a product of post-traumatic stress
$2.3M disorder. Requested lower prison sentence. Mor-
gan's lawyer described Morgan as "the anguished
soldier trying to suppress his memories of horrific
Vietnam combat." (Mintz 92) Managing partner of
Bronson firm said Morgan seemed "to be function-
ing fine as a lawyer" and there was no apparent
mental illness. (Mintz 92)
369. In cases in which mental health information was not available, the lawyers' names are omitted from the
table.
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Name & Alleged Mental Health Information Offered by the
Amt. Stolen Lawyers in Connection with their Billing Fraud
Maureen Walsh
$1.48M
At time billing fraud was discovered Walsh was tak-
ing Prednisone to control asthma, and an anti-anxi-
ety drug called Xanax. One psychiatrist from Ten-
nessee said Walsh's memory and professional
judgment were adversely affected by combination
of medications, and by mental disorders. (Bar Talk
97) Psychiatrist said she "developed a mixed
manic-depressive state which impaired her judg-
ment and capacity for self-restraint." (Rooney 96c)
She was said to be suffering from bipolar illness,
mania, and depression, and to have been given
medication that was not appropriate. Psychiatric
report said "it is likely that both bipolar illness and
drug-induced mood disorder... contributed to the
overall dysfunction experienced by Ms. [Walsh]
during the period of 1991-1994." (Bar Talk 97)
Walsh's lawyer submitted medical reports alleging
that Prednisone could cause hypermania, loss of
ability to perceive time, and delusions of grandeur.
(Stephens 97a) Asst. US Atty. Conway said
Walsh's billing fraud was caused by ambition and
greed. "We don't believe that any of the medica-
tions contributed at all to her crimes." (Gillis 97)
After indictment Walsh indicated intention to pre-
sent insanity defense, but ultimately made an Al-
ford3 7 0 plea. (Rooney 96c) Sentencing judge noted
that Walsh should receive reduced sentence be-
cause "she suffered from a diminished mental ca-
pacity." (Jackson 97)
6 William F Duker Duker's 33-month prison sentence to be followed by
$1.4M 2 years of supervised release conditioned on par-
ticipation in alcohol abuse program, and if neces-
sary, a mental health program. (Ethics Log)
370. An Alford plea is one in which the defendant does not admit guilt but concedes that the prosecutor could
prove the charges against him or her. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35-37 (1970) (holding that
appellate court erred in finding that guilty plea, made to avoid death penalty, was invalid).
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371. Writing about the Appler case, journalist John Murawski explained: "According to the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, .... the manic phase is characterized by inflated and uncritical
self-esteem, decreased need for sleep, excessive planning, buying sprees, foolish business investments, sexual
indiscretions, and flamboyant behavior. In the manic phase, a person lacks clarity of judgment." But, Murawski
explained, some observed that Appler's stealing was "premeditated and meticulous." He quoted Assistant Bar
Counsel Julia Porter's brief as urging that Appler's "secret, improper billing of clients was not a spur-of the
moment, impulsive gesture, showing poor judgment." Murawski, supra note 143, at 1.
Name & Alleged Mental Health Information Offered by the
Amt. Stolen Lawyers in Connection with their Billing Fraud
7 William Appler Diagnosed 1983 with manic-depressive illness (bipo-
$1.1M lar disorder),3 7' took lithium and received psycho-
therapy for 1 /2 years; (Murawski 94) alcohol abuse
and narcissistic personality disorder diagnosed
1991 (both said to be caused by bipolar disorder);
at that time Appler began taking lithium again.
Unsuccessfully argued that his disbarment violated
Americans With Disabilities Act. (Shesgreen)
10 Webster Hubbell. Hubbell recently stated that instead of downscaling his
$482T life and getting his finances in order, he kept using
more and more credit cards until finally he started
overbilling clients to cover his credit card expenses. He
said that overspending "can be like alcoholism" in that
it is a "self-defeating compulsion that he couldn't or
wouldn't stop." (Ahrens 97)
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Name & Alleged
Amt. Stolen
Timothy Flato
$300-400T
Mental Health Information Offered by the
Lawyers in Connection with their Billing Fraud
Flato submitted reports from two mental health pro-
fessionals. One, therapist Steven Walsh, said "The
most striking aspect of Mr. Flato's situation is the
degree of disturbance and dissatisfaction that ac-
companied what would appear to be an extremely
successful life.... Mr. Flato was depressed and
anxious, torn between his work and family, ever
redoubling his efforts, and feeling that he was fail-
ing on both fronts. [He] developed a magical, dis-
torted belief that, in some unspecifiable way, steal-
ing would relieve his depression." (Mintz 96b) The
other, psychologist Daniel Goldstine, wrote "Here
was a man compulsively exercising, compulsively
overworking, compulsively fathering and at the
same time doing an extremely sloppy job of em-
bezzling." (Mintz 96b) Prosecutor Anne Kenner
objected to Flato's plea for lenient sentence be-
cause theft was the product of stress that resulted
in diminished capacity. "Far from experiencing an
'impairment of the intellect,' Flato was practicing
at the top of his profession, facilitating highly com-
plex financial transactions in the technically chal-
lenging field of alternative energy." (Mintz 96c)
13 Richard Salomon A psychological evaluation produced a diagnosis of
$254T "obsessive-compulsive personality disorder,"
which Robert Cummins, Salomon's lawyer, said
"drove him to seek perfection in all things. This
was compounded by the pressures that exist in the
'big law firm.' " (Nachman 94) When Salomon
was placed on leave from firm, his lawyer said that
he would return if he was cleared of disciplinary
charges. He said Salomon's doctors had recom-
mended that he return to practice as a component
of his therapy. (Nachman 94)
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APPENDIx F: THE LAWYERS' COMMENTS WHEN CONFRONTED WITH
ALLEGATIONS
Name and
Alleged
Amt. Stolen
Statements by the Accused Lawyers and Their
Counsel Responding to the Billing Fraud Allegations
-4- -4-
Edward S.
Digges, Jr.
$3.1M
Harvey Myer-
son
$2.5M
Admitted that he stole nearly $800,000 from his partners,
whom he referred to as "parasites," because he felt they
benefited financially from his hard work. He said "It was
wrong, what I did to my partners, .. . regardless of how I
rationalized it." (Greenberg 90) Though he admitted over-
billing Dresser (his client) by $2.2 million as a condition of
his plea bargain, in a subsequent interview Digges claimed
there was no overbilling, but only a gross misunderstanding
about method by which he billed. Listed hours were a re-
flection of quality of service. He was doing "value billing."
At sentencing hearing Digges said "I do recognize that I've
made some mistakes in my conduct, and I'm truly sorry."
(Greenberg 90)
In October 1989, before firm collapsed, Myerson said finn was
suffering a "cash crunch," but he predicted that it would soon
become "more profitable" than ever. (Cohen 90) He said of the
charges: "This is a set-up.... Harvey Myerson was too up-
pity ... It means being a flamboyant and big cigar-smoking
Jewish lawyer who made it, and he flaunted it. I did get uppity
and that was one of my failures." (Hurtado 92) Myerson said
contract with Shearson did not require lawyers actually to work
hours they billed for. He explained his tax evasion as designed
"to hide assets from his ex-wife who had falsely induced him
into a 'sexless marriage' and was suing him for more alimony."
(Jensen 92b)
Charles Stillman, Myerson's lawyer, said before indictment was
issued: "When people finally sort through all of the facts and
circumstances, it will be clear that Harvey Myerson did not vio-
late the criminal law." (Jensen 92b) During criminal trial, Myer-
son claimed that other lawyers in his firm engaged in overbilling
without his knowledge, and that money he was accused of hav-
ing stolen from his partners was merely an advance which he
planned to repay. (Moses & Schmitt 92)
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3 Wilkes "Skip" When confronted with allegations of misconduct,
Morgan Morgan confessed to everything and immediately volun-
$2.3M teered to turn over all his assets to the Bronson firm. (Os-
borne 92) In an interview with government's psychiatrist in
criminal proceeding, Morgan said, "Before I dreamed up
the schemes [to embezzle], I saw a lot of things, a lot of
abuse by others [in the firm], and I think this opened a win-
dow ... The embezzlements began to feed my flying habit."
(Mintz 93)
4 H. Lawrence During hearing on his plea agreement Fox described
Fox his misconduct: "I used the system of billing clients for
$1.62M personal gain.... Some of that gain I reported as income,
and some I did not." (Groner 91b) At the sentencing hear-
ing, Fox said (in part): "I would never be able to come up
with the right words for remorse.... When you're caught,
everybody always says they're sorry." "Since this has un-
folded ... I have tried to do everything I could to preserve
assets, to help the victims.... I have continued to work at
writing and hope to sell products and clearly had never ever
not considered that if I were fortunate one more time in my
life, that I wouldn't attempt to see there was total equity. I
can't run, and I don't want to run." (Ex-Lawyer 92)
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5 Maureen In 1994 when Gary Fairchild's misconduct was exposed,
Walsh Walsh's lawyer, Michael Pope, asserted that his client had
$1.48M not engaged in misconduct: "This isn't a husband and wife
story. It's a husband story" (Triedman 95) In responding to
the disciplinary complaint, Walsh (through counsel) "de-
nied that there was any impropriety in [certain] billings....
It was Chapman policy to encourage billing above the mul-
tiple of the hours involved, so as to take into account the
factors other than time found in Rule 1.5 of the Rules of
Professional Responsibility (sic). Chapman did not, in gen-
eral, bill its clients solely on the basis of time, and Respon-
dent followed the policies of her firm." (Walsh Answer to
ARDC Complaint at 3-4)372
Accused of crediting payments to other clients than those who
had paid bills, Walsh explained that "it was common to al-
low variance premiums to be applied to uncollected
amounts so that a write-off of time could be avoided." (Id.
at 4) As to certain false billings, Walsh said she "did not
always label her time slips with file numbers, and believe[s]
attribution errors occurred." (Id. at 10) Accused of altering
time records to include services not rendered, she re-
sponded, "it was not uncommon at Chapman for an attor-
ney to revise or edit a time bill to reflect the value of the
services rendered and memory of work done and not re-
corded. The purpose of a Chapman bill was not to reflect time,
but to reflect the value of the service rendered." (Id. at 20)
6 William F. After Duker pleaded guilty to criminal charges his attorney,
Duker Gerald Shargel said his client was remorseful and accepted
$1.4M responsibility for his conduct. (Duker Pleads 97)
7 William Ap- Appler's attorney blamed Appler's conduct on his manic de-
pier373  pressive disorder. He noted that after the misconduct and
$1.1M before his disbarment, Appler practiced law for 4 years
without incident and was effectively treated with medica-
tion. (Ponce 96)
372. This might be denominated the "wrapping oneself in the rules" defense.
373. Assistant Bar Counsel Porter reportedly said Mr. Appler probably "began and continued stealing
money from his firm [because] he was repeatedly passed over for full-equity partnership." Murawski, supra
note 143, at 1.
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Gary Fairchild
$784T
Statements by the Accused Lawyers and Their
Counsel Responding to the Billing Fraud Allegations
Fairchild's lawyer said his client admitted his misconduct, but,
he said, "Gary has no information whatsoever regarding
any misconduct on the part of his wife." (Stevens 94c) An-
other Fairchild lawyer, explained his client's request for
voluntary disbarment: "Gary well understood that under the
situation he shouldn't remain a member of the bar, and he
wanted to make this as painless and non-controversial as
possible." (Duncan 94c) When he pled guilty to criminal
charges, Fairchild said "What I did was wrong, terribly
wrong.... I've disgraced my profession, betrayed my
former law firm, irreparably harmed my family and de-
stroyed my life." (O'Connor 95)
9 Michael X. Morrell's lawyer stated in response to disciplinary charges that
Morrell his client "committed no fraud, no misappropriation - none of
$500T the serious violations" that had been alleged. (Torry 95)
10 Webster Hub- Upon resignation from his position as Associate Attorney Gen-
bell eral of the US, Hubbell said "It is with deep regret that I
$482T have seen private issues between me and my family and my
former law firm elevated to public speculation.... From
time to time law firms and departing partners have lingering
discussions and even disputes over compensation and reim-
bursement matters; the Rose Law Firm and I are having
such discussions now. I am confident that at the conclusion
of these discussions all outstanding matters will be resolved
satisfactorily." (Isikoff 94) He said "I did not overbill the
RTC or any other clients," (McLachlan & Berkman 94)
The plea agreement states that "defendant admits that he did,
in fact, devise a scheme to defraud as described in Count
One of the Information." (Plea Agreement at 2) Hubbell
said "I want this court to know that I take full responsibility
for my actions and accept the full and complete conse-
quences for them, which are substantial.... I hope that by
pleading guilty I've taken the first step of easing my friends
and family's pain, and only hope it will justify restoring
their faith in me." (Labaton 94a)
11 James T. "I realize I made a terrible mistake. Whatever you do to me,
Crowley it's not going to be worse than what I've done to myself
$385T over the past year." (Solov 93a) Crowley said he wanted to
pay back the money he had taken and to continue practicing
law. "It's how I identify myself," said Crowley. "Law is
my life." (Solov 93a)
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12 Timothy Flato Flato described himself as addicted to expense padding. "I
$300-400T would swear to myself never to do it again," he said. "I felt
hooked." (Mintz 96b)
13 Richard Salo- Salomon's lawyer said his client was driven "to seek perfec-
mon tion in all things," and this "was compounded by the pres-
$214T sures that exist in the big law firm." (Nachman 94)
14 Sherman F. Taub said he resigned from Tenzer "to develop other business
Taub interests, and as a result of certain disagreements with the
$225T firm." He declined to explain further to a reporter who
asked. (Adams 94)
15 Stanford D. Hess said the bank always paid its bills late and that the time
Hess inflation scheme was an attempt to secure fees that were
$110T owing. "It was an attempt to get even.... We were always
in the economic position of being behind the eight ball, of
having huge amounts of fees owed and trying to get them
back.... We deceived [Berman] into believing that he had a
discount.... I regret that I didn't tell them. I regret that we
did it." (James 95b)
Berman, CEO of the client bank, testified that when Hess told
him about the overbilling scheme, "[h]e looked up at me
and said, 'Malcolm, I've done something bad and I need to
tell you about it.... I overbilled [the bank] by $20,000.'
Later, he said Hess "pulled out a hankie and wiped away
the tears." (James 95b)
16 Scott J. Wolas reportedly called his father after he disappeared and
McKay stated that he would never be caught and even if he was
Wolas caught, nothing could be proven. (Vorobil 96)
APPENDIX G: DISCIPLINARY RULES ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN VIOLATED
Appendix G identifies the disciplinary rules alleged, admitted, or proven to
have been violated by the lawyers. The most common alleged violations are listed
at the top; the less common allegations are explained in footnotes. The rule
numbers on the table refer to a substantive category of rule (e.g. unreasonable
fees) and should be read to include the equivalent rule (if there is one) in the
Model Rules numbering system or the Model Code.
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374. Collecting an unreasonable fee, or the model code equivalent, charging an excessive fee.
375. Conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
376. Engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law.
377. Committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects.
378. Myerson was charged with violating Judiciary Law 90(4)(b), which provides for automatic disbarment
upon conviction of a federal felony that also would constitute a felony under New York law. The New York
Appellate Division found, however, that the federal crimes for which Myerson was charged were not
"'essentially similar'.., to acts which are defined as a felony [in New York]." In re Myerson, 182 A.D. 2d 242
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992). As a result, Myerson was found to have connitted "serious crimes" within the meaning
of Judiciary Law 90(4)(d) for conduct that is not felonious in New York. He was suspended pending a hearing
on sanctions. Id. at 143.
379. Morgan resigned from the California bar after he was criminally charged.
380. Fox was charged under D.C. Code 11-2503(a), which imposes automatic disbarment for conduct
involving moral turpitude per se. See In re Fox, 627 A.2d 511 (D.C. 1993).
381. Walsh also was charged with violation of Ill. Supreme Court Rule 771 (conduct which tends to defeat
the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute), and with violation of
the counterpart rules that preceded the adoption of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. In re Walsh, No.
312973, Complaint Before Hearing Board of Illinois ARDC (filed Oct. 13, 1994).
382. Duker was charged with violating Judiciary Laws 90(4)(a) and 90(4)(b) which provide for automatic
disbarment upon pleading guilty to a federal felony. In re Duker, 242 A.D.2d 853, 853-854 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997).
383. Appler was also charged with violating Rule 1.7(b)(1) (representing two clients whose interests conflict)
and DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude that adversely reflects on fitness to
practice law). In re Appler, 669 A.2d 731, 732 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995).
1-102 8.4 (b)
Name & Alleged 1.5 8.4(c) (A)(3) Criminal Other
Amt. Stolen Fees3 74 Deceit 375 Disrepute 376 Act 377 Charges
1 Edward S. Digges, Jr. X X
$3.1M
2 Harvey Myerson 378
$2.5M
3 Wilkes "Skip" Morgan 379
$2.3M
4 H. Lawrence Fox 380
$1.62M
5 Maureen Walsh X X X 381
$1.48M
6 William F. Duker 382
$1.4M
7 William Appler X X X 383
$1.IM
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384. Fairchild was charged with violation of Illinois Rules 1.7(a) (for assisting his wife in matters adverse to
his obligations to the firm), breach of fiduciary duty, and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 771 (conduct that harms
the administration of justice or brings disrepute to the legal profession). In re Fairchild, No. 94CH607,
Statement of Charges (Il1. 1994).
385. Morrell was charged with violating DR 9-102(A) (misappropriation of client funds), and 9-102(B)
(failing to keep complete records and to account for client funds). In re Morrell, No. 348-92 (D.C. 1995).
386. See ARK. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 8.4(b) (1997) (defining professional miscon-
duct as the commission of "a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects."); see id." 6(B)(1) ("When a complaint against an attorney is based on a
conviction of a felony or a crime which also violates Rule 8.4(b) of the Model Rules, the Committee shall
institute an action of disbarment."). Webster Hubbell may have consented to his disbarment in light of this
rule.
387. Crowley also was found to have violated Model Code DR 1-102(A)(6), which states, "a lawyer shall
not engage in any conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law." Office of Disciplinary Counsel v.
Crowley, 634 N.E.2d 1008 (Ohio 1994).
388. Flato resigned from the California bar after criminal charges were filed against him. In re Flato, No.
96-Q-02268 (Cal. 1996).
389. Salomon also was charged with violation of ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. RPC Rule 7.1 (West 1990)
(engaging in false or misleading communication about himself" with reference to his credential fraud). In re
Salomon, MR 10420 (I11., Sept. 23, 1994).
390. Taub also was charged with violation of N.Y CLS Code of Prof. Respons. DR 1-102(a)(7) (now DR
1-102(a)(8)) which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice law. In re Taub, H.P. No. 34195, Notice of Charges (N.Y. Sup. Ct. I Dept. 1996).
391. Hess also was charged with violation of Model Code DR-2-106 which prohibits a lawyer from charging
1-102 8.4 (b)
Name & Alleged 1.5 8.4(c) (A)(3) Criminal Other
Amt. Stolen Fees 3 7 4 Deceit 375 Disrepute 376 Act 377 Charges
8 Gary Fairchild x 384
$784T
9 Michael X. Morell X X 385
$500T
10 Webster Hubbell x
3 8 6
$482T
11 James T. Crowley X X 387
$385T
12 Timothy Flato 388
$300-400T
13 Richard Salomon X X 389
$254T
14 Sherman F. Taub X 390
$225T
15 Stanford D. Hess X X X X 391
$110T
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1-102 8.4 (b)
Name & Alleged 1.5 8.4(c) (A)(3) Criminal Other
Amt. Stolen Fees 3 7 4 Deceit 375 Disrepute 376 Act 377 Charges
16 Scott J. McKay Wolas 392
APPENDIX H: DISCOVERY OF BILLING FRAUD
Name &
Alleged
Amt. Stolen How the Billing Fraud Was Discovered
Edward S. Digges, Laurie Atkinson, a firm secretary, found a bill on her
Jr. computer screen in spring 1988 that included time
$3.1M erroneously billed under her name and those of
other secretaries. She told partner Michael Whar-
ton, who confronted Digges about phony hours
that had been billed under his name. (Greenberg
90) Soon after that Digges' principal client's in-
house counsel noticed that the company was pay-
ing Digges' firm three times what it was paying
other firms that were doing more work. (Groner
89) The client filed suit for malpractice.
2 Harvey Myerson New comptroller at Webster & Sheffield discovered
$2.5M in 1979 that Myerson had altered receipts for ex-
penses submitted for reimbursement. The firm au-
dited Myerson's expenses for 1977 and 1978 and
found $120,000 of expense fraud. The managing
partner, William H. Hogeland, Jr., then had a
"Dutch Uncle type-talk" with Myerson, and made
him repay those expenses.
or collecting an "illegal or clearly excessive fee" and Model Rule 1.8 (h), which prohibits a lawyer from
contracting with a client to limit the lawyer's liability for malpractice unless the client is permitted by law and
the client is independently represented in making the agreement. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hess, Misc.
Docket No. AG-55-97 (Md. Ct. App. 1997).
392. Wolas was suspended from the practice of law based on his willful failure to cooperate with the
disciplinary committee. Disciplinary Proceedings, N.Y. L. J., Nov. 3, 1997, at 4.
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In 1983 a client of Myerson's, Allegheny Beverage
Co., complained of overbilling. They had paid $4
million in fees during the last two years. Myerson
dismissed the complaint as a client's effort to avoid
paying a bill. Accepting this explanation, the firm
wrote off close to $1 million in billable time.
(Jensen 92a, 92b) When Myerson came to Finley
Kumble in 1984, Steven Kumble learned that
Myerson's gross income was the same amount as
his annual interest payments on loans made to pur-
chase his five houses. Nothing was done about it.
(Jensen 92b) In 1989, some former Myerson &
Kuhn lawyers gave evidence to Shearson Lehman,
a client, that the firm was overbilling Shearson.
(Cohen 89b)
3 Wilkes "Skip" Mor- In 1991, Bronson's accounting office reported a
gan build-up of unbilled time and expenses. (Osborne
$2.3M 92).
4 H. Lawrence Fox J. Michael McGarry III, managing partner of the DC
$1.62M office of Winston & Strawn, said the firm learned
of Fox's billing fraud from a "credible source"
who had gotten the information from someone in
the firm who was close to Fox. (Groner 91a)
5 Maureen Walsh An associate who worked for Walsh complained that
$1.48M she had asked him to make false representations on
his time sheets. (Goldberg 94)
6 William F. Duker FDIC's inspector general began an audit of bills from
$1.4M Duker's firm. (Walsh 97) The billing fraud was
uncovered after auditors became suspicious when
Duker began resisting requests for handwritten
time sheets and other records. (Barrett 97)
7 William Appler A secretary noticed that Appler had not credited a
$1.lM client for an airline ticket that he had not used. She
reported this to some partners, who investigated. A
month later the firm learned that Appler was billing
one client directly. (Re Appler)
8 Gary Fairchild Lawyers at Chapman & Cutler reported mishandling
$784M of funds involving Maureen Walsh and Fairchild to
Winston & Strawn. (Gibson and Gratteau 94)
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9 Michael X. Morrell Morrell was President of LaSalle Corp. while he
$500M practiced law at Akin, Gump. In 1990 a LaSalle
employee blew the whistle on Morrell's miscon-
duct after Morrell failed to obtain FDA approval to
market a drug for LaSalle. LaSalle officers advised
Akin, Gump of Morrell's actions. (Torry 95)
10 Webster Hubbell Hubbell's father-in-law Seth Ward permanently in-
$482M jured his back while fixing the Hubbells' window.
Soon after that Hubbell took on a major piece of
litigation for Ward under a contingent fee arrange-
ment and promised that the Rose firm would pay
all litigation expenses. Hubbell's mother died dur-
ing this litigation. Hubbell lost the case. Then a
consulting firm sued Hubbell and the firm for
about $123,000 claimed to be owed for work on
the case. When Hubbell's partners discovered the
fee and expense agreement between Hubbell and
Ward, they were furious. They then began to exam-
ine Hubbell's billing practices. (Eisler 95)
11 James T. Crowley Problems discovered during an internal investigation
$385M at the firm. (Thompson 94)
12 Timothy Flato A billing partner noticed that Flato had requested that
$300-400T a trip be billed to a certain client. (Osborne 95)
13 Richard Salomon Lawyers at Mayer, Brown & Platt discovered that
$254T Salomon had falsely listed his JD as magna cum
laude. This led to investigation of Salomon's con-
duct, which turned up the billing fraud. (Nachman
94)
14 Sherman F. Taub No information available.
$225T
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Amt. Stolen
Stanford D. Hess
$110T
How the Billing Fraud Was Discovered
A Weinberg lawyer, Judith O'Neill, submitted a fee
petition on one Fairfax matter. The court requested
documentation of hours billed. O'Neill then with-
drew the petition, because the documents would
have disclosed Hess' fee inflation scheme. She then
reported the scheme to James Carbine, head of the
litigation dept. He ordered cessation of the system
and began an investigation. (Bowling 95c)
The judge in the malpractice case noted that O'Neill
claimed not to know of the billing scheme until she
reviewed pre-bills after the petition had been sub-
mitted. She noted also that two paralegals testified
that O'Neill instructed them that in preparing the
fee petition, they should ignore any billing irregu-
larities they noticed. (Berkman 95b)
16 Scott J. McKay Beginning in 1991, first one and then two associates
Wolas began to raise concerns with Wolas and with other
partners that Wolas was billing clients for a great
deal of work that he was not doing. (Davis 97)
APPENDIX I: INVESTIGATION AND REPORTING BY THE LAW FIRMS
Name and
Alleged Firm Investigation and Reporting of Billing Fraud to
Amt. Stolen Prosecutors and Disciplinary Agencies
1 Edward S. Digges, Upon receiving notice of the malpractice lawsuit by
Jr. Digges' client, Digges' partners sought to inspect
$3.1M the firm's books. (Geyelin 89)
2 Harvey Myerson Some former Myerson & Kuhn lawyers made an
$2.5M anonymous report of alleged overbilling to the
New York lawyer disciplinary agency. (Cohen 89b)
3 Wilkes "Skip" Mor- A query from the firm accounting office led to an in-
gan vestigation by the firm's revenue and expense com-
$2.3M mittee, which revealed more billing irregularities.
The management committee confronted Morgan,
who immediately confessed to billing fraud. (Os-
borne 92)
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4 H. Lawrence Fox After a report of misconduct by a firm employee,
$1.62M Gary Fairchild, the managing partner of Winston &
Strawn, started an investigation. (Groner 9 la) The
firm reported Fox's conduct to the DC Bar and the
U.S. Attorney. (Groner 91a)
5 Maureen Walsh An associate's report led to an investigation of her
$1.48M billing practices, which culminated in a search of
all her files, and a 3/2 hour interview of Walsh.
Chapman & Cutler hired another firm to investi-
gate further. Lawyers at Chapman reported Walsh's
mishandling of funds to Winston & Strawn, which
had contracted some work to Walsh. Gary
Fairchild, the managing partner, then started an
investigation. (Goldberg 94) Both firms reported
Walsh's conduct to state and federal authorities.
(Stevens 94a & 94b)
6 William F. Duker A federal government auditor suspected that Duker
$1.4M had instructed his secretary to destroy or alter time
sheets. Federal prosecutors obtained her coopera-
tion in exchange for immunity from prosecution.
(Barrett 97)
7 William Appler Appler turned himself in to the bar upon advice of
$1.iM counsel after the firm told him that it would report
his misconduct to the bar. (Murawski 94, Re Ap-
pler)
8 Gary Fairchild Winston & Strawn had decided to report Fairchild's
$784T misconduct to the disciplinary agency, but
Fairchild reported himself instead. The firm also
reported the matter to county and federal prosecu-
tors (Dillon 94)
9 Michael X. Morrell After learning of Morrell's misconduct from his cli-
$500T ent, Akin, Gump fired Morrell (Torry 95) The firm
reported Morrell's conduct to disciplinary authori-
ties 23 months later. Managing partner Laurence
Hoffman said that the firm did not "have all the
facts" and waited to file a complaint until it had a
"complete understanding" of the situation. (Torry
95)
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10 Webster Hubbell When Hubbell left the Rose firm to go to Washing-
$482T ton, his partners had questions about his expenses
and kept asking him for relevant records. Hubbell
repeatedly said he would provide these documents,
but he did not do so. (Labaton 94b) The Rose firm
reported Hubbell's expense and billing fraud to
Arkansas disciplinary authorities after attempts to
reach a settlement with Hubbell failed.
11 James T. Crowley Crowley's misconduct was reported by the firm to the
$385T Ohio disciplinary authorities. (Myers 92a)
12 Timothy lato Latham & Watkins began to investigate Flato's con-
$300-400T duct in late November '94 and confronted him in
January '95. Flato was asked to resign, which he
did, admitting that he had submitted false expense
reports. (Maley 95) Managing partner Robert Dell
notified the US Attorney of Flato's conduct. The
US Attorney said that the fact that Flato had prom-
ised to pay back the money he took did not mean
that he would not be prosecuted. (Steuart 95b) 3 9 3
13 Richard Salomon Other members of Mayer, Brown & Platt reported to
$254T disciplinary authorities that Salomon had errone-
ously represented his Harvard JD to be magna cum
laude. Then the firm conducted an internal investi-
gation that turned up over $200,000 of billing
fraud, which the firm also reported to the bar.
(Finkel 94, Nachman 94)
14 Sherman F. Taub Tenzer, Greenblatt reported the matter to the disci-
$225T plinary agency in New York. (Adams 94)
393. Robert Dell, managing partner of Latham & Watkins, said that he did not recall why the report was
made to federal rather than to state prosecutors, but, he said, "we felt an obligation to advise someone, and we
do deal with federal courts more often." Victoria Slind-Flor, Latham & Watkins Partner Pleads Guilty, NAT'L
L.J., May 13, 1996, atA4.
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Alleged
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-- I- S
Stanford D. Hess
$110T
Firm Investigation and Reporting of Billing Fraud to
Prosecutors and Disciplinary Agencies
The billing inflation scheme became an issue because
of a pending claim for attorneys fees in litigation
between the client and its borrowers. (Answer to
Petition) Weinberg & Green partners reportedly
met several in 1987 to discuss how to proceed.3 94
Howse, former executive director of the law firm,
described these deliberations. "There were part-
ners who said it's not illegal or unethical and it
doesn't have to be paid back.... Others... said it
should be paid back regardless of whether it's legal
or not, and ... others... said it was illegal and has
to be paid back." (James 95a) Hess reported the
billing scheme to the client. (Answer to Petition)
16 Scott J. McKay Hunton & Williams allegedly waited 1 2 years after
Wolas one associate complained about Wolas' billing
practices before investigating. The firm held an
internal mini-trial, after which managing partner
W. Taylor Reveley III told associates that the firm
could not prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that
Wolas had fabricated bills. (Davis 97)
394. Benjamin Rosenberg, who represented the Fairfax Savings Bank in its malpractice suit against
Weinberg & Green, told the judge: "It is amazing how many people knew about the overbilling 'how many
lawyers knew abbut this' and didn't say a word." Jane Bowling, Counsel Trade Fraud Claims at Close of
Weinberg Trial, DAILY REc., Jul. 12, 1995, at 1.
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APPENDIX J: COMMENTS OF PARTNERS AND CLIENTS
Name & Alleged
Amt. Stolen
-4 4
Edward S. Dig-
ges, Jr.
$3.1M
Harvey Myerson
$2.5M
Responses of partners and clients to the allegations
Levin, Digges' former partner, said "I say in the law busi-
ness, if you don't trust your partner, you ought not to be
partners." (Geyelin 89) He continued: "We frankly left
management totally in his hands.... We trusted him."
He concluded that "[11f we were at fault, it is that we
delegated our authority to him.... But, in my mind, I
don't think that was unreasonable, knowing who he
was." (Geyelin 89) Wharton, the other named partner,
said "We all felt - at least I did - that the Digges
background, both family reputation and money, was such
that we never would falter." (Geyelin 89) He said Digges
"lived in a different stratosphere from most people, in
every fashion. He would not socialize with us. In his
background was English Gentry, and I think he fashioned
his whole life around that ancestry." (Geyelin 89)
When Myerson & Kuhn was in financial trouble, but before
it collapsed, some partners remained confident about
Myerson. Partner Mark Segall, for example, said "Har-
vey has no flaws as a lawyer or manager." (Cohen 90)
Faith Whittlesey, another partner said, "I think he's the
most gifted trial lawyer in the US today." (Cohen 90) A
federal investigator said "If there ever was a conscious
avoidance of the truth, it was his partners.... Because
they had a financial interest." (Jensen 92b)
Juror Lenora Small, commenting on Myerson's acquittal on
charges of stealing from his partners said, "all of them
were sharing in the good times and they didn't com-
plain.... We thought they had an obligation to ask ques-
tions." (Jensen 92a) Jury foreman Gregory Lambert said
of Myerson's partners: "None of them gave a s--t as long
as they were getting their money." (Jensen 92a)
3 Wilkes "Skip" The managing partner at Bronson described Morgan as
Morgan "seeming to be functioning fine as a lawyer." (Mintz 92)
$2.3M
4 H. Lawrence Fox One unnamed former partner explained "You can write
$1.62M down your fees and write up your expenses, and the cli-
ent doesn't get hurt." (Groner 91a) J. Michael McGarry,
managing partner of Winston & Strawn, said of Fox's
expense fraud: "the scenario we're looking at is close to
that." (Groner 91 a)
i i
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Responses of Partners and Client to the Allegations
-1i
Maureen Walsh
$1.48M
William F. Duker
$1.4M
+
Asked to comment on allegations that Walsh or he himself
was overbilling, managing partner James Spiotto said,
"We do not comment on these matters, out of respect for
clients and other people." (Anderson 94) A firm spokes-
man reported in October '94 that "Mrs. Fairchild was
removed as a partner of Chapman & Cutler by unani-
mous vote of the partnership earlier this year and the firm
has voluntarily contacted all affected clients and amica-
bly resolved all of these matters with each of them."
(Stevens 94b)
A spokesman for Harris Bank, (which had been overbilled
$1.2 million in 21 matters over 8 years), said "We felt
Chapman & Cutler handled the matter appropriately and
our relationship with them has not changed. ... No cus-
tomer has suffered any financial loss and we are con-
vinced it was an isolated incident." (Stevens 94b)
Michael Ross, a lawyer at Duker's firm, said Duker's part-
ners were "shocked and stunned, to say the least" when
they learned of the investigation. (Walsh 97) He said
"It's inexplicable and was totally out of character....
Bill Duker enjoyed a wonderful reputation as a lawyer."
(Walsh 97) Ross noted that "When the law firn learned
of the government's investigation, they all made them-
selves available.... There's no continuing investiga-
tion.... It was a single, isolated instance of wrongdo-
ing." (Walsh 97) An associate commented that "Duker
exhorted younger lawyers to keep their meters running
late into the evening." (Barrett 97) An associate said
Duker was often frustrated that his "subordinates were
being excessively cautious in billing for their time."
(Barrett 97) An associate joked that if one found a quar-
ter on the floor they should not touch it because it be-
longed to "Bill." (Barrett 97)
7 William Appler "'Everyone was just completely shocked,' recalls Charles
$1. IM Work, the partner in charge of McDermott, Will's Wash-
ington outpost. 'It was a deep feeling of betrayal. We
were exceptionally angry about it.' "(Murawski 94)
Name & Alleged
Amt. Stolen
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Amt. Stolen Responses of Partners and Client to the Allegations
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Gary Fairchild
$784T
After Fairchild's misconduct came to light, one partner said
"If you told me there was only one honest lawyer out of
476 lawyers here, I would tell you it was Gary
Fairchild.... He seemed to be perfectly open and above-
board. It's like when the kid next door turns out to be an
ax murderer." (Margolick 94) One partner said "Some-
how, along the way, he lost the ability to distinguish be-
tween his personal assets and the assets of the firm."
(Dillon 94) Winston & Strawn managing partner James
R. Thompson said "His reputation was that of a model of
probity and frugality, that's why we were all stunned.
But the money is not the point. When we found he had
abused the trust of his partners, he was gone." (Margol-
ick 94)
9 Michael X. Mor- No comments found in published sources.
rell
$500T
10 Webster Hubbell When Hubbell resigned as Associate Attorney General because
$482T of allegations of billing fraud, Attorney General Janet Reno
called Hubbell "a tireless crusader for doing the right thing"
and expressed confidence that he had done nothing wrong.
(Isikoff 94)
11 James T. Crowley After Crowley resigned from Thompson, managing partner
$385T Thomas C. Stevens said that "irregularities" in Crowley's
billing practices had occurred over at least two years, that six
clients had been overbilled, and that "thousands of dollars,
rather than hundreds of thousands of dollars" were involved.
(Myers 92a) Crowley then became a partner at Reminger &
Reminger, whose managing partner, Mario C. Ciano stated
that the clients alleged to have been overbilled had gone with
Crowley to his new firm. He said the alleged billing fraud
was "relatively minor." (Myers 92b) Ciano said Crowley
was "known in the business as a lawyer's lawyer." (McCarty
97)
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12 Timothy Flato Robert Dell, managing partner at Latham, said after Flato
$300-400T left the firm: "When we asked him to resign... he ac-
knowledged his mistake. He was very remorseful....
It's a bit of a sad day." (Steuart 95a) Partner Randy Bas-
sett said Flato's partners reacted with "shock and dis-
may" to the allegations. "It is inconceivable why anyone
would do something like this.... He basically betrayed
the trust of his partners and his clients." (Maley 95)
13 Richard Salomon One former partner at Mayer, Brown & Platt says "There
$254T was a rumor around for years" that Salomon had exag-
gerated his credentials on his resume. He said Salomon
was "a pathological liar... [and] the most incredible
overbiller." (Nachman 94) Another said: "People hated
him.... He was obnoxious, abrupt, and didn't treat
people well." (Nachman 94) A third partner said Salo-
mon had been tolerated despite his personality because
"he generated lots of business." (Nachman 94) One part-
ner who helped investigate Salomon said Salomon's bill-
ing fraud was not "rational economic behavior" because
his misrepresentation of firm costs did not produce pay-
ments directly to him or increase his compensation by
the law firm. (Nachman 94)
14 Sherman F. Taub Except to confirm the charges against Taub, the Tenzer,
$225T Greenblatt firm has made no comment on Taub's behav-
ior. (Adams 94a and 94b)
15 Stanford D. Hess Howard Miller, managing partner at Weinberg & Green
$110T when Hess was inflating bills, testified in the malpractice
trial that he did not know of Hess' billing practices. Hess
testified that he told Miller about the billing fraud and
that while Hess watched, Miller dictated a memo about it
to the accounting department to ensure that additional
increments would be added automatically to each bill-
able unit. (Bowling 95b) Berman, CEO of the client
bank, was said by a judge who reviewed the matter to
have found the scheme "humorous." The judge wrote,
"Berman was pleased the firm had overbilled because it
created an opportunity for him to recover a substantial
amount of money .... " (O'Brien 96) 3 9 5
395. Benjamin Civiletti, the head of Venable, Baetjer, and Howard said, commenting on the Hess matter, that
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Amt. Stolen
Scott J. McKay
Wolas
Responses of Partners and Client to the Allegations
After the internal investigation was concluded, Hunton &
Williams managing partner W. Taylor Reveley, III, told
associates that Mr. Wolas was "a sloppy pig, not a dirty
rat." (Adams 97)
In '96, after Wolas left the firm, the managing partner de-
nied that Wolas departure was triggered by discovery of
misconduct. "Scott took a leave of absence after he ad-
vised us that he had to spend more time on family busi-
ness matters," and "later in the summer, we mutually
agreed his withdrawal from the firm would be appropri-
ate, but it was for other reasons." (Davis 96a)
Gordon F. Rainey, Chairman of H & W, issued a statement in
response to lawsuits against the firm relating to Wolas' in-
vestment activities. It said, "there is no basis for the claims
against our law firm... [which] did not know about... [and]
in no way authorized [Wolas'] outside investment activities.
We first learned of the allegations against him after he re-
signed from the firm in July 1995. We immediately reported
the allegations to the authorities .... "(Statement 96)
APPENDIX K: PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES TO THE LAWYERS
Name &
Alleged Impact of Billing Fraud on Relationship to Firm,
Amt. Stolen Subsequent Employment, and Other Consequences
I Edward S. Digges, The firm severed relations with Digges in March of
Jr. 1989 and then renamed the firm Wharton, Levin &
$3.IM Ehrmantraut. (Geyelin 89) An involuntary bank-
ruptcy petition was filed against Digges in the Dis-
trict of Maryland in 1989. As of 1997, the bank-
ruptcy case was still pending.396
large firms should have "high standards of morality and accuracy.... It casts a terrible aspersion on the entire
profession when one of those [firms] that should demonstrate leadership is found to have feet of clay." Saundra
Torry, Decision Exposes the Pitfalls of Padding Legal Bills, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1995, at B7.
396. Case No. 89-52272.
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Harvey Myerson
$2.5M
Impact of Billing Fraud on Relationship to Firm,
Subsequent Employment, and Other Consequences
Myerson initially was sent to a minimum security facility
in Florida. After a year he was transferred to a higher-
security prison in Michigan. Myerson reportedly had
obtained contraband Cuban cigars and cash, and when
he was supposed to be working in the prison law hi-
brary he was sometimes drafting documents for his
appeal. He apparently irritated both inmates and guards
by his frequent assertions that his ties to high officials,
including deputy White House counsel Vincent Foster,
would enable him to obtain a presidential pardon.
(Hansen 94) He was released from prison after 3 years
and 9 months (his sentence was 4 years and 3 months).
Then he then moved to Florida, where he was to report
to a probation officer for 3 years. (Adams 97) He
bought a $1.75 million oceanfront house in Key West.
His former partner Bowie Kuhn bought a million dol-
lar home in Florida at about the same time. (Buettner)
Florida exempts homes from obligations to creditors in
bankruptcy proceedings. (Canellos 97)
3 Wilkes "Skip" Mor- Morgan was fired by Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon in
gan 1992. (Osborne 92)
$2.3M
4 H. Lawrence Fox Fox resigned from the firm to avoid being fired in 1991.
$1.62M (Groner 91 a)
5 Maureen Walsh Walsh was fired from Chapman & Cutler in May '94.
$1.48M (Goldberg 94) In '95 she moved to Idaho with her
three children. (Van Duch & Gately 96) Gary Fairchild
withdrew a divorce petition he filed in '93. Walsh's
lawyer confirmed in '96 that the couple no longer lives
together, but he was unsure of the status of their mar-
riage. (Rooney 96b) Walsh began serving her prison
sentence in January '98. (Stephens 97a) After she was
released from prison, she returned to Idaho, where she
is employed as an office assistant at an architectural
firm. (Manson 99)
6 William F. Duker Duker resigned from Duker, Barrett, Gravante & Markel
$1.4M in the summer of '97. (Walsh 97) He was sentenced to
L_ spend 33 months in prison.
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7 William Appler Appler was fired in March '91 by McDermott, Will &
$1.1M Emery. He became a solo practitioner, renting
space at Epstein, Becker & Green. (Murawski 94)
He practiced law for 4 more years until his disbarment.
(Ponce 96) He has worked as a consultant on FDA
matters. (Summit 96) He has an office in D.C. and is a
spokesman for the ephedra industry (a drug used in
dietary supplements). (USA Today 97)
8 Gary Fairchild Fairchild resigned from Winston & Strawn in May '94.
$784T Managing partner James Neis described Fairchild's
exit from the firm, saying "I told his lawyer if he
didn't resign in six hours, I was going to expel him in
seven." (E.B. 95) After Fairchild was released from
prison, he became a sales executive with Medline In-
dustries, Inc., a former client. (Rooney 96, Bar Talk
96)
9 Michael X. Morrell Fired from Akin Gump '92. (Torry 95)
$500T
10 Webster Hubbell Hubbell reportedly was undeterred from billing fraud by
$482T the investigation of his billing practices at the Rose
Law Firm. After resigning as Associate Attorney Gen-
eral in 1994, he did consulting work, including lobby-
ing for the LA Department of Airports. City controller
Rick Tuttle said Hubbell billed the agency for 80 hours
of work. The controller examined records of 50 hours
of this claimed service and found that Hubbell had
worked less than 7 hours. (Purdum 97) His report said
an itemized statement that Hubbell submitted describ-
ing the work he did for the agency was "materially
false." (Saunders 97) Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr continued to investigate Hubbell, and indicted
him twice more on other charges. (Lewis 99) In 97
Hubbell published a book: FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES:
OuR JouRNEY FROM LrrnE RocK TO WAsHINGroN,
D.C. He received a $400,000.00 advance. (Ahrens 97)
Hubbell is cunrently "earning less than $20,000 a year
at the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives
in Alexandria, where he works on issues such as seek-
ing prison release for elderly, nonviolent first-offend-
ers." (Ahrens 97)
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Amt. Stolen
Impact of Billing Fraud on Relationship to Firm,
Subsequent Employment, and Other Consequences
11 James T. Crowley' Forced to resign from Thompson Hine in '92, he be-
$385T came a partner two weeks later at Reminger and
Reminger. (Solov 93a) After suspension from prac-
tice, Crowley left Reminger, sold his house and
purchased a restaurant tavern. In early '97 he sepa-
rated from his wife and moved into an apartment
above the tavern. Crowley shot and killed himself
in October, '97. (McCarty 97)
12 Timothy Flato Flato was forced to resign from Latham & Watkins in
$300-400T January '95 (Steuart 95a) In '96, Flato's attorney
stated that "Flato will not be able to seek readmis-
sion to the bar for a minimum of 5 years and he is
currently struggling to find a new employment
niche." (Sllind-Flor 96)
13 Richard Salomon In February '94, Salomon was involuntarily placed
$254T on personal leave by Mayer, Brown & Platt. He
was still being paid as of May '94, pending the
outcome of a disciplinary investigation.
(Nachman 94)
14 Sherman F. Taub Resigned from the firm after allegations of expense
$225T fraud. (Adams 94)
15 Stanford D. Hess Hess left Weinberg & Green to become a partner at
$110T another firm four months before the malpractice
suit against W&G went to trial. (Mullaney 94a) He
was asked to leave by managing partner Charles 0.
Monk because of his conduct in representing Fair-
fax. (Bowling 95b)
16 Scott J. McKay Resigned from Hunton & Williams in July '95; he
Wolas (Davis 96c) at least partially reimbursed his four
partner-investors before he disappeared. (Vorobil
96) Wolas is said to have written a 500 page spy
novel that he would like to sell. (Davis 96)
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APPENDIX L: LAW FIRM MONITORING SYSTEMS 397
Name & Accounting/Monitoring Systems in Place in
Alleged the Firms at the Time the Billing Fraud
Amt. Stolen Occurred and Subsequently
Edward S. Digges, "Each partner was responsible for his own billing,
Jr. without review or verification from anyone else at
$3.1M the firm." (Dresser 89) However, "[t]he partners
shared equally in the net income of the firm, with-
out regard to source of income or billing levels."
(Dresser 89)
4 H. Lawrence Fox Loren Wittner, a Winston & Strawn partner, said after
$1.62M Fox was convicted, the firm increased its account-
ing checks and balances. (Stevens 94) Other
changes were implemented after Fairchild's billing
fraud was discovered. (see below)
6 William F. Duker Attorneys and paralegals who worked on FDIC and
$1.4M RTC matters submitted their bills to the firm's of-
fice manager. She gave them to Duker to review.
Duker inflated the hours recorded before sending
out bills. No one else in the firm reviewed these
bills. (Adams 97)
397. In cases in which information on firm monitoring systems was not available, or where such information
was reported in another table, the lawyer's name is omitted from this table.
1999]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
Name & Accounting/Monitoring Systems in Place in
Alleged the Firms at the Time the Billing Fraud
Amt. Stolen Occurred and Subsequently
Gary Fairchild
$784T
About a month before Fairchild's misconduct was
uncovered, the firm executive committee elected
its first general counsel, who assumed responsibil-
ity for malpractice issues, conflicts of interest, and
so on.3 9 8 Only accounting personnel had routinely
reviewed Fairchild's expense accounts. The billing
fraud also was not caught by Arthur Anderson or
Ernst & Young, the outside auditors who had re-
viewed the firm's finances. (Dillon 94) Managing
partner James R. Thompson explained that while
Fairchild had been managing partner, he was "in
charge of the firm's finances.... If he submitted an
expense voucher and said it was for firm business,
there was no one to question it." (Stevens & Woo
94a) After Fairchild's misconduct emerged,
Thompson reported that the firm established a
"corporate-type system where both Neis and I are
in charge, and there's not just one man in control."
(Stevens & Woo 94a) Thompson said. " [F]rom
now on, nobody is above suspicion." (Dillon 94)
He cautioned that "If you go too far in control, you
lose the bond of trust.... I don't want to sit here
night after night looking at fifteen-dollar expense
accounts." (Dillon 94)
9 Michael X. Morrell DC disciplinary authorities said Akin, Gump "never
$500T sought information from Morrell and supervised
him poorly or not at all." (Torry 95)
10 Webster Hubbell Hubbell used firm checks for less than $1,000 to pay
$428T for personal expenses. Checks under $1,00 did not
I_ require a second partner signature. (Labaton 94b)
12 Timothy Flato A billing partner reviewed all expense reports at
$300-400T Latham. Flato engaged in expense fraud for 3 years
before the partner noticed "something fishy" about
Flato's expenses. (Steuart 95)
398. Professor Stephen Gillers of New York University noted that one reason for the creation of a general
counsel position would allow a firm to obtain attorney-client privilege protection for some conversations within
the firm about issues relating to professional conduct. Amy Stevens, Lawyers and Clients: Do Big Law Finms
Need General Counsel? Yes Says Winston & Strawn, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1994, at B3.
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Alleged the Firms at the Time the Billing Fraud
Amt. Stolen Occurred and Subsequently
13 Richard Solomon Solomon's theft was detected 7 years after it began
$254T by an internal firm investigation and a subsequent
Price Waterhouse review. (Nachman 94)
14 Sherman F Taub Tenzer, Greenblatt allowed partners to "write off"
$225T client expenses up to $1,500 without approval of
the billing partner; the firm would pay those
amounts. (Adam 94)
APPENDIX M: SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS AT THE LAW FIRMS399
Name, Alleged
Amt. Stolen, &
Firm Where
Fraud Occurred Subsequent Developments at Law Firm
Edward S. Digges, The firm now operates as Wharton, Levin, Ehr-
Jr. mantraut, Klein & Nash, with offices in Baltimore
$3.1M and Annapolis. The firm lists clients such as
Digges, Wharton & Bridgestone/Firestone, Clorox Corp., Dow Chemi-
Levin cal, Lloyds of London, USAir, and others. (Martin-
dale 97)
2 Harvey Myerson Myerson & Kuhn filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in
$2.5M '89 as a result of financial difficulties, some of
Myerson & Kuhn which were related to Myerson's billing fraud.
(Myerson & Kuhn v. Brunswick 1990) Ultimately
some partners agreed to pay creditors $3.9 million,
which represents 22 cents per dollar of debt. (Mo-
ses & Lambert 92) Several of Myerson's former
partners, often referred to as "Harvey's boys,"
faced criminal and disciplinary charges. They suf-
fered less serious penalties than Myerson because
of cooperation with investigators, expressions of
remorse, and because in some cases it was ob-
served that Myerson had bullied them into miscon-
duct.4
° °
399. Where information was not available about subsequent developments at a lawyer's firm or has been
reported in another table, the name of the lawyer is omitted from the table.
400. For information on Myerson's partners who were disciplined or prosecuted for billing fraud, see
Appendix A.
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3 Wilkes "Skip" Mor- Bronson closed the Santa Rosa office of the firm,
gan which had been managed by Morgan, and another
$2.3M branch office in Walnut Creek. Other factors con-
Bronson, Bronson & tributed to the downsizing, but one partner identi-
McKinnon fled the Morgan scandal as the "most spectacular"
of the branch office problems. (Donoghue 95) The
firm was dissolved by a vote of the partners in
April 1999. The number of lawyers declined from
189 in '92 to about 60 in '99. (Donoghue 95, Liv-
ingston 99)
4 H. Lawrence Fox Fox had headed a group at Winston & Strawn that
$1.62M handled transactions involving waste disposal. The
Winston & Strawn remainder of the group left the firm in '92 to go to
Verner Lipfert. This move was said to be unrelated
to Fox's departure. (Waste 92)
5 Maureen Walsh In the early '90s Chapman & Cutler had about 230 law-
$1.48M yers; by February '96 that number dropped to 180
Chapman & Cutler lawyers. (Van Duch & Gately 96) 17 associates were
laid off in March of '95. (Frienkel 95) A firm spokes-
man said "We don't see any connection" between the
attrition and the Walsh matter. (Frienkel 97)
6 William F Duker The law firm changed its name to Barrett & Gravante,
$1.4M (Walsh 97) and has offices in Florida and New York.
Duker, Barrett, Gra- (Martindale 97)
vante & Markel
10 Webster Hubbell One firm client commented that "the Web Hubbell thing
$482T creates in the minds of people whether that was an
The Rose Law Firm isolated incident or something that went on regularly."
(Weisskopf & Schmidt 94) Another client who used to
retain the Rose Law Finn as local counsel in Arkansas
has given his business to other firms claiming "why
buy a problem when you don't need to?" (Weisskopf
& Schmidt 94)
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12 Timothy Flato Apparently the Flato matter had little negative impact on
$300-400T Latham & Watkins' fortunes. It was anticipated that
Latham & Watkins "Flato's failings will have little or no impact on the
firm's extremely healthy bottom line." (Rauber 96)ed
The firm added thirty attorneys during '96 and pro-
duced $300.million in revenue in 95 with 259 partners.
(Rauber 96)
14 Sherman E Taub One client of Tenzer, Greenblatt, Beryl Zyskind, fired the
$225T law firm because of Taub's departure. He was Taub's
Tenzer, Greenblatt, brother-in-law. At the time he fired the firm, he owed
Fallon & Kaplan $1 million in legal fees. (Adams 94)
15 Stanford D. Hess Weinberg & Green was harmed by the Fairfax malprac-
$110T ice suit and some other suits against it during the same
Weinberg & Green period. James Carbine, former head of the litigation
department, who investigated the Hess matter, left in
August 1996, saying "Everybody connected with
Weinberg & Green has been adversely affected." (Hy-
man 96) In '95-96 the firm was "aggressively down-
sized," "shrinking to about 75 lawyers from as many
as 120." (Hyman 96) In 99 the firm merged with Saul,
Ewing, Remick and Saul. (Conversation with W & G
partner Deborah Shortlidge.)
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